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Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California 
 
Ruling Below: Regents of the Uni. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 
2018).  
 
Overview: This is a case concerning whether the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to 
wind down the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy is judicially reviewable; and 
whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA policy is lawful. The petitioners move to appeal 
the orders of the district court denying their motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for 
failure to state a claim. 
 
Issue: (1) Whether the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to wind down the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals policy is judicially reviewable; and (2) whether DHS’s decision to 
wind down the DACA policy is lawful.  
 
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA; Janet Napolitano, in her official 




UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; Kristjen Nielsen, in 
her official capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, 
Defendants- Appellants 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
 
Decided on May 15, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
It is no hyperbole to say that Dulce Garcia 
embodies the American dream. Born into 
poverty, Garcia and her parents shared a San 
Diego house with other families to save 
money on rent; she was even homeless for a 
time as a child. But she studied hard and 
excelled academically in high school. When 
her family could not afford to send her to the 
top university where she had been accepted, 
Garcia enrolled in a local community college 
and ultimately put herself through a four-year 
university, where she again excelled while 
working full-time as a legal assistant. She 
then was awarded a scholarship that, together 
with her mother's life savings, enabled her to 
fulfill her longstanding dream of attending 
and graduating from law school. Today, 
Garcia maintains a thriving legal practice in 
San Diego, where she represents members of 
underserved communities in civil, criminal, 
and immigration proceedings. 
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On the surface, Dulce Garcia appears no 
different from any other productive—indeed, 
inspiring—young American. But one thing 
sets her apart. Garcia's parents brought her to 
this country in violation of United States 
immigration laws when she was four years 
old. Though the United States of America is 
the only home she has ever known, Dulce 
Garcia is an undocumented immigrant. 
Recognizing the cruelty and wastefulness of 
deporting productive young people to 
countries with which they have no ties, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security announced a 
policy in 2012 that would provide some relief 
to  individuals like Garcia, while allowing 
our communities to continue to benefit from 
their contributions. Known as Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, the 
program allows those noncitizens who 
unwittingly entered the United States as 
children, who have clean criminal records, 
and who meet various educational or military 
service requirements to apply for two-year 
renewable periods of deferred action—a 
revocable decision by the government not to 
deport an otherwise removable person from 
the country. DACA also allows recipients to 
apply for authorization to work in this 
country legally, paying taxes and operating in 
the aboveground economy. Garcia, along 
with hundreds of thousands of other young 
people, trusting the government to honor its 
promises, leapt at the opportunity. 
But after a change in presidential 
administrations, in 2017 the government 
moved to end the DACA program. Why? 
According to the Acting Secretary of 
Homeland Security, upon the legal advice of 
the Attorney General, DACA was illegal 
from its inception, and therefore could no 
longer continue in effect. And after Dulce 
Garcia—along with other DACA recipients 
and affected states, municipalities, and 
organizations—challenged this conclusion in 
the federal courts, the government adopted 
the position that its fundamentally legal 
determination that DACA is unlawful is 
unreviewable by the judicial branch. 
With due respect for the Executive Branch, 
we disagree. The government may not 
simultaneously both assert that its actions are 
legally compelled, based on its interpretation 
of the law, and avoid review of that assertion 
by the judicial branch, whose "province and 
duty" it is "to say what the law is."  The 
government's decision to rescind DACA is 
subject to judicial review. And, upon review, 
we conclude that plaintiffs are likely to 
succeed on their claim that the rescission of 
DACA—at least as justified on this record—
is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law. We therefore affirm the 




A. History of Deferred Action 
The central benefit available under the 
DACA program is deferred action. 
Because  much of this dispute revolves 
around the legitimacy of that practice, we 
begin by reviewing the Executive Branch's 
historical use of deferred action. 
The basic concept is a simple one:  deferred 
action is a decision by Executive Branch 
officials  not to pursue deportation 
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proceedings against an individual or class of 
individuals otherwise eligible for removal 
from this country.  
Unlike most other forms of relief from 
deportation, deferred action is not expressly 
grounded in statute. It arises instead from the 
Executive's inherent authority to allocate 
resources and prioritize cases.  As such, 
recipients of deferred action "enjoy no formal 
immigration status."  But despite its non-
statutory origins, Congress has historically 
recognized the existence of deferred action in 
amendments to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), as well as other 
statutory enactments.  The Supreme Court 
has also recognized deferred action by name, 
describing the Executive's "regular practice 
(which ha[s] come to be known as 'deferred 
action') of exercising discretion for 
humanitarian reasons or simply for its own 
convenience."  Thus, "it is well settled that 
the Secretary [of Homeland Security] can 
exercise deferred action."  
Official records of administrative discretion 
in immigration enforcement date at least back 
to the turn of the twentieth century, not long 
after the enactment of the nation's first 
general immigration statute in 1882. A 1909 
Department of Justice circular regarding 
statutorily authorized denaturalization 
instructed that "as a general rule, good cause 
is not shown for the institution of proceedings 
. . . unless some substantial results are to be 
achieved thereby in the way of betterment of 
the citizenship of the country."  
The government's exercise of deferred action 
in particular first came to light in the 1970s, 
as a result of Freedom of Information 
Act litigation over the government's efforts to 
deport John Lennon and Yoko Ono, 
apparently based on Lennon's "British 
conviction for marijuana possession." Then 
known as "nonpriority status," the practice 
had been observed in secret within the former 
Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) since at least the 1950s, but INS 
officials had publicly denied its 
existence. After the Lennon case revealed the 
practice, the INS issued its first public 
guidance on the use of deferred action, stating 
that "[i]n every case where the district 
director determines that adverse action would 
be unconscionable because of the existence 
of appealing humanitarian factors, he shall 
recommend consideration for nonpriority." 
Although the 1975 guidance was rescinded in 
1997, DHS officials continue to apply the 
same humanitarian factors in deciding 
whether to grant an individual deferred 
action.  
In addition to case-by-case adjudications, the 
Executive Branch has frequently applied 
deferred action and related forms of 
discretionary relief programmatically, to 
entire classes of otherwise removable 
noncitizens. Indeed, the Congressional 
Research Service has compiled a list of 
twenty-one such "administrative directives 
on blanket or categorical deferrals of 
deportation" issued between 1976 and 2011.  
To take one early example, in 1956 President 
Eisenhower extended immigration parole to 
over thirty thousand Hungarian refugees who 
were otherwise unable to immigrate to the 
United States because of restrictive quotas 
then in existence.  The power to parole—that 
is, to allow a noncitizen physically to enter 
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the country, while treating that person as "at 
the border" for purposes of immigration 
law—is established by statute, but the version 
of the INA in existence when President 
Eisenhower acted did not explicitly authorize 
programmatic exercises of the parole power. 
Subsequent presidents made use of similar 
categorical parole initiatives. Wadhia.  
Another  salient example is the Family 
Fairness program, established by the Reagan 
Administration and expanded under 
President George H.W. Bush. 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 (IRCA) had provided a pathway to legal 
status for hundreds of thousands of 
undocumented noncitizens, but did not make 
any provision for their close relatives unless 
those individuals separately qualified under 
the Act's criteria. President Reagan's INS 
Commissioner interpreted IRCA not to 
authorize immigration benefits for anyone 
outside the statutory criteria, but nevertheless 
exercised executive discretion to defer the 
deportation of the minor children of 
noncitizens legalized under the statute. And 
in 1990, the INS instituted "significant 
liberalizations" of the policy by granting one-
year periods of extended voluntary departure 
to children and spouses of individuals 
legalized under IRCA who could establish 
admissibility, continuous residency, and a 
clean criminal record.  Contemporary 
estimates by INS officials of the number of 
people potentially eligible ranged as high as 
1.5 million. Extended voluntary departure, 
the mechanism through which these 
individuals were allowed to remain in the 
United States is, like deferred action, a 
creature of executive discretion not 
specifically authorized by statute.  
Since then, the immigration agency has 
instituted categorical deferred action 
programs for self-petitioners under the 
Violence Against Women Act; applicants for 
T and U visas (which are issued to victims of 
human trafficking and of certain crimes, 
respectively); foreign students unable to 
fulfill their visa requirements after Hurricane 
Katrina; and widowed spouses of United 
States citizens who had been married less 
than two years. None of these deferred action 
programs was expressly authorized by statute 
at the time they were initiated. 
 
B. The DACA Program 
DACA was announced in a June 15, 2012, 
memorandum from Secretary of Homeland 
Security Janet Napolitano, entitled 
"Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with 
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the 
United States as Children." Secretary 
Napolitano explained that the nation's 
immigration laws "are not designed . . . to 
remove productive young people to countries 
where they may not have lived or even speak 
the language," especially where   "many of 
these young people have already contributed 
to our country in significant ways," and, 
because they were brought here as children, 
"lacked the intent to violate the law." She 
therefore determined that "[p]rosecutorial 
discretion, which is used in so many other 
areas, is especially justified here." 
The Napolitano memorandum thus laid out 
the basic criteria of the DACA program, 
under which a noncitizen will be considered 
for a grant of deferred action if he or she: 
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• came to the United States under the age of 
sixteen; 
• has continuously resided in the United 
States for at least five years preceding [June 
15, 2012] and is present in the United States 
on [June 15, 2012]; 
• is currently in school, has graduated from 
high school, has obtained a general education 
development certificate, or is an honorably 
discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or 
Armed Forces of the United States; 
• has not been convicted of a felony offense, 
a significant misdemeanor offense, or 
multiple misdemeanor offenses, nor 
otherwise poses a threat to national security 
or public safety; and 
• is not above the age of thirty [on June 15, 
2012].  
DACA applicants must submit extensive 
personal information to DHS, along with fees 
totaling nearly $500. Applicants also submit 
to biometric screening in which they are 
photographed and fingerprinted, enabling 
extensive biographical and biometric 
background checks. If those checks come 
back clean, each application is then evaluated 
for approval by DHS personnel on a case-by-
case basis. 
If approved into the DACA program, an 
applicant is granted a renewable two-year 
term of deferred action—again, "a form of 
prosecutorial discretion whereby the 
Department of Homeland Security declines 
to pursue the removal of a person unlawfully 
present in the United States."  In addition to 
the deferral of removal itself, pre-existing 
DHS regulations allow all deferred-action 
recipients to apply for employment 
authorization, enabling them to work legally 
and pay taxes. Indeed, "DACA recipients 
are required to apply for employment 
authorization, in keeping with the Executive's 
intention that DACA recipients remain 
'productive' members of society."  Finally, 
DHS does not consider deferred-action 
recipients, including those benefitting from 
DACA, to accrue "unlawful presence" for 
purposes of the INA's reentry bars. 
In an attempt to build on the success of the 
DACA program, in 2014 Secretary of 
Homeland Security Jeh Johnson issued a 
separate memorandum that both announced 
the related Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
program (DAPA), which allowed deferred 
action for certain noncitizen parents of 
American citizens and lawful permanent 
residents, and expanded DACA by (1) 
removing the age cap, (2) extending the term 
of deferred-action and related work-
authorization grants from two to three years, 
and (3) moving up the cutoff date by which 
an applicant must have been in the United 
States to January 1, 2010. Twenty-six states 
challenged this extension in federal court, 
arguing that DAPA is unconstitutional. All of 
the policies outlined in the Johnson 
memorandum were enjoined nationwide in a 
district court order upheld by the Fifth Circuit 
and affirmed by an equally divided Supreme 
Court.  The original DACA program 
remained in effect. 
In 2017, a new presidential administration 
took office, bringing with it a change in 
immigration policy. On February 20, 2017, 
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then-Secretary of Homeland Security John 
Kelly issued a memorandum that set out the 
administration's new enforcement priorities, 
stating that "the Department no longer will 
exempt classes or categories of removable 
aliens from potential enforcement." 
However, the memorandum explicitly left 
DACA and DAPA in place. In a second 
memorandum issued June 15, 2017, after 
"consider[ing] a number of factors, including 
the preliminary injunction in the [Texas] 
matter, the ongoing litigation, the fact that 
DAPA never took effect, and our new 
immigration enforcement priorities," 
Secretary Kelly rescinded DAPA as an 
"exercise of [his] discretion." 
Then, on June 28, 2017, Texas Attorney 
General Ken Paxton wrote to United States 
Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III 
threatening that if the federal government did 
not rescind DACA by September 5, 2017, 
Paxton would amend the complaint in 
the Texas litigation to challenge DACA as 
well as DAPA. 
On September 4, 2017, the day before 
Paxton's deadline, Attorney General Sessions 
sent his own letter to Acting Secretary of 
Homeland Security Elaine Duke. The 
Attorney General's letter "advise[d] that the 
Department of Homeland Security . . . should 
rescind" the DACA memorandum based on 
his legal opinion that the Department lacked 
statutory authority to  have created DACA in 
the first place. He wrote: 
DACA was effectuated by the previous 
administration through executive action, 
without proper statutory authority and with 
no established end-date, after Congress'[s] 
repeated rejection of proposed legislation that 
would have accomplished a similar result. 
Such an open-ended circumvention of 
immigration laws was an unconstitutional 
exercise of authority by the 
Executive  Branch. 
The Attorney General further opined that 
"[b]ecause the DACA policy has the same 
legal and constitutional defects that the courts 
recognized as to DAPA, it is likely that 
potentially imminent litigation would yield 
similar results with respect to DACA." 
The very next day, following the Attorney 
General's directive, Acting Secretary Duke 
issued a memorandum rescinding DACA. 
The memorandum begins with a 
"Background" section that covers DACA, 
DAPA, the Texas litigation, Secretary 
Kelly's previous memoranda, Texas Attorney 
General Paxton's threat, and the Attorney 
General's letter. Then, in the section titled 
"Rescission of the June 15, 2012 DACA 
Memorandum," the Duke memorandum 
states: 
Taking into consideration the Supreme 
Court's and the Fifth Circuit's rulings in the 
ongoing litigation, and the September 4, 2017 
letter from the Attorney General, it is clear 
that the June 15, 2012 DACA program 
should be terminated. In the exercise of my 
authority in establishing national 
immigration policies and priorities, except 
for the purposes explicitly identified below, I 
hereby rescind the June 15, 2012 
memorandum. 
The Duke memorandum further states that 
although DHS would stop accepting initial 
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DACA requests effective immediately, the 
agency would provide a one-month window 
in which renewal applications could be filed 
for current DACA beneficiaries whose 
benefits were set to expire before March 5, 
2018. It also states that DHS would not 
terminate existing grants of deferred action 
under DACA "solely based on the directives 
in this memorandum." Thus, beginning on 
March 5, 2018, each DACA recipient's grant 
of deferred action would be allowed to expire 
at the end of its two-year term. As of 
September 4, 2017—the day before the 
rescission—approximately 689,800 
individuals were enrolled in DACA. 
 
C. Procedural History 
The rescission of DACA instantly sparked 
litigation across the country, including the 
cases on appeal here. Suits were filed in the 
Northern District of California by the 
Regents of the University of California, a 
group of states led by California, the City of 
San Jose, the County of Santa Clara and 
Service Employees International Union 
Local 521, and a group of individual DACA 
recipients led by Dulce Garcia. The 
complaints included claims that the 
rescission was arbitrary and capricious under 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); 
that it was a substantive rule 
requiring  notice-and-comment rulemaking 
under the APA; that it violated the due 
process and equal protection rights protected 
by the U.S. Constitution; and that DHS was 
equitably estopped from using the 
information provided on DACA applications 
for enforcement purposes. The cases were 
consolidated before Judge William Alsup in 
the District Court for the Northern District of 
California and proceeded to litigation. 
On October 17, 2017, the district court 
ordered the government to complete the 
administrative record, holding that the record 
proffered by the government was 
incomplete in several respects. Seeking to 
avoid providing additional documents, the 
government filed a petition for mandamus. In 
arguing its mandamus petition, the 
government took the position that the legality 
of the rescission should stand, or fall based 
solely on the reasons and the record already 
provided by the government. We denied the 
mandamus petition, stating that "the notion 
that the head of a United States agency would 
decide to terminate a program giving legal 
protections to roughly 800,000 people based 
solely on 256 pages of publicly available 
documents is not credible, as the district court 
concluded."  
The government next petitioned the Supreme 
Court for the same mandamus relief; the 
Court did not reach the merits of the 
administrative record dispute, but instead 
instructed the district court to rule on the 
government's threshold arguments 
challenging reviewability of its rescission 
decision before requiring the government to 
provide additional documents.  Thus, the 
administrative record in this case still 
consists of a scant 256 publicly available 
pages, roughly three-quarters of which are 
taken up by the three published judicial 
opinions from the Texas litigation. 
Returning to the district court, the 
government moved to dismiss the 
consolidated cases on jurisdictional grounds 
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and for failure to state a claim, while the 
plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. 
The district court granted the request for a 
nationwide preliminary injunction, holding 
that most of the plaintiffs had standing; that 
neither the APA nor the INA barred judicial 
review; and that plaintiffs were likely to 
succeed on their claim that the decision to 
rescind DACA was arbitrary and capricious. 
The district court therefore entered a 
preliminary injunction requiring DHS to 
adjudicate renewal applications for existing 
DACA recipients. 
In a separate order, the court partially granted 
and partially denied the government's motion 
to dismiss. The court dismissed plaintiffs' 
notice-and-comment and Regulatory 
Flexibility Act claims; a due process claim 
premised on an entitlement to deferred 
action; and the equitable estoppel claim. The 
court denied the motion as to plaintiffs' equal 
protection claim and a due process claim 
premised on an alleged change in DHS's 
information-sharing policy. 
The district court certified the issues 
addressed in both its orders for interlocutory 
review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). We 
granted the government's petition for 
permission to appeal the orders. Plaintiffs 
cross-appealed, asserting that the district 
court erroneously dismissed their notice-and-
comment and due process claims. 
 
II. 
"We review the district court's decision to 
grant or deny a preliminary injunction for 
abuse of discretion."  Within this inquiry, 
"[w]e review the district court's legal 
conclusions de novo, the factual findings 
underlying its decision for clear error."  A 
district court's decision on a motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
or for failure to state a claim is also reviewed 
de novo. 
III. 
The threshold question in this case is in many 
ways also the most pivotal: is Acting 
Secretary Duke's decision to rescind the 
DACA program reviewable by the courts at 
all? The government contends that both the 
APA and the INA bar judicial review; we 
address each statute in turn. 
 
A. Reviewability under the APA 
The APA provides for broad judicial review 
of agency action: "A person suffering legal 
wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within 
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled 
to judicial review thereof. Thus, as a general 
matter, the Supreme Court has consistently 
articulated "a 'strong presumption' favoring 
judicial review of administrative action."  
However, the APA also forecloses judicial 
review under its procedures to the extent that 
"agency action is committed to agency 
discretion by law."  "This is a very narrow 
exception" that comes into play only "in 
those rare instances where statutes are drawn 
in such broad terms that in a given case there 
is no law to apply.” 
In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court 
analyzed this exception in considering "the 
extent to which a decision of an 
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administrative agency to exercise its 
'discretion' not to undertake certain 
enforcement actions is subject to judicial 
review under the [APA]." In Chaney, the 
Commissioner of the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) declined to take 
investigatory and enforcement action against 
state prison officials' use of drugs, which had 
been FDA-approved for medical use, in 
human executions. A group of prisoners on 
death row had petitioned the FDA, arguing 
that using the drugs to execute humans was 
unlawful because they were only approved 
for medical use, and not for 
executions.  Responding to the petition, the 
Commissioner questioned whether the FDA 
had jurisdiction  to prohibit the use of drugs 
in executions, but went on to conclude that 
even if the agency did have  jurisdiction, it 
would "decline to exercise it under [the 
agency's] inherent discretion to" do so.  The 
inmates then sued the FDA, attempting to 
invoke the APA's framework for judicial 
review.  
The Supreme Court held that the FDA 
Commissioner's discretionary decision not to 
enforce the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
against state prison officials was 
unreviewable under the APA. The Court 
identified a pre-APA "tradition" under which 
"an agency's decision not to prosecute or 
enforce . . . is a decision generally committed 
to an agency's absolute discretion," and 
concluded that "the Congress enacting the 
APA did not intend to alter that tradition." As 
the Court summed up its holding, "[t]he 
general exception to reviewability provided 
by § 701(a)(2) for action 'committed to 
agency discretion' remains a narrow one, but 
within that exception are included agency 
refusals to institute investigative or 
enforcement proceedings, unless Congress 
has indicated otherwise."  That is, the normal 
presumption in favor of judicial review is 
reversed when the agency action in question 
is a refusal to enforce the substantive law. 
Importantly for present purposes, the Court 
explicitly left open the question whether "a 
refusal by the agency to institute proceedings 
based solely on the belief that it lacks 
jurisdiction" might be reviewable 
notwithstanding this general rule.  This 
reservation makes perfect sense. It is one 
thing to read the APA's exception for "agency 
action [] committed to agency discretion by 
law" as including the Executive's 
discretionary decisions to decline 
enforcement, given a pre-existing legal 
tradition that had treated those decisions as 
unreviewable. It would be quite another to 
say that an agency's non-discretionary belief 
that it lacked the power to enforce the law 
was similarly "committed to agency 
discretion."  
Several years after Chaney, our court directly 
addressed the question that the Supreme 
Court had left open. In Montana Air Chapter 
No. 29 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 
a union representing civilian Air National 
Guard employees filed an unfair labor 
practice charge against the National Guard 
Bureau, but the Federal Labor Relations 
Authority (FLRA) refused to issue a 
complaint. . The opinion letters issued by 
FLRA's general counsel indicated that he had 
"determined, according to his interpretation 
of the statutes and regulations, that he lacked 
jurisdiction to issue an unfair labor practice 
complaint" under the circumstances.  
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Acknowledging Chaney's rule that "[a]n 
agency's decision not to take enforcement 
action . . . is presumed to be immune from 
judicial review," we noted that the 
Supreme Court had nevertheless "suggested 
that discretionary nonenforcement decisions 
may be reviewable when" the refusal to 
enforce is based on a supposed lack of 
jurisdiction. We took the next logical step, 
holding that Chaney's presumption of 
nonreviewability "may be overcome if the 
refusal is based solely on the erroneous belief 
that the agency lacks jurisdiction." Because 
"the General Counsel's decision not to issue 
an unfair labor practice complaint was based 
on his belief that he lacked jurisdiction to 
issue such a complaint," we proceeded to 
"examine the General Counsel's statutory and 
regulatory interpretations to determine if his 
belief that he lacked jurisdiction was 
correct."   
The final piece of the APA reviewability 
puzzle is the Supreme Court's decision 
in City of Arlington v. FCC. There, the Court 
was faced with the question whether an 
agency's determination of its own jurisdiction 
is entitled to the same deference as any other 
agency interpretation under Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., Writing for the Court, 
Justice Scalia explained in no uncertain 
terms that  in the context of administrative 
agencies, "the distinction between 
'jurisdictional' and 'nonjurisdictional' 
interpretations is a mirage."  With respect to 
courts, the jurisdictional/nonjurisdictional 
divide is a real and consequential one, 
because "[a] court's power to decide a case is 
independent of whether its decision is correct 
. . . . Put differently, a jurisdictionally proper 
but substantively incorrect judicial decision 
is not ultra vires."  But the same is not true 
with respect to agencies: "Both their power to 
act and how they are to act is authoritatively 
prescribed by Congress, so that when they act 
improperly, no less than when they act 
beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is 
ultra vires." . Thus, the Court concluded, 
"[t]he reality, laid bare, is that there is no 
difference, insofar as the validity of agency 
action is concerned, between an agency's 
exceeding the scope of its authority (its 
'jurisdiction') and its exceeding authorized 
application of authority that it unquestionably 
has."   
To summarize, Chaney holds that an 
agency's refusal to enforce the substantive 
law is presumptively unreviewable because 
that discretionary nonenforcement function is 
"committed to agency discretion" within the 
meaning of the APA. Montana Air builds 
upon the question left open by Chaney's 
footnote four, explaining that a 
nonenforcement decision is reviewable 
notwithstanding Chaney if the decision was 
based solely on the agency's belief that it 
lacked jurisdiction to act. And City of 
Arlington teaches that there is no difference 
between an agency that lacks jurisdiction to 
take a certain action, and one that is barred by 
the substantive law from doing the same; the 
question "is always, simply, whether the 
agency has stayed within the bounds of its 
statutory authority."  The rule that emerges is 
this: an agency's nonenforcement decision is 
outside the scope of 
the Chaney presumption—and is therefore 
presumptively reviewable—if it is based 
solely on a belief that the agency lacked the 
lawful authority to do otherwise. That is, 
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where the agency's decision is based not on 
an exercise of discretion, but instead on a 
belief that any alternative choice was 
foreclosed by law, the APA's "committed to 
agency discretion" bar to reviewability, 5 
U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), does not apply. 
This rule is fully consistent with the Supreme 
Court's decision in ICC v. Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers (BLE), which rejected 
the notion that "if the agency gives a 
'reviewable' reason for otherwise 
unreviewable action, the action becomes 
reviewable." We have no quarrel with that 
statement in the abstract, but as applied it 
simply begs the question: is the agency action 
in question "otherwise unreviewable"? 
The BLE case concerned the reviewability of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission's 
denial of a motion to reopen proceedings on 
grounds of material error. The Supreme 
Court held that category of agency action 
presumptively unreviewable because it 
"perceive[d] . . . a similar tradition of 
nonreviewability" to the one it had found 
in Chaney for nonenforcement decisions.  In 
reaching its holding, the Court rejected an 
argument that there was nevertheless "law to 
apply"—and that therefore the action was not 
committed to agency discretion—as the 
agency's order had discussed the legal merits 
at length. What mattered was that the 
agency's "formal action" was one for which a 
tradition of nonreviewability was 
discernable, regardless of how the agency 
explained its action. 
BLE thus stands for the proposition that if a 
particular type of agency action is 
presumptively unreviewable, the fact that the 
agency explains itself in terms that 
are  judicially cognizable does not change the 
categorical rule. Fair enough. But the 
categorical rule announced in Chaney does 
not encompass nonenforcement 
decisions based solely on the agency's belief 
that it lacked power to take a particular 
course; instead, the Court explicitly declined 
to extend its rule to that situation.  And 
in Montana Air, we held that such 
decisions are reviewable.  BLE's statement 
about "otherwise unreviewable" agency 
decisions, therefore, has no application to the 
category of agency action at issue here. 
We believe the analysis laid out above 
follows necessarily from existing doctrine. 
And, just as importantly, this approach also 
promotes values fundamental to the 
administrative process. 
First, the Montana Air rule does not 
impermissibly encroach on executive 
discretion; to the contrary, it empowers the 
Executive. If an agency head is mistaken in 
her assessment that the law precludes one 
course of action, allowing the courts to 
disabuse her of that incorrect view of the law 
does not constrain discretion, but rather 
opens new vistas within which discretion can 
operate. That is, if an administrator chooses 
option A for the sole reason that she believes 
option B to be beyond her legal authority, a 
decision from the courts putting 
option B back on the table allows a reasoned, 
discretionary policy choice between the two 
courses of action. And if the agency's view of 
the law is instead confirmed by the courts, no 
injury to discretion results because the status 
quo is preserved. 
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Moreover, allowing judicial review under 
these circumstances serves the critical 
function of promoting accountability within 
the Executive Branch—not accountability to 
the courts, but democratic accountability to 
the people. Accountability in this sense is 
fundamental to the legitimacy of the 
administrative system: although they are 
"unelected . . . bureaucrats," the heads of 
cabinet-level departments like DHS "are 
subject to the exercise of political oversight 
and share the President's accountability to the 
people."  Indeed, the Constitution's 
Appointments Clause was designed to ensure 
public accountability for . . . the making of a 
bad appointment . . . ."   
This democratic responsiveness is especially 
critical for agencies exercising prosecutorial 
functions because, as Justice Scalia 
explained in his oft-cited dissent in Morrison 
v. Olson, "[u]nder our system of government, 
the primary check against prosecutorial abuse 
is a political one.” This check works because 
"when crimes are not investigated and 
prosecuted fairly, nonselectively, with a 
reasonable sense of proportion, the President 
pays the cost in political damage to his 
administration."  In other words, when 
prosecutorial functions are exercised in a 
manner that is within the law but is 
nevertheless repugnant to the sensibilities of 
the people, "the unfairness will come home to 
roost in the Oval Office."  
But public accountability for agency action 
can only be achieved if the electorate knows 
how to apportion the praise for good 
measures and the blame for bad ones. 
Without knowing the true source of an 
objectionable agency action, "the public 
cannot 'determine on whom the blame or the 
punishment of a pernicious measure, or 
series of pernicious measures ought really to 
fall.'"  In then-Professor Kagan's words, "the 
degree to which the public can understand the 
sources and levers of bureaucratic action" is 
"a fundamental precondition of 
accountability in administration."  
The Montana Air rule promotes 
accountability by ensuring that the public 
knows where to place blame for an unpopular 
measure. When an agency justifies an action 
solely with an assertion that the law prohibits 
any other course, it shifts responsibility for 
the outcome from the Executive Branch to 
Congress (for making the law in question) or 
the courts (for construing it). If the Executive 
is correct in its interpretation of the law, then 
the public is correct to blame the other two 
branches for any resulting problems. But if 
the Executive is wrong, then it avoids 
democratic accountability for a choice that 
was the agency's to make all along. Allowing 
the judiciary—the branch ultimately 
responsible for interpreting the law—to 
review such decisions prevents this anti-
democratic and untoward outcome. As Judge 
Bates of the District Court for the District of 
Columbia aptly put the point in confronting 
the very issue we face here, "an official 
cannot claim that the law ties her hands while 
at the same time denying the courts' power to 
unbind her. She may escape political 
accountability or judicial review, but not 
both."  
We therefore must determine whether the 
Acting Secretary's decision to end DACA 
was based solely on a belief that the program 
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was unlawful, such that 
the Chaney presumption does not apply.  
We take Attorney General Sessions literally 
at his word when he wrote to Acting 
Secretary Duke that "DACA was effectuated 
. . . without proper statutory authority," and 
that DACA "was an unconstitutional exercise 
of authority by the Executive Branch." These 
are the reasons he gave for advising Acting 
Secretary Duke to rescind DACA. We 
therefore agree with the district court that the 
basis for the rescission was a belief that 
DACA was unlawful, and that the 
discretionary "litigation risk" rationale 
pressed by the government now is a mere 
post-hoc rationalization put forward for 
purposes of this litigation. Acting 
Secretary Duke's September 5, 2017, 
rescission memorandum contains exactly one 
sentence of analysis: 
Taking into consideration the Supreme 
Court's and the Fifth Circuit's rulings in the 
ongoing litigation, and the September 4, 2017 
letter from the Attorney General, it is clear 
that the June 15, 2012 DACA program 
should be terminated. 
In the next sentence, the Acting Secretary 
went on to announce the rescission itself: 
In the exercise of my authority in establishing 
national immigration policies and priorities, 
except for the purposes explicitly identified 
below, I hereby rescind the June 15, 2012 
memorandum. 
The easy rejoinder to the government's 
insistence that the Acting Secretary rescinded 
DACA due to "litigation risks" is that the 
Acting Secretary did not mention "litigation 
risks" as a "consideration." And both 
"consideration[s]" actually enumerated by 
the Acting Secretary are most naturally read 
as supporting a rationale based on DACA's 
illegality. The "ongoing litigation" 
referenced is of course Texas v. United 
States, in which the Fifth Circuit upheld a 
preliminary injunction against the related 
DAPA policy, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed by an equally divided vote. The 
"rulings" in that case are propositions of 
law—taken alone, they are more readily 
understood as supporting a legal conclusion 
(DACA is illegal) than a pragmatic one 
(DACA might be enjoined). The pragmatic 
interpretation requires extra analytical steps 
(someone might sue to enjoin DACA, and 
they might win) that are entirely absent from 
the list of factors that the Acting Secretary 
stated she was "taking into consideration" in 
making her decision. Acting Secretary Duke 
easily could have included "the prospect of 
litigation challenging DACA" in her list of 
considerations; had she done so, then perhaps 
the reference to the Texas litigation could be 
read as supporting a practical worry about an 
injunction. Absent that, however, 
the mention of the courts' "rulings" is best 
read as referencing the courts' legal 
conclusions. 
Attorney General Sessions's September 4, 
2017, letter likewise focuses on the supposed 
illegality of DACA, rather than any alleged 
"litigation risk." Its substantive paragraph 
states 
DACA was effectuated . . . without proper 
statutory authority and with no established 
end-date, after Congress'[s] repeated 
rejection of proposed legislation that would 
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have accomplished a similar result. Such an 
open-ended circumvention of immigration 
laws was an unconstitutional exercise of 
authority by the Executive Branch. 
These sentences unmistakably reflect the 
Attorney General's belief that DACA was 
illegal and therefore beyond the power of 
DHS to institute or maintain. The letter goes 
on to opine that "[b]ecause the DACA policy 
has the same legal and constitutional defects 
that the courts recognized as to DAPA [in 
the Texas litigation], it is likely that 
potentially imminent litigation would yield 
similar results with respect to DACA." But in 
the context of the full paragraph, the 
reference to "similar results" is best read not 
as an independent reason for rescinding 
DACA, but as a natural consequence of 
DACA's supposed illegality—which is the 
topic of the paragraph as a whole. In the 
words of Judge Garaufis of the District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York, that 
reference "is too thin a reed to bear the weight 
of Defendants' 'litigation risk' argument."  
In any event, the Attorney General's letter is 
relevant only to the extent it illuminates 
whether Acting Secretary Duke—the official 
who actually rescinded the DACA 
program—did so as an exercise of her 
discretion or because she understood her 
hand to be forced by the law. In this 
connection, it is helpful to compare the 
operative language used by Acting Secretary 
Duke to rescind DACA with that used by her 
predecessor, Secretary John Kelly, to rescind 
DAPA just months before. In his June 15, 
2017, memorandum, Secretary Kelly wrote: 
After consulting with the Attorney General, 
and in the exercise of my discretion in 
establishing national immigration 
enforcement policies and priorities, I hereby 
rescind the November 20, 2014 
memorandum [that established DAPA]. 
Placed alongside Acting Secretary Duke's 
language, the parallels—and the 
differences—are stark. Acting Secretary 
Duke's memorandum reads: 
In the exercise of my authority in establishing 
national immigration policies and priorities, 
except for the purposes explicitly identified 
below, I hereby rescind the June 15, 2012 
memorandum [that established DACA]. 
The obvious similarities between the two 
passages strongly suggest that Acting 
Secretary Duke modeled her language after 
that of Secretary Kelly's memo. And indeed, 
we know that the Acting Secretary 
considered the Kelly memorandum in 
reaching her decision, because the 
government has told us so.  
Given that Acting Secretary Duke hewed so 
closely to Secretary Kelly's language in 
general, it is appropriate to draw meaning 
from the one major difference between the 
two sentences: Secretary Kelly exercised his 
"discretion" in ending DAPA; Acting 
Secretary Duke merely exercised her 
"authority."  The point is that with the 
example set by the Kelly memorandum in 
front of her, Acting Secretary Duke clearly 
would have known how to express that the 
rescission was a discretionary act case. 
Furthermore, the near-verbatim language of 
the two rescission memoranda suggests that 
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the Acting Secretary adopted the majority of 
Kelly's wording, but actively rejected 
describing the DACA rescission as an act of 
discretion. This difference in language cuts 
strongly against any suggestion that the 
rescission was discretionary. 
The government counters that the 
memorandum "focused from beginning to 
end principally on litigation concerns, not the 
legality of DACA per se." But as the State 
plaintiffs point out, the memorandum's 
references to these supposed "litigation 
concerns" were limited to a simple summary 
of the Texas litigation's procedural history; 
appeared only in the "Background" section of 
the memorandum; and were not referenced in 
the Acting Secretary's statement of what she 
was "[t]aking into consideration."  
The government also asserts that because the 
Acting Secretary wrote that DACA "should" 
rather than must be ended, she did not view 
herself as bound to act. But even on its face, 
"should" is fully capable of expressing 
obligation or necessity.  The Acting 
Secretary's use of "should" instead of "must" 
cannot overcome the absence of any 
discussion of potential litigation or the "risks" 
attendant to it from the rescission 
memorandum's statement of reasons, and the 
discrepancy between the rescission of DAPA 
as an act of "discretion" and the rescission of 
DACA as an act of "authority." 
Finally, the government takes a quote from 
the Supreme Court to the effect that courts 
should "uphold a decision of less than ideal 
clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be 
discerned,", and contorts it into an argument 
that the district court's "narrow reading of the 
Acting Secretary's rationale is hardly the only 
one that 'may reasonably be discerned' from 
the Acting Secretary's memorandum." 
But Bowman is about finding a reviewable 
rationale in an agency's action versus 
finding no articulation of that 
rationale. Bowman does not say—and it 
certainly does not logically follow—that a 
court must ignore the most natural reading of 
an agency's statement of reasons just 
because it may also be "reasonably 
susceptible" to a (less compelling) reading 
that the government would prefer. The 
government is in effect asking the court to 
defer to agency counsel's post-hoc 
rationalization, as long as there is some 
reading of the rescission memorandum—
never mind how strained—that would 
support it. Bowman does not require this 
incongruous result. 
We agree with the district court that the 
Acting Secretary based the rescission of 
DACA solely on a belief that DACA was 
beyond the authority of DHS. 
Under Montana Air and Chaney's footnote 
four, this conclusion brings the rescission 
within the realm of agency actions 
reviewable under the APA. Unless the INA 
itself deprives the courts of jurisdiction over 
this case, we must proceed to evaluate the 
merits of plaintiffs' arbitrary-and-capricious 
claim. 
 
B. Jurisdiction under the INA 
The government contends that the INA 
stripped the district court of its jurisdiction in 
a provision that states: 
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Except as provided in this section [which sets 
out avenues of review not applicable here] . . 
. no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any 
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien 
arising from the decision or action by the 
[Secretary of Homeland  Security] to 
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or 
execute removal orders against any alien 
under this chapter. 
The Supreme Court has explicitly held 
that this section "applies only to three 
discrete actions that the [Secretary] may take: 
her 'decision or action' to 
'commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, 
or execute removal orders.'"  As the Court 
put it, "[i]t is implausible that the mention of 
three discrete events along the road to 
deportation was a shorthand way of referring 
to all claims arising from deportation 
proceedings. Not because Congress is too 
unpoetic to use synecdoche, but because that 
literary device is incompatible with the need 
for precision in legislative drafting."  
The government attempts to expand Section 
1252(g) to encompass this case in two ways. 
First, it points out that the AADC Court read 
that provision as Congress's effort to shield 
executive decisions not to grant deferred 
action from review outside the procedures 
prescribed by the INA. The Court quoted a 
treatise describing the practice of deferred 
action and the litigation that would result 
when the government declined to grant 
deferred action: "Efforts to challenge the 
refusal to exercise such discretion on behalf 
of specific aliens sometimes have been 
favorably considered by the courts . . 
.."  Having reviewed these developments, the 
Court concluded: "Section 1252(g) seems 
clearly designed to give some measure of 
protection to 'no deferred action' decisions 
and similar discretionary determinations. . . 
."  
The government argues that AADC's 
reasoning—and therefore Section 1252(g)—
applies to the rescission of DACA, which is 
itself in some sense a "no deferred action" 
decision. It seems quite clear, however, 
that AADC reads Section 1252(g) as 
responding to litigation over individual "no 
deferred action" decisions, rather than a 
programmatic shift like the DACA 
rescission. For example, the treatise 
passage AADC quotes to set the scene for 
Congress's action refers explicitly to 
"[e]fforts to challenge the refusal to exercise 
[deferred action] on behalf of specific aliens. 
. . ."  And in any case, the holding of AADC 
was explicit: "The provision applies only to 
[the] three discrete actions" mentioned in the 
statute.  
The government's fallback argument is thus 
to cast the rescission of DACA as an initial 
"action" in the agency's "commence[ment] 
[of] proceedings." But AADC specifically 
rejected a broad reading of the three discrete 
actions listed in Section 1252(g). 
"[D]ecisions to open an investigation, [or] to 
surveil the suspected violator" 
are not included in Section 1252(g)'s 
jurisdictional bar, even though these actions 
are also "part of the deportation 
process,"  and could similarly be construed as 
incremental steps toward an eventual 
"commence[ment] [of] proceedings,"  
Indeed, in a case closely on point, our court 
rejected the application of Section 
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1252(g) and allowed to proceed a challenge 
to INS guidance narrowly interpreting the 
terms of a "one-time legalization program" 
for undocumented immigrants.  We noted 
that "[a]s interpreted by the Supreme Court in 
[AADC], [Section 1252(g)] applies only to 
the three specific discretionary actions 
mentioned in its text, not to all claims relating 
in any way to deportation proceedings," and 
held that the challenge was not barred. The 
panel did not appear concerned by the fact 
that it was possible to conceptualize that 
policy choice by INS as an ingredient in a 
subsequent decision to commence 
proceedings against particular individuals. 
The government cites no cases applying 
the Section 1252(g) bar to a programmatic 
policy decision about deferred action; the 
two cases it does cite were challenges to 
individual "no deferred action" decisions—
that is, they fall exactly within Section 
1252(g) as interpreted by the Court in AADC. 
Especially in light of the "'strong 
presumption in favor of judicial review of 
administrative action' governing the 
construction of jurisdiction-stripping 
provisions of IIRIRA[.]"  
 
IV. 
Having concluded that neither the APA nor 
the INA precludes judicial review, we turn to 
the merits of the preliminary  injunction. The 
district court held that plaintiffs satisfied the 
familiar four-factor preliminary injunction 
standard with respect to their claim under the 
APA that the rescission of DACA was 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law." 
The government takes issue with the district 
court's conclusion on only one of the 
preliminary injunction factors: the likelihood 
of success on the merits. 
 In an arbitrary-and-capricious challenge, 
"[i]t is well-established that an agency's 
action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis 
articulated by the agency itself."   
Similarly, it is black letter law that where an 
agency purports to act solely on the basis that 
a certain result is legally required, and that 
legal premise turns out to be incorrect, the 
action must be set aside, regardless of 
whether the action could have been justified 
as an exercise of discretion. That principle 
goes back at least as far as the Supreme 
Court's seminal decision in Chenery I, in 
which the Court stated: 
If [agency] action rests upon an 
administrative determination—an exercise of 
judgment in an area which Congress has 
entrusted to the agency—of course it must 
not be set aside because the reviewing court 
might have made a different determination 
were it empowered to do so. But if the action 
is based upon a determination of law as to 
which the reviewing authority of the courts 
does come into play, an order may not stand 
if the agency has misconceived the law. 
This holding of Chenery I remains good 
law.  As the D.C. Circuit flatly put it, "An 
agency action, however permissible as an 
exercise of discretion, cannot be sustained 
where it is based not on the agency's own 
judgment but on an erroneous view of the 
law."  
 287 
Thus, if the DACA rescission was based 
solely on an erroneous legal premise, it must 
be set aside under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). We 
have already concluded, in our discussion of 
reviewability, that the rescission was indeed 
premised on the belief that the DACA 
program was unlawful. We next must decide 
whether that legal conclusion was correct.  
Attorney General Sessions's September 4, 
2017, letter expresses several possible bases 
for the agency's ultimate conclusion that 
DACA was unlawful. First, the Attorney 
General states that "DACA was effectuated 
by the previous administration through 
executive action . . . after 
Congress'[s]   repeated rejection of proposed 
legislation that would have accomplished a 
similar result." But our court has already 
explained that "Congress's failure to pass the 
[DREAM] Act does not signal the 
illegitimacy of the DACA program," partly 
because "the DREAM Act and the DACA 
program are not interchangeable policies 
because they provide different forms of 
relief": the DREAM Act would have 
provided a path to lawful permanent resident 
status, while DACA simply defers removal. 
Moreover, there is nothing inherently 
problematic about an agency addressing a 
problem for which Congress has been unable 
to pass a legislative fix, so long as the 
particular action taken is properly within the 
agency's power. This argument therefore 
provides no independent reason to think that 
DACA is unlawful. 
The Attorney General's primary bases for 
concluding that DACA was illegal were that 
the program was "effectuated . . . without 
proper statutory authority" and that it 
amounted to "an unconstitutional exercise of 
authority." More specifically, the Attorney 
General asserted that "the DACA policy has 
the same legal and constitutional defects that 
the courts recognized as to DAPA" in 
the Texas litigation. 
The claim of "constitutional defects" is a 
puzzling one because as all the parties 
recognize, no court has ever held that DAPA 
is unconstitutional. The Fifth Circuit and 
district court in Texas explicitly declined to 
address the constitutional issue.  Indeed, the 
government makes no attempt in this appeal 
to defend the Attorney General's assertion 
that the DACA program is unconstitutional. 
We therefore do not address it further. 
With respect to DACA's alleged "legal . . . 
defects," the district court explained in great 
detail the long history of deferred action in 
immigration enforcement, including in the 
form of broad programs; the fact that the 
Supreme Court and Congress have both 
acknowledged deferred action as a feature of 
the immigration system; and the specific 
statutory responsibility of the Secretary of 
Homeland Security for "[e]stablishing 
national immigration enforcement policies 
and priorities,".  The government does not 
contest any of these propositions, which 
themselves go a long way toward 
establishing DACA's legality. Instead, the 
government argues that the Fifth Circuit's 
reasons for striking down the related DAPA 
policy would also apply to DACA. 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that DAPA was 
unlawful on two grounds: first, that DAPA 
was in fact a legislative rule and therefore 
should have been promulgated through 
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notice-and-comment rulemaking; and 
second, that DAPA was substantively 
inconsistent with the INA.  
With respect to the first holding, notice-and-
comment procedures are not required where 
the agency pronouncement in question is a 
"general statement[] of policy."  "The critical 
factor to determine whether a directive 
announcing a new policy constitutes a rule or 
a general statement of policy is the extent to 
which the challenged [directive] leaves the 
agency, or its implementing official, free to 
exercise discretion to follow, or not to follow, 
the [announced] policy in an individual 
case."  
On its face, DACA obviously allows (and 
indeed requires) DHS officials to exercise 
discretion in making deferred action 
decisions as to individual cases: Secretary 
Napolitano's memorandum announcing 
DACA specifically states that "requests for 
relief pursuant to this memorandum are to be 
decided on a case by case basis." The Fifth 
Circuit in Texas held that DAPA was a 
substantive rule notwithstanding similar 
discretionary language, based primarily on 
statistics regarding the approval rates of 
DACA applications. The court read those 
statistics as revealing that DACA was 
discretionary in name only—that is, that DHS 
personnel had no discretion to deny deferred 
action if the DACA criteria were met.  
But as the dissenting judge in Texas pointed 
out, DACA's (then) 5% denial rate—which 
did not include applications rejected for 
administrative deficiencies—is consistent 
with a discretionary program given that 
applicants self-select: "It should be expected 
that only those highly likely to receive 
deferred action will apply; otherwise, 
applicants would risk revealing their 
immigration status and other identifying 
information to authorities, thereby risking 
removal (and the loss  of a sizeable fee)."  
Moreover, the denial rate has risen as the 
DACA program has matured. DHS statistics 
included in the record reveal that in fiscal 
year 2016, for example, the agency approved 
52,882 initial DACA applications and denied 
11,445; that is, 17.8% of the applications 
acted upon were denied. As Judge King 
concluded, "Neither of these numbers 
suggests an agency on autopilot."  In light of 
these differences, we do not agree that DACA 
is a legislative rule that would require notice-
and-comment rulemaking. 
As to the substantive holding in Texas, the 
Fifth Circuit concluded that DAPA conflicted 
with the INA largely for a reason that is 
inapplicable to DACA. Specifically, the Fifth 
Circuit reasoned that the INA provides "an 
intricate process for illegal aliens to derive a 
lawful immigration classification from their 
children's immigration status" but that 
"DAPA would allow illegal aliens to receive 
the benefits of lawful presence solely on 
account of their children's immigration status 
without complying with any of the 
requirements. . . that Congress has 
deliberately imposed."  As the district court 
in this case noted, there is no analogous 
provision in the INA defining how 
immigration status may be derived by 
undocumented persons who arrived in the 
United States as children. One of the major 
problems the Fifth Circuit identified with 
DAPA is therefore not present here. 
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In resisting this conclusion, the government 
flips the Fifth Circuit's reasoning on its head, 
arguing that "[i]nsofar as the creation of 
pathways to lawful presence was relevant, the 
fact that Congress had legislated only for 
certain individuals similarly situated to 
DAPA beneficiaries—and not DACA 
recipients—would make 
DACA more inconsistent with the INA than 
DAPA." To the extent the government meant 
to draw on the Texas court's analysis, it gets 
it exactly backwards: the whole thrust of the 
Fifth Circuit's reasoning on this point was 
that DHS was without authority because 
"Congress has 'directly addressed the precise 
question at issue.'"  There is no argument that 
Congress has similarly occupied the field 
with respect to DACA; as the Attorney 
General himself noted, Congress has 
repeatedly rejected Dreamer legislation. 
The second major element of the Fifth 
Circuit's analysis on the substantive issues 
was that the INA itself "prescribes . . . which 
classes of aliens can achieve deferred action 
and eligibility for work authorization."  The 
court drew the implication that the statute 
must therefore preclude the Executive 
Branch from granting these benefits to other 
classes.  
But  "[t]he force of any negative implication 
. . . depends on context."  Indeed, "[w]e do 
not read the enumeration of one case to 
exclude another unless it is fair to suppose 
that Congress considered the unnamed 
possibility and meant to say no to it."  Here, 
the express grants of deferred action cited by 
the Fifth Circuit were not passed together as 
part of the original INA; rather, they were 
added to the statute books piecemeal over 
time by Congress.  
Given this context, we find it improbable that 
Congress "considered the . . . possibility" of 
all other potential uses for deferred action 
"and meant to say no" to any other 
application of that tool by the immigration 
agency. We think the much more reasonable 
conclusion is that in passing its seriatim 
pieces of legislation, instructing that this and 
that "narrow class[]" of noncitizens should be 
eligible for deferred action, Congress meant 
to say nothing at all about the underlying 
power of the Executive Branch to grant the 
same remedy to others. We do not read an 
"and no one else" clause into each of 
Congress's individual express grants of 
deferred action. 
Another element in the Fifth Circuit's 
analysis was that "DAPA would make 4.3 
million otherwise removable aliens eligible 
for lawful presence, employment 
authorization, and associated benefits, and 
'we must be guided to a degree by common 
sense as to the manner in which Congress is 
likely to delegate a policy decision of such 
economic and political magnitude to an 
administrative agency.'" DACA, on the other 
hand, had 689,800 enrollees as of September 
2017. The government asserts that this 
difference in size is "legally immaterial," but 
that response is unconvincing. If the point is 
that the "economic and political magnitude" 
of allowing 4.3 million people to remain in 
the country and obtain work authorization is 
such that Congress would have spoken to it 
directly, then surely it makes a difference that 
one policy has less than one-sixth the 
"magnitude" of the other. As the district court 
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laconically put it, "there is a difference 
between 4.3 million and 689,800." 
Finally, the government finds "an 
insurmountable obstacle to plaintiffs' 
position" in that "the district court's 
injunction affirmed by the Fifth Circuit 
covered both DAPA and expanded DACA." 
It is true that the Texas court also enjoined 
the expansions of DACA that were 
announced in the same memorandum as the 
DAPA program.  But no analysis was 
devoted to those provisions by either the Fifth 
Circuit or the Texas district court, and one of 
the keys to the Fifth Circuit's reasoning—that 
Congress had supposedly occupied the field 
with respect to obtaining immigration 
benefits through one's children—
does not apply to either the original DACA 
program or its expansions. Under these 
circumstances, we do not find 
the Texas courts' treatment of the DACA 
expansions to be strong persuasive authority, 
much less an "insurmountable obstacle."  
In sum, the reality is (and always has been) 
that  the executive agencies charged with 
immigration enforcement do not have the 
resources required to deport every single 
person present in this country without 
authorization. Recognizing this state of 
affairs, Congress has explicitly charged the 
Secretary of Homeland Security with 
"[e]stablishing national immigration 
enforcement policies and priorities."  
It is therefore no surprise that deferred action 
has been a feature of our immigration 
system—albeit one of executive invention—
for decades; has been employed categorically 
on numerous occasions; and has been 
recognized as a practical reality by both 
Congress and the courts.  In a world where 
the government can remove only a small 
percentage of the undocumented noncitizens 
present in this country in any year, deferred 
action programs like DACA enable DHS to 
devote much-needed resources to 
enforcement priorities such as threats to 
national security, rather than blameless and 
economically productive young people with 
clean criminal records. 
We therefore conclude that DACA was a 
permissible exercise of executive discretion, 
notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit's 
conclusion that the related DAPA program 
exceeded DHS's statutory authority. DACA 
is being implemented in a manner that 
reflects discretionary, case-by-case review, 
and at least one of the Fifth Circuit's key 
rationales in striking down DAPA is 
inapplicable with respect to DACA. With 
respect for our sister circuit, we find the 
analysis that seemingly compelled the result 
in Texas entirely inapposite. And because the 
Acting Secretary was therefore incorrect in 
her belief that DACA was illegal and had to 
be rescinded, plaintiffs are likely to succeed 
in demonstrating that the rescission must be 
set aside.  
To be clear: we do not hold that DACA could 
not be rescinded as an exercise of Executive 
Branch discretion. We hold only that here, 
where the Executive did not make a 
discretionary choice to end DACA—but 
rather acted based on an erroneous view of 
what the law required—the rescission was 
arbitrary and capricious under settled law. 
The government is, as always, free to 
reexamine its policy choices, so long as doing 
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so does not violate an injunction or any 
freestanding statutory or constitutional 
protection.  
V. 
Having concluded that the district court was 
correct in its APA merits holding, we now 
turn to the question of the appropriate 
remedy. The district court preliminarily 
enjoined the rescission of DACA with 
respect to existing beneficiaries on a 
nationwide basis. The government asserts 
that this was error, and that a proper 
injunction would be narrower. 
The general rule regarding the scope of 
preliminary injunctive relief is that it "should 
be no more burdensome to the defendant than 
necessary to provide complete relief to the 
plaintiffs before the court."  
It is also important to note that the claim 
underlying the injunction here is an arbitrary-
and-capricious challenge under the APA.  In 
this context, "[w]hen a reviewing court 
determines that agency regulations are 
unlawful, the ordinary result is that the rules 
are vacated—not that their application to the 
individual petitioners is proscribed."  As 
Justice Blackmun explained while "writing 
in dissent but apparently expressing the view 
of all nine Justices on this question,"  
The Administrative Procedure Act permits 
suit to be brought by any person "adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action." In 
some cases the "agency action" will consist 
of a rule of broad applicability; and if the 
plaintiff prevails, the result is that the rule is 
invalidated, not simply that the court forbids 
its application to a particular 
individual. Under these circumstances a 
single plaintiff, so long as he is injured by the 
rule, may obtain "programmatic" relief that 
affects the rights of parties not before the 
court. 
A final principle is also relevant: the need for 
uniformity in immigration policy.  As the 
Fifth Circuit stated when it affirmed the 
nationwide injunction against DAPA,  "the 
Constitution requires an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization; Congress has instructed that 
the immigration laws of the United States 
should be enforced vigorously and uniformly; 
and the Supreme Court has described 
immigration policy as a comprehensive 
and unified system."  Allowing uneven 
application of nationwide immigration policy 
flies in the face of these requirements. 
In its briefing, the government fails to explain 
how the district court could have crafted a 
narrower injunction that would provide 
complete relief to the plaintiffs, including the 
entity plaintiffs.  Nor does it provide 
compelling reasons to deviate from the 
normal rule in APA cases, or to disregard the 
need for uniformity in national 
immigration policy. The one argument it 
does offer on this latter point—that 
"[d]eferred action is itself a departure from 
vigorous and uniform enforcement of the 
immigration laws," and that "enjoining the 
rescission of DACA on a nationwide basis . . 
. increases rather than lessens that 
departure"—is a red herring. 
DACA is national immigration policy, and 
an injunction that applies that policy to some 
individuals while rescinding it as to others is 
inimical to the principle of uniformity. 
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We therefore conclude that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in issuing a 
nationwide injunction. Such relief is 
commonplace in APA cases, promotes 
uniformity in immigration enforcement, and 
is necessary to provide the plaintiffs here 
with complete redress. 
VI. 
We turn next to the district court's treatment 
of the government's motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim. The government 
moved to dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims; the 
district court dismissed some claims and 
denied the government's motion as to others. 
We take each claim in turn.  
A. APA: Arbitrary-and-Capricious 
For the reasons stated above in discussing 
plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, 
the district court was correct to deny the 
government's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' 
claim that the DACA rescission was arbitrary 
and capricious under the APA.  
B. APA: Notice-and-Comment 
Plaintiffs also assert that the rescission of 
DACA is in fact a substantive rule under the 
APA, and that it therefore could not be 
validly accomplished without notice-and-
comment procedures. 
As touched on above with respect to DACA 
itself, an agency pronouncement is excluded 
from the APA's requirement of notice-and-
comment procedures if it constitutes a 
"general statement[] of policy." General 
statements of policy are those that "advise the 
public prospectively of the manner in which 
the agency proposes to exercise a 
discretionary power."  "To qualify as a 
general statement of policy . . . a directive 
must not establish a binding norm and must 
leave agency officials free to consider the 
individual facts in the various cases that arise 
and to exercise discretion."  
The district court held that because DACA 
itself was a general statement of policy that 
did not require notice and comment, it could 
also be rescinded without those procedures. 
This proposition finds support in Mada-
Luna, in which "we conclude[d] that [a 
deferred-action Operating Instruction] 
constituted a general statement of policy, and 
thus could be validly repealed and 
superseded without notice-and-comment 
proceedings." Plaintiffs contest this 
conclusion, arguing that the 
DACA rescission was a binding rule, even 
though DACA's adoption was a general 
statement of policy. They provide two bases 
for this assertion. 
First, plaintiffs argue that the rescission is 
binding because it requires DHS officials to 
reject new DACA applications and (after a 
certain date) renewal applications. It is true 
that Acting Secretary Duke's rescission 
memorandum makes rejections of DACA 
applications mandatory. But the relevant 
question under the rescission memorandum is 
not whether DHS officials retained discretion 
to accept applications for a program that no 
longer existed; instead, the question is 
whether DHS officials retained discretion to 
grant deferred action and collateral benefits 
outside of the (now-cancelled) DACA 
program. 
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For its part, the government asserts that the 
rescission memorandum made clear that, 
despite the rescission, "future deferred action 
requests will be 'adjudicat[ed] . . . on an 
individual, case-by-case basis.'" Mildly put, 
this assertion mischaracterizes the 
memorandum. The quoted language refers to 
the treatment of only (a) initial applications 
pending on the date of the rescission, and (b) 
renewal applications filed within the one-
month wind-down period. It does not refer to 
how future requests for deferred action 
outside the DACA program would be 
handled. Still, the rescission memorandum 
also did not forbid the agency from granting 
such requests, and it acknowledged the 
background principle of deferred action as 
"an act of prosecutorial discretion meant to be 
applied only on an individualized case-by-
case basis." And the memorandum closed by 
stating that "no limitations are placed by this 
guidance on the otherwise lawful 
enforcement or litigation prerogatives of 
DHS"—presumably including granting 
deferred action on a case-by-case basis to 
some people who would have been eligible 
for DACA. 
If allowed to go into effect, the rescission of 
DACA would undoubtedly result in the loss 
of deferred action for the vast majority of the 
689,800 people who rely on the program. But 
the rescission memorandum does not 
mandate that result because it leaves in place 
the background principle that deferred action 
is available on a case-by-case basis. 
Plaintiffs' primary argument against this 
conclusion is a citation to United States ex 
rel. Parco v. Morris, which is said to be "the 
only other decision to address an Executive 
Branch decision to terminate a deferred-
action program without undergoing notice-
and-comment rulemaking." But as the district 
court noted, the key factor in that case was 
the contention that under the policy at issue, 
"'discretion' was exercised favorably in all 
cases of a certain kind and then, after repeal 
of the regulation, unfavorably in each such 
case."  DACA, by contrast, explicitly 
contemplated case-by-case discretion, and its 
rescission appears to have left in place 
background principles of 
prosecutorial discretion. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the DACA 
rescission is not a general policy statement 
because it is binding as a legal interpretation 
that a DACA-like program would be illegal. 
But again, this argument answers the wrong 
question. The Acting Secretary's legal 
conclusion that a DACA-like program is 
unlawful does not constrain the discretion of 
line-level DHS employees to grant deferred 
action on a case-by-case basis, and those 
employees lack authority to institute such an 
agency-wide program in the first place. And 
plaintiffs do not point to any reason 
why this Acting Secretary's legal conclusion 
about DACA would bind subsequent 
Secretaries if they were to disagree with its 
reasoning—just as Acting Secretary Duke 
reversed course from previous Secretaries 
who concluded DACA was legal. This is not 
a "new 'binding rule of substantive law,'" , 
affecting the rights of the people and entities 
regulated by the agency; it is an interpretation 
of the agency's own power, and plaintiffs do 
not explain why it should be read as binding 
future DHS Secretaries. The district court 
correctly dismissed plaintiffs' notice-and-
comment claims. 
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C. Due Process: Deferred Action 
The Garcia plaintiffs—individual DACA 
recipients—have brought a substantive due 
process claim alleging that the rescission 
deprived them of protected interests in their 
DACA designation, including the renewal of 
their benefits. The district court dismissed 
this claim, holding that there is no protected 
entitlement in either the initial grant of 
deferred action under DACA or the renewal 
of benefits for existing DACA enrollees. On 
appeal, the Garcia plaintiffs challenge this 
ruling only as it applies to the renewal of 
DACA benefits, not as to the initial grant. 
"A threshold requirement to a substantive or 
procedural due process claim is the plaintiff's 
showing of a liberty or property interest 
protected by the Constitution."  It is possible 
to have a property interest in a government 
benefit, but "a person clearly must have more 
than an abstract need or desire for [the 
benefit]. He must have more than a unilateral 
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to 
it."  Although "a benefit is not a protected 
entitlement if government officials may grant 
or deny it in their discretion," , a legitimate 
claim of entitlement may exist where there 
are "rules or mutually explicit understandings 
that support [a plaintiff's] claim of 
entitlement to the benefit . . . ."  The dispute 
here focuses on whether such "mutually 
explicit understandings" existed between the 
government and DACA recipients with 
respect to the renewal of DACA benefits. 
The Garcia plaintiffs assert that they and the 
government "'mutually' understood that 
DACA recipients would be able to renew 
their benefits and protection on an ongoing 
basis so long as they fulfilled the program's 
criteria." But this argument is undercut by the 
DACA FAQs published by DHS, which 
explicitly state that "USCIS retains the 
ultimate discretion to determine whether 
deferred action is appropriate in any given 
case even if the [renewal] guidelines are 
met." The FAQs also state that any 
individual's "deferred action may be 
terminated at any time, with or without a 
Notice of Intent to Terminate, at DHS's 
discretion," and Secretary Napolitano's 
DACA memorandum claims that it "confers 
no substantive right, immigration status or 
pathway to citizenship." Whether or not these 
provisions are legally operative, they do not 
indicate that the government shared 
plaintiffs' expectation of presumptive 
renewal. 
Attempting to overcome this facially 
discretionary language, plaintiffs emphasize 
several factors. First, they say, the very 
nature of the DACA project was such that 
presumptive renewal was required to 
encourage people to participate; a two-year 
term with no presumption of renewal would 
not have been attractive enough to outweigh 
the risks to the applicants. Moreover, 
Secretary Napolitano's DACA memorandum 
itself states that grants of deferred action 
under DACA will be "subject to renewal," 
and the actual criteria for renewal were 
"nondiscretionary" in nature. Finally, the 
plaintiffs point to a more than 99% approval 
rate for adjudicated DACA renewal 
applications. This, they assert, is powerful 
evidence of a mutual understanding of 
presumptive renewal. 
 295 
All these points might have revealed a 
question of fact as to whether a mutually 
explicit understanding of presumptive 
renewal existed—thereby avoiding dismissal 
on the pleadings—if plaintiffs were bringing 
a claim that, for example, their individual 
DACA renewals were denied for no good 
reason. But it is hard to see how an 
expectation of renewal within the confines of 
the existing DACA policy could have created 
a mutually explicit understanding that the 
DACA program itself would not be 
terminated wholesale. That is, a 99% renewal 
rate under DACA provides no evidence that 
the government shared an understanding that 
the DACA program would continue existing 
indefinitely to provide such renewals. None 
of plaintiffs' cited authorities appear to 
address this kind of claim. 
While we may agree with much of what 
plaintiffs say about the cruelty of ending a 
program upon which so many have come to 
rely, we do not believe they have plausibly 
alleged a "mutually explicit understanding" 
that DACA—created by executive action in a 
politically polarized policy area and 
explicitly couched in discretionary 
language—would exist indefinitely, 
including through a change in presidential 
administrations. On that basis, we affirm the 
district court's dismissal. 
D. Due Process: Information-Sharing 
Several of the complaints allege a different 
due process theory: DACA recipients had a 
protected interest based on the government's 
representations that the personal information 
they submitted with their applications would 
not be used for enforcement purposes, and 
the government violated this interest by 
changing its policy to allow such use. The 
district court held that the plaintiffs had 
plausibly alleged facts that state a claim 
under this theory. 
As with their other due process claim, the 
question whether DACA recipients enjoy a 
protected due process right protecting them 
from having the government use their 
information against them for enforcement 
purposes turns on the existence of a 
"mutually explicit understanding[]" on that 
point between the government and DACA 
recipients. The DACA FAQs published by 
DHS state the following information-use 
policy: 
Information provided in this request is 
protected from disclosure to ICE and CBP 
for the purpose of immigration enforcement 
proceedings unless the requestor meets the 
criteria for the issuance of a Notice to Appear 
or a referral to ICE under the criteria set forth 
in USCIS' Notice to Appear guidance. 
Individuals whose cases are deferred 
pursuant to DACA will not be referred to 
ICE. The information may be shared with 
national security and law 
enforcement agencies, including ICE and 
CBP, for purposes other than removal, 
including for assistance in the consideration 
of DACA, to identify or prevent fraudulent 
claims, for national security purposes, or for 
the investigation or prosecution of a criminal 
offense. The above information sharing 
policy covers family members and guardians, 
in addition to the requestor. This policy, 
which may be modified, superseded, or 
rescinded at any time without notice, is not 
intended to, does not, and may not be relied 
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upon to create any right or benefit, 
substantive or procedural, enforceable by law 
by any party in any administrative, civil, or 
criminal matter. 
The statement that applicant information "is 
protected from disclosure" to the 
enforcement arms of DHS is a strong 
commitment, and plaintiffs plausibly allege 
that DACA recipients reasonably relied on it. 
The government of course points to the 
express caveat that the information-sharing 
policy "may be modified, superseded or 
rescinded at any time." But as the district 
court held, this qualifier is ambiguous as to 
whether it allows the government to change 
its policy only prospectively, or also with 
respect to information already received—and 
this ambiguity presents a fact question not 
amenable to resolution on the pleadings. 
Plaintiffs' interpretation that a policy change 
would only apply prospectively is a plausible 
one, given that the policy is written in terms 
of what will happen to "[i]nformation 
provided in this request," rather than DACA-
derived information generally. (emphasis 
added). It is at least reasonable to think that a 
change in the policy would apply only to 
those applications submitted after that change 
takes effect. And while the government also 
relies on the language stating that the policy 
does not create enforceable rights, such a 
disclaimer by an agency about what its 
statements do and do not constitute as a legal 
matter are not dispositive.  Plaintiffs have 
plausibly alleged a mutually explicit 
understanding that DACA applicants' 
information would be protected from 
disclosure. 
The government argues in the alternative that 
plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that 
DHS actually changed its policy. Plaintiffs' 
allegations rest on a set of FAQs about the 
DACA rescission that DHS published the 
same day it issued the rescission 
memorandum, September 5, 2017. In those 
rescission FAQs, the previous language 
stating that personal information "is 
protected from disclosure" has been replaced 
with the following: 
Information provided to USCIS in DACA 
requests will not be proactively provided to 
ICE and CBP for the purpose of immigration 
enforcement proceedings, unless the 
requestor meets the criteria for the issuance 
of a Notice to Appear or a referral to ICE 
under the criteria set forth in USCIS' Notice 
to Appear guidance.  
The government's first response—that the 
differing language in the two FAQs does not 
actually reflect a difference in policy—is 
hard to swallow. It does not take much 
parsing of the text to see the significant 
difference between "protect[ing]" something 
from "disclosure" on the one hand, and 
merely declining to "proactively provide[]" it 
on the other. This is especially so when the 
entities in question (and to which USCIS 
presumably would now provide 
information reactively) are fellow 
components of the same umbrella agency. 
Changing gears, the government also points 
to yet a third set of FAQs, published months 
after the rescission and not part of the record 
in this case, which state: 
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Information provided to USCIS for the 
DACA process will not make you an 
immigration priority for that reason alone. 
That information will only be proactively 
provided to ICE or CBP if the requestor 
meets the criteria for the issuance of a Notice 
To Appear or a referral to ICE under the 
criteria set forth in USCIS' Notice to Appear 
guidance. This information-sharing policy 
has not changed in any way since it was first 
announced, including as a result of the Sept. 
5, 2017 memo starting a wind-down of the 
DACA policy. 
The government notes that a district court 
relied on FAQs containing this language in 
parallel litigation to dismiss a nearly identical 
information-use due process claim.  
But this case is critically different because 
in Batalla Vidal the plaintiffs had attached 
the new version of the FAQs to their 
complaint. As the court there explained, 
"Plaintiffs . . . have effectively pleaded 
themselves out of court by relying on a 
document that contradicts their otherwise-
unsupported allegation of a change to DHS's 
information-use policy."  By contrast, here 
the most recent FAQs were not attached to or 
referenced in any of the complaints—indeed, 
they postdate the filing of the complaints. 
Therefore, the normal rule applies: materials 
outside the complaint cannot be considered 
on a motion to dismiss.  
Even if it could be considered, this newest 
FAQ would not conclusively resolve the 
question of fact surrounding DHS's current 
information-sharing policy because it still 
contains the language that suggests a change 
from the pre-rescission policy.  Plaintiffs 
have plausibly alleged that DHS has changed 
its policy. 
Finally, in order to state a substantive due 
process claim, plaintiffs must allege conduct 
that "shock[s] the conscience and offend[s] 
the community's sense of fair play and 
decency." The government makes a passing 
argument that this standard is not satisfied 
because the information-sharing policy has 
always contained some exceptions, but as 
the Garcia plaintiffs put it, "[a]pplicants 
accepted those limited, acknowledged risks 
when they applied for DACA. They did not 
accept the risk that the government would 
abandon the other assurances that were 
'crucial' to 'inducing them to apply for 
DACA.'" (alterations incorporated). We 
agree.  Plaintiffs have stated a due process 
claim based on the alleged change in DHS's 
information-sharing policy. 
 
E. Equal Protection 
The district court also held that plaintiffs 
stated a viable equal protection claim by 
plausibly alleging that the DACA rescission 
disproportionately affected Latinos and 
individuals of Mexican descent and was 
motivated by discriminatory animus.  
Because the district court denied the 
government's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' 
equal protection claim at the pleading stage, 
we take all of the complaints' allegations as 
true and construe them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs We agree with the 
district court that plaintiffs plausibly alleged 
an equal protection claim. 
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Most significantly, plaintiffs allege that the 
rescission of DACA disproportionately 
impacts Latinos and individuals of Mexican 
heritage, who account for 93% of DACA 
recipients. The complaints also allege a 
history of animus toward persons of Hispanic 
descent evidenced by both pre-presidential 
and post-presidential statements by President 
Trump, who is alleged to have decided to end 
DACA, even though the directive to the 
Acting Secretary was issued from Attorney 
General Sessions. Finally, the district court 
properly considered "the unusual history 
behind the rescission," all of which appeared 
in the record submitted by the government. 
As the district court noted, "DACA received 
reaffirmation by the agency as recently as 
three months before the rescission, only to be 
hurriedly cast aside on what seems to have 
been a contrived excuse (its purported 
illegality). This strange about-face, done at 
lightning speed, suggests that the normal care 
and consideration within the agency was 
bypassed." 
The government contends that the equal 
protection claim is foreclosed by AADC, in 
which the Supreme Court stated that "as a 
general matter . . . an alien unlawfully in this 
country has no constitutional right to assert 
selective enforcement as a defense against his 
deportation." But in the context of this case, 
the challenge to the rescission of DACA is 
not raised "as a defense against [] 
deportation," and is not a claim of "selective 
enforcement."  Rather, it is a freestanding 
claim that the Executive Branch, motivated 
by animus, ended a program that 
overwhelmingly benefits a certain ethnic 
group. Thus, the equal protection claim does 
not implicate the concerns motivating the 
Court in AADC and underscored by the 
government: inhibiting prosecutorial 
discretion, allowing continuing violations of 
immigration law, and impacting foreign 
relations. The two cases cited by the 
government do not support its position, as 
both of them involved an individual 
noncitizen making an equal protection 
argument in an attempt to avoid his own 
deportation.  Plaintiffs' challenge to the 
rescission of DACA—which is itself 
discretionary—is not such a case. 
The government also contends that even if 
not totally barred by AADC, plaintiffs' claims 
must be subject to the heightened pleading 
standard applied to selective-prosecution 
claims in the criminal context. But this 
argument meets the same objection: as the 
district court held, plaintiffs' challenge is not 
a selective-prosecution claim. We are 
therefore not persuaded by the government's 
arguments. 
The Supreme Court's recent decision 
in Trump v. Hawaii, does not foreclose this 
claim. There, statements by the President 
allegedly revealing religious animus against 
Muslims were "[a]t the heart of plaintiffs' 
case . . . ."  The Court assumed without 
deciding that it was proper to rely on the 
President's statements, but nevertheless 
upheld the challenged executive order under 
rational basis review.  Here, by contrast, 
plaintiffs provide substantially greater 
evidence of discriminatory motivation, 
including the rescission order's disparate 
impact on Latinos and persons of Mexican 
heritage, as well as the order's unusual 
history. Moreover, our case differs 
from Hawaii in several potentially important 
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respects, including the physical location of 
the plaintiffs within the geographic United 
States, the lack of a national security 
justification for the challenged government 
action, and the nature of the constitutional 
claim raised. 
Therefore, we conclude that plaintiffs have 
stated a plausible equal protection claim. 
 
VII. 
The rescission of DACA—based as it was 
solely on a misconceived view of the law—is 
reviewable, and plaintiffs are likely to 
succeed on their claim that it must be set 
aside under the APA. We therefore affirm the 
district court's entry. The district court also 
properly dismissed plaintiffs' APA notice-
and-comment claim, and their claim that the 
DACA rescission violates their substantive 
due process rights. The district court also 
properly denied the government's motion to 
dismiss plaintiffs' APA arbitrary-and-
capricious claim, their claim that the new 
information-sharing policy violates their due 
process rights, and their claim that the DACA 
rescission violates their right to equal 
protection. of a preliminary injunction. The 
district court also properly dismissed 
plaintiffs' APA notice-and-comment claim, 
and their claim that the DACA rescission 
violates their substantive due process rights. 
The district court also properly denied the 
government's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' 
APA arbitrary-and-capricious claim, their 
claim that the new information-sharing 
policy violates their due process rights, and 
their claim that the DACA rescission violates 
their right to equal protection. 
* * * 
The Executive wields awesome power in the 
enforcement of our nation's immigration 
laws. Our decision today does not curb that 
power, but rather enables its exercise in a 
manner that is free from legal misconceptions 
and is democratically accountable to the 
public. Whether Dulce Garcia and the 
hundreds of thousands of other young 
dreamers like her may continue to live 
productively in the only country they have 
ever known is, ultimately, a choice for the 
political branches of our constitutional 
government. With the power to make that 
choice, however, must come accountability 
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whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA policy is lawful. The petitioners move to appeal 
the orders of the district court denying their motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for 
failure to state a claim. 
 
Issue: (1) Whether the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to wind down the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals policy is judicially reviewable; and (2) whether DHS’s decision to 
wind down the DACA policy is lawful.  
 





Donald J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants 
 
United States District Court, District of Columbia 
 
Decided on August 17, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
BATES, District Judge: 
Before the Court is the government's motion 
for a stay pending appeal of the April 24, 
2018 order vacating the rescission of the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
("DACA") program and the August 3, 2018 
order denying reconsideration of the April 
24, 2018 order. Also before the Court is the 
government's unopposed motion for 
clarification that the August 3, 2018 order 
was a final, appealable judgment. 
The government seeks a stay of the Court's 
orders in their entirety or, in the alternative, 
at least insofar as they require the Department 
of Homeland Security ("DHS") to begin 
accepting applications for initial grants of 
DACA benefits and for advance parole under 
the DACA program.  Plaintiffs oppose the 
government's motion in part, urging the Court 
not to stay its orders in their entirety, but 
agreeing that a stay as to initial DACA 
applications would be proper.  For the 
reasons that follow, the government's motion 
to clarify will be granted, and its motion for a 
stay pending appeal will be granted in part. 
The Court will stay its order as to new DACA 
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applications and applications for advance 
parole, but not as to renewal applications. 
The Court is mindful that continuing the stay 
in this case will temporarily deprive certain 
DACA-eligible individuals, and plaintiffs in 
these cases, of relief to which the Court has 
concluded they are legally entitled. But the 
Court is also aware of the significant 
confusion and uncertainty that currently 
surrounds the status of the DACA program, 
which is now the subject of litigation in 
multiple federal district courts and courts of 
appeals. Because that confusion would only 
be magnified if the Court's order regarding 
initial DACA applications were to take effect 
now and later be reversed on appeal, the 
Court will grant a limited stay of its order and 
preserve the status quo pending appeal, as 
plaintiffs themselves suggest. 
 
I. MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), 
district courts generally have the authority to 
stay their orders pending appeal In 
determining whether to grant such a stay, 
courts consider four factors: "(1) whether the 
stay applicant has made a strong showing that 
he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) 
whether the applicant will be irreparably 
injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of 
the stay will substantially injure the other 
parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) 
where the public interest lies." 
Traditionally, courts in this Circuit have 
considered these factors on a "'sliding scale,' 
whereby 'a strong showing on one factor 
could make up for a weaker showing on 
another.'"  Although recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court have called this approach into 
question, "the district judges in this Circuit 
continue to adhere to binding precedent and 
apply the sliding scale approach to determine 
whether a movant is entitled to an injunction 
pending resolution of its appeal," , and 
plaintiffs do not dispute the propriety of that 
approach here. Thus, if "the three other 
factors strongly favor issuing" a stay, then the 
government "need only raise a 'serious legal 
question' on the merits" for that stay to issue.  
As to the first factor, the Court finds that the 
government's appeal raises   "serious legal 
question[s]."  Those questions include 
whether DHS's decision to rescind DACA 
was subject to judicial review under 
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 
and, if so, whether that decision was arbitrary 
and capricious. Of course, this Court has 
already answered both questions in the 
affirmative: as the Court has explained at 
length elsewhere, DACA's rescission was 
both reviewable and unlawful because it was 
based chiefly on a "virtually unexplained" 
conclusion that DACA was 
unlawful.  Nevertheless, the government has 
assembled a "substantial case on the merits," 
and the fact that the Court has thus far been 
unpersuaded by that case does not preclude 
the issuance of a stay,   
The remaining factors lend sufficient support 
to plaintiffs' proposal for a limited stay 
pending appeal to render that stay appropriate 
in light of the government's "substantial" 
legal case. But they do not support the 
government's request for a stay of the Court's 
order in its entirety. 
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The second factor—the risk of irreparable 
injury to DHS—favors a stay, but only as to 
initial DACA applications and applications 
for DACA-based advance parole. The Court 
is unmoved by the government's assertion of 
injury resulting from its being "enjoined from 
implementing an act of Congress." Gov't's 
Mot. at 8. As the Court has already explained, 
DHS has been implementing that act of 
Congress (the Immigration and Nationality 
Act) under an ill-considered (and hence 
possibly incorrect) understanding of its 
enforcement authority. Unlike an injunction 
prohibiting the exercise of statutory authority 
altogether, this Court's order simply corrects 
the improper exercise of that authority. To 
the extent that such an injury is cognizable at 
all, it is insufficient to justify staying the 
Court's order here. 
The Court accepts, however, that the 
additional staff and other resources required 
for DHS to process initial DACA 
applications would constitute a cognizable 
injury. DHS estimates that full 
implementation of the Court's order would 
lead to the filing of over 100,000 initial 
DACA applications and 30,000 requests for 
advance parole, which would in turn require 
the hiring of 72 temporary employees and the 
reassignment or hiring of 60 full-time 
employees. But these burdens apply only as 
to initial DACA applications, since DHS has 
been accepting renewal applications since 
mid-2012, with the exception of a brief 
period in late 2017 and early 2018. The 
second factor therefore favors plaintiffs' 
proposed limited stay, not the government's 
full stay. 
The third factor, the risk of injury to 
plaintiffs, again favors continuing the stay as 
to initial DACA applications and applications 
for advance parole, but not as to renewal 
applications. Although the government 
maintains that the termination of existing 
DACA benefits—which would immediately 
end DACA beneficiaries' work 
authorizations and could lead to their 
removal from the United States—is not an 
irreparable harm, this untenable proposition 
has been rejected by this Court and by several 
others. And although there are currently two 
preliminary injunctions in place requiring 
DHS to continue accepting renewal 
applications, as the Court has previously 
noted, "those injunctions are both on 
expedited appeals and hence could be 
reversed in the not-too-distant future." This 
Court's order—which, unlike the preliminary 
injunctions entered in parallel litigation, is a 
final judgment—will therefore prevent 
irreparable harm to plaintiffs and all current 
DACA beneficiaries should those other 
injunctions be reversed. Hence, it will not be 
stayed as to renewal applications. 
By contrast, the Court agrees with the district 
court in Regents that "while plaintiffs have 
demonstrated that DACA recipients . . . are 
likely to suffer substantial, irreparable harm 
as a result 
The second factor therefore favors plaintiffs' 
proposed limited stay, not the government's 
full stay. of the rescission, they have not 
made a comparable showing as to individuals 
who have never applied for or obtained 
DACA" benefits. The same is true of advance 
parole. Thus, like the second factor, the third 
factor supports a stay as to initial DACA 
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applications and applications for advance 
parole, but not as to renewal applications. 
The fourth and final factor—the public 
interest—also favors this limited stay. The 
Court has already recognized the disruption 
that would ensue if DHS were to begin 
accepting initial DACA applications 
pursuant to the Court's order but that order 
were later reversed on appeal. Just as this 
potential for disruption previously counseled 
in favor of a 90-day stay of the Court's order 
of vacatur,  it now suggests that the public 
interest would be served by a stay pending 
appeal as to initial DACA applications. Like 
the second and third factors, however, this 
fourth factor does not support a stay as to 
renewal applications, since DHS is already 
accepting those applications. 
In sum, because the government's appeal 
raises "serious legal questions," and because 
the remaining factors—harm to DHS, harm 
to DACA beneficiaries, and the public 
interest—favor a stay of the Court's order of 
vacatur as to initial DACA applications and 
applications for DACA-based advance 
parole, the Court will grant the government's 
request for a stay as to those applications. But 
because the three equitable factors do not 
favor a stay as to applications for the renewal 
of DACA benefits, pursuant to the "sliding 
scale" approach employed in this Circuit, the 
Court will not stay its order as to renewal 
applications. And the Court notes again that 
plaintiffs agree to this limited stay of the 
Court's order pending appeal.  
 
II. MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION 
Finally, the government has moved for 
clarification that the Court's August 3, 2018 
order was a final, appealable judgment.  The 
government also seeks an order dismissing 
plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to 
DACA's rescission as moot. Plaintiffs oppose 
the dismissal of their constitutional claims 
but agree that the Court's August 3, 2018 
order is final and appealable.  
Initially, the Court deferred ruling on 
plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to 
DACA's rescission pending DHS's response 
to the April 24, 2018 order vacating DACA's 
rescission on administrative 
grounds. Because the Court has since 
declined to reconsider its April 24, 2018 
order, a decision on plaintiffs' constitutional 
challenges to DACA's rescission is 
unnecessary. Moreover, the Court has 
already entered final judgment on plaintiffs' 
remaining administrative and constitutional 
claims. Thus, the Court's August 3, 2018 
order denying reconsideration "adjudicat[ed] 
all the claims and all the parties' rights and 
liabilities" in this action and was therefore a 
final, appealable order.  
For the foregoing reasons, the government's 
motion for a stay pending appeal will be 
granted in part, and the Court will stay its 
order of vacatur as it applies to initial DACA 
applications and applications for DACA-
based advance parole. The government's 
motion to clarify will also be granted. A 
separate order has been issued on this date. 
 ORDER 
Upon consideration of [the government's 
unopposed motion for clarification and the 
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government's motion for a stay pending 
appeal, and for the reasons given in the 
Memorandum Opinion issued on this date, it 
is hereby 
ORDERED that the motion for clarification 
is GRANTED; it is further 
ORDERED that the motion for a stay 
pending appeal is GRANTED IN PART 
AND DENIED IN PART; it is further 
ORDERED that, pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 62(c), [69] the April 24, 2018 
order vacating the rescission of the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") 
program and [77] the August 3, 2018 order 
denying reconsideration of the April 24, 2018 
order are STAYED pending the 
government's appeal in this matter to the 
extent that those orders require the 
Department of Homeland Security to begin 
accepting initial DACA applications or 
applications for advance parole under the 
DACA program; it is further 
ORDERED that, in all other respects, the 
stay of the April 24, 2018 and August 3, 2018 
orders is LIFTED and those orders shall take 
immediate effect; and it is further 
ORDERED that the Court's April 24, 2018 
and August 3, 2018 orders are clarified to 
constitute together a final, appealable 
judgment that "adjudicat[ed] all the claims 
and all the parties' rights and liabilities" in 























McAleenan v. Vidal 
 
Ruling Below: Nielsen v. Vidal., F.2d (2nd Cir. 2018).  
 
Overview: This is a case concerning whether the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to 
wind down the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy is judicially reviewable; and 
whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA policy is lawful. The petitioners move to appeal 
the orders of the district court denying their motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for 
failure to state a claim. 
 
Issue: (1) Whether the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to wind down the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals policy is judicially reviewable; and (2) whether DHS’s decision to 
wind down the DACA policy is lawful.  
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United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 
 
Decided on July 5, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
POOLER, RAGGI, HALL, Circuit Judges: 
 
Petitioners move, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b), for leave to appeal November 9, 
2017, and March 29, 2018, orders of the 
district court denying their motions to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure 
to state a claim. Upon due consideration, it is 
hereby ORDERED that the petitions are 
GRANTED.  
 
It is further ORDERED that these appeals, as 
well as the appeals docketed under 2d Cir. 
18-1521 and 18-1525, be heard in tandem 
with Petitioners’ appeals of the district 
court’s February 13, 2018, preliminary 
injunction, 2d Cir. 18-485 and 18-488.  
 
Petitioners are directed to file a scheduling 
notification within 14 days of the  
date of entry of this order pursuant to Second 






“It’s Now the Supreme Court’s Turn to Try to Resolve the Fate of the Dreamers” 
 
 
The New York Times 
 
Michael D. Shear and Adam Liptak 
 
June 28, 2019 
 
For seven years, the so-called Dreamers — 
nearly 800,000 young men and women who 
were brought to the United States illegally as 
children — have lived in limbo, protected 
from immediate deportation but without the 
guarantee of any permanent future in the 
United States. 
On Friday, the Supreme Court agreed to 
resolve their fate, an announcement that sets 
in motion what is likely to be a yearlong legal 
clash over immigration policy and the power 
of the presidency that will probably 
culminate next summer with a ruling by the 
justices. 
But by agreeing to take the case, the Supreme 
Court also provided a window of opportunity 
during which the Republicans and Democrats 
in Congress could permanently resolve the 
status of the young immigrants, perhaps by 
giving them a chance to earn citizenship. 
At stake is a program that protects Dreamers 
known as Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals, or DACA, that President Barack 
Obama created through executive action in 
2012. Mr. Trump tried to end the program in 
2017, calling it an “end-run around 
Congress” and saying that Mr. Obama’s use 
of executive authority to protect the 
immigrants violated “the core tenets that 
sustain our Republic.” 
Members of both parties, as well as Mr. 
Trump on several occasions, have expressed 
sympathy for the Dreamers, many of them 
fully assimilated young men and women in 
school or with careers. But there is no 
evidence that a deal is likely. 
For years, lawmakers have failed to reach any 
kind of consensus despite repeated attempts 
at negotiation. In 2018, a possible deal 
collapsed amid demands from Mr. Trump for 
restrictive changes to immigration laws and 
billions of dollars to build a wall along the 
southwestern border. 
This month, the Democrat-led House passed 
sweeping legislation that would provide a 
path to citizenship for Dreamers and other 
immigrants whose legal status Mr. Trump has 
targeted. But the legislation is already 
languishing in the Republican-controlled 
Senate, where opponents view it as amnesty 
for lawbreakers. 
“We will continue to fight tirelessly to protect 
these outstanding young men and women as 
we work to ensure America remains a nation 
of hope, freedom and opportunity for all,” 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi said in a statement 
after the court’s announcement on Friday. 
Immigration advocacy groups have said they 
plan to urge Dreamers to renew their 
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protections under DACA, which expire every 
two years, until the fate of the program is 
decided by Congress or the Supreme Court. 
Since July 1, the federal government has 
approved more than 373,000 renewal 
requests. 
During his 2016 presidential campaign, Mr. 
Trump vowed to end the DACA program, 
making it part of the anti-immigrant message 
that helped fire up his supporters. When he 
won, he promised to follow through even as 
he expressed sympathy for the Dreamers, a 
group of whom he had met with years earlier. 
On the day of his inauguration, he told a 
Democratic senator that he should not worry 
about the young immigrants. 
But by September 2017, a group of 
conservative state attorneys general were 
threatening to sue the government if the 
president refused to make good on his 
promise to end the DACA program. Against 
the advice of lawmakers in both parties, Mr. 
Trump ordered that the program be 
terminated. 
At the same time, Mr. Trump delayed the 
program’s end by six months, saying he 
wanted to give Congress time to pass 
legislation that would permanently protect 
the Dreamers from deportation and give them 
an eventual path to citizenship. 
“We will resolve the DACA issue with heart 
and compassion — but through the lawful 
Democratic process,” Mr. Trump said in a 
statement after ending the program. “It is 
now time for Congress to act!” 
Mr. Trump’s six-month deadline initially put 
pressure on lawmakers in both parties to 
reach a deal. But that faded when a lower 
court judge blocked his decision to end 
DACA and ordered the government to 
continue operating it. 
In November, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San 
Francisco, ruled against the administration. It 
acknowledged that presidents have broad 
powers to alter the policies of earlier 
administrations but said the legal rationale 
offered by the Trump administration did not 
withstand scrutiny. The court also questioned 
“the cruelty and wastefulness of deporting 
productive young people to countries with 
which they have no ties.” 
In May, a second federal appeals court, the 
Fourth Circuit in Richmond, Va., issued a 
similar ruling. 
The Trump administration has long sought to 
persuade the Supreme Court to rule on 
whether it had the authority to cancel the 
program. But the justices turned down an 
unusual petition seeking review in January 
2018, before any appeals court had ruled. The 
administration asked again in November, not 
long before the Ninth Circuit ruled. 
For many months, the Supreme Court took 
no action on the request, which was at odds 
with the court’s usual practice. 
On Friday, before the justices left for their 
summer break, the court agreed to hear an 
appeal of the Ninth Circuit decision, 
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents 
of the University of California, No. 18-587, 
along with two others in which appeals courts 
have not yet ruled: Trump v. NAACP, No. 
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18-588, and McAleenan v. Vidal, No. 18-
589. 
The administration has argued that the 
program was an unconstitutional exercise of 
executive authority, relying on a ruling from 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans, that shut down 
a related program created by Mr. Obama, 
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 
and Lawful Permanent Residents, or DAPA, 
saying he had exceeded his statutory 
authority. 
In his executive action establishing DAPA, 
which was blocked by courts before it went 
into effect, Mr. Obama would have allowed 
as many as five million unauthorized 
immigrants who were the parents of citizens 
or of lawful permanent residents to apply for 
a program sparing them from deportation and 
providing them work permits. 
After the death of Justice Antonin Scalia in 
2016, the Supreme Court deadlocked, 4 to 4, 
in an appeal of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, 
leaving it in place and ending what Mr. 
Obama had hoped would become one of his 
central legacies. 
The Trump administration has argued that the 
DAPA ruling meant that DACA was also 
unlawful. 
In its decision in November, the Ninth Circuit 
said the two programs differed in important 
ways, rejecting the administration’s legal 
analysis. The appeals court affirmed a 
nationwide injunction ordering the 
administration to retain major elements of the 
program while the case moved forward. 
Such nationwide injunctions, which have 
been used by courts to block executive 
actions in both the Obama and the Trump 
administrations, have been the subject of 
much commentary and criticism. 
The Supreme Court will hear arguments in 
the case during its next term, which starts in 
October. If a deal is not reached, a decision 
by the court next summer could roil the 
presidential campaign, no matter which way 
the court rules. 
A decision to let the Trump administration 
end the program could energize angry 
Democratic voters and immigration 
advocates to campaign even more 
aggressively against the president. If the 
court prevents Mr. Trump from ending 



















June 28, 2019 
 
The Supreme Court announced Friday it will 
consider next term whether the Trump 
administration illegally tried to end the 
program that shields from deportation young 
undocumented immigrants brought to the 
United States as children. 
Lower courts have said that President 
Trump’s decision to terminate the Obama-era 
program was based on faulty legal reasoning 
and that the administration has failed to 
provide a solid rationale for ending it. 
The Supreme Court’s somewhat reluctant 
review of the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA) program means that, for the 
third consecutive year, the high court will 
pass judgment on a Trump priority that has 
been stifled by federal judges — this time in 
a presidential election year and in a case with 
passionate advocates and huge consequences. 
The Supreme Court ended its term Thursday 
by putting on hold the Trump 
administration’s plan to put a citizenship 
question on the 2020 Census. In 2018, it 
narrowly approved the president’s travel 
ban on arrivals from a handful of mostly 
Muslim countries. 
The DACA program has become politically 
volatile and the object of negotiations — to 
no end, so far — between Congress and the 
White House. Initiated in 2012 by a 
proclamation from President Barack Obama, 
DACA has protected from deportation nearly 
700,000 people brought to the United States 
as children, a group that’s been labeled 
“dreamers.” 
The justices have considered since January 
whether to review a ruling against the 
administration from the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 9th Circuit in California. It 
recently denied a request to expedite review 
of a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the 4th Circuit. 
A political solution that would relieve the 
court of having to decide the program’s 
legality has not been forthcoming. Some 
experts in the field have wondered if the 
court’s acceptance of the case, or a decision 
next term, might spur action. 
The Trump administration moved to scuttle 
the program in 2017 after Texas and other 
states threatened to sue to force its end. Then-
Attorney General Jeff Sessions advised the 
Department of Homeland Security that the 
program was probably unlawful and that it 
could not be defended. 
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Sessions based that decision on a ruling by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, 
which said that another Obama program 
protecting immigrants was beyond the 
president’s constitutional powers. The 
Supreme Court deadlocked 4 to 4 in 2016 
when considering the issue. 
But other courts have rejected that theory, 
saying DACA is different. They have kept 
the program in place, requiring that those 
already enrolled be allowed to renew their 
participation. California Attorney General 
Xavier Becerra (D), who is among those 
fighting the administration’s decision, said 
that more than 373,000 two-year renewals 
have been approved since January 2018. 
Those approved to be in the program are 
allowed work permits and are protected from 
deportation, as long as they abide by its 
regulations and do not violate laws. 
“DACA reflects our nation’s commitment to 
helping hardworking people and creates hope 
and opportunity for a new generation — 
many of whom were brought to our country 
as toddlers,” Becerra said in a statement after 
the Supreme Court announcement. 
“So far, both lower courts in our legal fight to 
protect DACA have agreed with us that the 
Trump Administration’s attempt to end it was 
unlawful.” 
Judges who have blocked ending the program 
have said the administration could remedy 
the legal impasse by providing a detailed 
reasoning of why the program should be 
abolished. Instead, it has continued to combat 
the orders in court. 
The fight over the young people protected by 
the program — the average age is around 24 
— has been a fierce battle between Trump 
and Democrats, who largely defend the 
initiative. 
Trump at times has said he would like to find 
a way to protect those in the program, but 
attempts to work out a political compromise 
have foundered amid the larger partisan 
debate over immigration and border security. 
The administration has been eager to get the 
issue before the Supreme Court, where it 
believes the more conservative wing will be 
on its side. 
Solicitor General Noel J. Francisco, 
representing the administration at the 
Supreme Court, said in a brief that the cases 
“concern the Executive Branch’s authority to 
revoke a discretionary policy of non-
enforcement that is sanctioning an ongoing 
violation of federal immigration law by 
nearly 700,000 aliens.” 
So far, appeals courts in California, New 
York, Virginia and a district judge in the 
District of Columbia have said that reasoning 
is wrong. (A judge in Texas said the program 
was illegal but declined to rule that it should 
cease.) The judges who have ruled against the 
Department of Homeland Security’s 
justification for ending DACA say it must be 
based on more than just a belief about its 
legal underpinnings. 
“To be clear: we do not hold that DACA 
could not be rescinded as an exercise of 
Executive Branch discretion,” Judge Kim 
McLane Wardlaw said in the 9th Circuit’s 
opinion. “We hold only that here, where the 
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Executive did not make a discretionary 
choice to end DACA — but rather acted 
based on an erroneous view of what the law 
required — the rescission was arbitrary and 
capricious under settled law.” 
The regents of the University of California, 
one of the parties challenging the 
administration, told the Supreme Court there 
was no hurry to take the case because each 
DACA recipient had been vetted by the 
federal government. 
The university leadership quoted a tweet 
from Trump to argue that not even this 
administration was advocating immediate 
deportation. 
“Does anybody really want to throw out 
good, educated and accomplished young 
people who have jobs, some serving in the 
military? Really!” the president tweeted in 
September. 
The court accepted three cases, which will be 
consolidated for hearing in the new term that 
starts in October. They are Department of 
Homeland Security v. Regents of the 
University of California; Trump v. NAACP 
and McAleenan v. Vidal. 
The court accepted a bundle of new cases 
Friday before the justices scattered for 
vacations and summer teaching gigs. 
In one, it granted petitions from Bridget 
Kelly and Bill Baroni, two former aides to 
former New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie (R) 
who were convicted of felonies in 2016 for 
their parts in causing gridlock near the 
George Washington Bridge as retaliation 
against a mayor who did not support their 
boss. 
The case is Kelly v. United States. 
The justices said they will also review a 
Montana Supreme Court ruling invalidating a 
state program offering tax credits for funding 
scholarships. The scholarships could be used 
at private schools, including religious 
schools, and the court said that violated a 
prohibition in the state constitution. 
















“Supreme Court Doesn’t Act on Trump’s Appeal in ‘Dreamers’ Case” 
 
 




January 22, 2019 
 
The Supreme Court took no action on 
Tuesday on the Trump administration’s plans 
to shut down a program that shields some 
700,000 young undocumented immigrants 
from deportation. 
The court’s inaction almost certainly means 
it will not hear the administration’s challenge 
in its current term, which ends in June. The 
justices’ next private conference to consider 
petitions seeking review is scheduled for Feb. 
15. 
Even were they to agree to hear the case then, 
it would not be argued until after the next 
term starts in October under the court’s usual 
procedures. A decision would probably not 
arrive until well into 2020. 
The move left the program in place and 
denied negotiating leverage to President 
Trump, who has said he wanted to use a 
Supreme Court victory in the case in 
negotiations with Democrats over 
immigration issues. 
Mr. Trump tried to end the program in 2017, 
calling it an unconstitutional use of executive 
power by his predecessor and reviving the 
threat of deportation for immigrants who had 
been brought to the United States illegally as 
young children. 
But federal judges have ordered the 
administration to maintain major pieces of 
the program, Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals, or DACA, while legal challenges 
move forward. 
In November, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San 
Francisco, ruled against the administration. It 
acknowledged that presidents have broad 
powers to alter the policies of earlier 
administrations but said that the legal 
rationale offered by the Trump 
administration did not withstand scrutiny. 
The court also questioned “the cruelty and 
wastefulness of deporting productive young 
people to countries with which they have no 
ties.” 
Mr. Trump has criticized that ruling and has 
said he would be vindicated in the Supreme 
Court. He also predicted that a Supreme 
Court victory in the case, United States 
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents 
of the University of California, No. 18-587, 
would strengthen his hand in negotiations 
with Democratic lawmakers over 
immigration issues. 
“I think it’s going to be overturned in the 
United States Supreme Court, and I think it’s 
going to be overwhelmingly overturned,” Mr. 
Trump said at a cabinet meeting this month, 
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adding, “So if we win that case — and I say 
this for all to hear — we’ll be easily able to 
make a deal on DACA and the wall as a 
combination.” 
Mr. Trump has taken inconsistent positions 
on the program. Even as he tried to end it, he 
called upon Congress to give legal status and 
an eventual path to citizenship to the young 
immigrants, who are sometimes called 
“Dreamers.” More recently, he offered to 
extend the program in exchange for 
concessions on a border wall. 
The administration has argued that the 
program, instituted by the Obama 
administration, was an unconstitutional 
exercise of executive authority, relying on a 
ruling from the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans, 
concerning a related program. The Supreme 
Court deadlocked, 4 to 4, in an appeal of that 
ruling. 
But the Ninth Circuit said the two programs 
differed in important ways, undermining the 
administration’s legal analysis. The appeals 
court affirmed a nationwide injunction 
ordering the administration to retain major 
elements of the program while the case 
moved forward. Such nationwide 
injunctions, which have been used by courts 
to block executive actions in both the Obama 
and the Trump administrations, have been the 
subject of much commentary and criticism. 
Also on Tuesday, the administration told the 
court that it would ask it to hear an appeal 
of a trial judge’s ruling barring the addition 
of a question on citizenship to the next 
census. The administration’s filing said it 
would ask the justices to bypass the appeals 
court and put the case on a very fast track, 
culminating in arguments in April or May. 
That was necessary, the solicitor general, 
Noel J. Francisco, wrote, because “the 
government must finalize the census 
questionnaire by the end of June 2019 to 
enable it to be printed on time.” 
“It is exceedingly unlikely that there is 
sufficient time for review in both the court of 
appeals and in this court by that deadline,” 






















The Washington Post 
 
Ann E. Marimow and Robert Barnes 
 
May 17, 2019  
 
A federal appeals court ruled Friday that the 
Trump administration had been “arbitrary 
and capricious” in its bid to end an Obama-
era program that shields young 
undocumented immigrants from deportation.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit 
partially reversed an earlier ruling in the case 
brought by the immigrant advocacy 
organization CASA de Maryland.  
In a 2-to-1 decision, the court said the 
government had failed to “give a reasoned 
explanation for the change in policy, 
particularly given the significant” interests 
involved, according to the majority opinion 
written by Judge Albert Diaz and joined by 
Judge Robert King.  
The decision is similar to one reached by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. The 
Trump administration has asked the Supreme 
Court to intervene. But the request has been 
pending for months, and the justices have 
stopped putting the case on their weekly 
discussion list.  
It is expected that the Supreme Court will 
have to deliver the final word on the program, 
called Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals, or DACA, most likely in the term 
that begins in October. It could be that the 
justices are waiting for all of the appeals 
courts considering the issue to weigh in; 
another case challenging the administration’s 
DACA decision has been argued in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  
In the case decided Friday, Judge Julius N. 
Richardson said in his dissent that the 
administration had acted within its authority 
and noted the limited role of the judiciary.  
“It is not our place to second-guess the 
wisdom of the discretionary decisions made 
by the other branches. The rescission of 
DACA was a controversial and contentious 
decision, but one that was committed to the 
executive branch,” wrote Richardson, who 
was recently named to the court by President 
Trump. Diaz was nominated by President 
Barack Obama, and King by President Bill 
Clinton.  
The Justice Department declined to comment 
on the ruling Friday.  
“We recognize the struggle is not over and 
there are more battles to fight in the Supreme 
Court on this road to justice, but our families 
are emboldened by knowing that they are on 
the right side of history — the only question 
is whether all this country’s institutions can 
be certain of the same,” said Gustavo Torres, 
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executive director of CASA de Maryland, the 
immigrant organization that was the lead 
plaintiff in the case.  
A series of lower-court judges ruled against 
the administration, finding that Trump’s 
decision to end the program was based on 
faulty legal reasoning. Those decisions 
allowed immigrants already enrolled to 
renew their participation — meaning DACA 
remained in place. The program has shielded 
nearly 700,000 young people, often referred 
to as “dreamers.”  
The ruling from the Richmond-based 4th 
Circuit partly reverses a decision from the 
late U.S. District Judge Roger W. Titus of 
Maryland, who last year said — in a ruling 
that broke with the views from lower courts 
— that the administration had the authority to 
wind down the program.  
Trump cited that decision in his favor in a 
message at the time on Twitter: “Federal 
Judge in Maryland has just ruled that 
‘President Trump has the right to end 
DACA,’ ” Trump wrote.  
In his decision, Titus, who was appointed to 
the federal bench in Maryland by President 
George W. Bush and died in March, 
criticized Trump for his “unfortunate and 
often inflammatory rhetoric,” and noted that, 
were he not a judge constrained to 
interpreting the law, he would opt for a 
different result.  
“An overwhelming percentage of Americans 
support protections for ‘Dreamers,’ yet it is 
not the province of the judiciary to provide 
legislative or executive actions when those 
entrusted with those responsibilities fail to 
act,” Titus wrote, adding later, “This Court 
does not like the outcome of this case, but is 
constrained by its constitutionally limited 
role to the result that it has reached. 
Hopefully, the Congress and the President 



























November 8, 2018 
 
A federal appeals court supported the 
University of California Board of Regents in 
their case against the current federal 
administration’s decision to end Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals on Thursday. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit blocked the Department of 
Homeland Security’s decision to terminate 
DACA benefits and discontinue applications. 
The three-judge panel supported past 
decisions that required the Trump 
administration continue accepting 
applications and renewals. 
DACA is an executive action issued by 
former President Barack Obama in 2012 to 
help undocumented individuals who arrived 
to the country as children to obtain work 
permits, college degrees and driver’s 
licenses. Trump announced he would rescind 
the program in September 2017, and the UC 
countered immediately, saying the repeal 
violated undocumented persons’ due process 
rights. 
UC President Janet Napolitano was the U.S. 
secretary of Homeland Security under 
President Obama when he created DACA. 
One of the ninth circuit judges, Kim McLane 
Wardlaw, said the Obama administration did 
not overreach the executive branch’s powers 
because it made the choice about how to 
direct deportation resources. She said 
executive agencies do not have the resources 
to deport every undocumented individual, 
which led Obama to pause deportation 
proceedings for minors through the creation 
of DACA. 
The Court said the government’s decision to 
repeal DACA was based on an arbitrary and 
possibly misguided view of the law, and is 
therefore subject to review by the courts. 
UC spokesperson Claire Doan said in a 
statement the University welcomes the 
appellate court’s decision and is now calling 
on the Trump administration to stop its 
efforts to repeal DACA. 
Doan added while Thursday’s ruling was a 
win for the UC, Congress must enact 
permanent protections for DACA recipients 
including a path to citizenship, so students 
will not have to worry about their futures. 
On Monday, the United States Department of 
Justice and the U.S. solicitor general filed a 
petition asking the Supreme Court to decide 
the issue before the ninth circuit court made 
its decision. The Supreme Court previously 
rejected a similar request to pre-emptively 
intervene in February. The Trump 
administration is expected to appeal this 
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August 3, 2018 
 
A federal judge on Friday ruled that the 
Trump administration must fully restore a 
program that protects from deportation some 
young immigrants who were brought to the 
United States illegally as children, including 
accepting new applications for the program. 
U.S. District Judge John Bates in 
Washington, D.C., said he would stay 
Friday’s order, however, until August 23 to 
give the administration time to decide 
whether to appeal. Bates first issued a ruling 
in April ordering the federal government to 
continue the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals, or DACA, program, including 
taking applications. He stayed that ruling for 
90 days to give the government time to better 
explain why the program should be ended. 
On Friday Bates, who was appointed by 
former President George W. Bush, a 
Republican, said he would not revise his 
previous ruling because the arguments of 
President Donald Trump’s administration did 
not override his concerns. 
Under DACA, roughly 700,000 young 
adults, often referred to as “Dreamers”, were 
protected from deportation and given work 
permits for two-year periods, after which 
they must re-apply to the program. 
The program was created in 2012 under 
former President Barack Obama, a Democrat. 
Two other federal courts in California and 
New York had previously ordered that 
DACA remain in place while litigation 
challenging Trump’s decision to end it 
continued. Those rulings only required the 
government to process DACA renewals, not 
new applications. 
Another lawsuit in a Texas federal court is 
seeking to end DACA. 
A spokesman for the U.S. Department of 
Justice said on Friday that the government 
would continue to defend its position that it 
“acted within its lawful authority in deciding 
to wind down DACA in an orderly manner.” 
Congress so far has failed to pass legislation 
to address the fate of the Dreamers, including 
a potential path to citizenship. 
Friday’s ruling came in lawsuits filed by 
several groups and institutions, including the 
National Association for the Advancement of 









Miriam Valverde  
 
August 6, 2018  
 
A federal judge said the Trump 
administration's rescission of a program 
deferring the deportation of young 
immigrants was "arbitrary and capricious" 
because it "failed adequately to explain its 
conclusion that the program was unlawful." 
U.S. District Judge John D. Bates on April 24 
gave the administration 90 days to issue a 
new memo rescinding Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (or DACA) that gives a 
"fuller explanation" on why the program 
lacks statutory and constitutional authority. 
Without a new memo, the initial September 
directive rescinding DACA will be vacated, 
and the original program will be 
restored, Bates wrote. That means the 
administration would have to resume 
accepting and processing new applications 
for DACA, in addition to renewal requests. 
Earlier this year, and in separate cases, 
federal judges in California and New 
York ordered the Trump administration to 
continue the program and accept renewal 
applications. The September memo said no 
new renewal applications would be accepted 
after Oct. 5, 2017. The administration in 
those previous cases had not been ordered to 
accept new applications. 
 
"We believe the judge's ruling is 
extraordinarily broad and wrong on the law," 
White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee 
Sanders said at an April 25 briefing. 
The case before Bates, in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia, was 
brought by the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People and the 
Trustees of Princeton University. 
Bates said the Trump administration had not 
cited any statutory provision with which 
DACA was in conflict. 
The Justice Department said the ruling did 
not change its stance challenging DACA's 
constitutionality. 
"DACA was implemented unilaterally after 
Congress declined to extend benefits to this 
same group of illegal aliens," said Justice 
Department spokesman Devin O'Malley. 
O'Malley said DACA "was an unlawful 
circumvention of Congress" and susceptible 
to the same legal challenges that "effectively 
ended" another Obama-era program, 
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 
and Lawful Permanent Residents. 
Pending a new memo and the judge's 
evaluation of its merits, we continue to rate 
this promise as In the Works.
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“Supreme Court Says White House Can Withhold DACA Documents for Now”  
 
 
The Wall Street Journal  
 
Jess Bravin and Brent Kendall  
 
December 8, 2017  
 
A divided Supreme Court on Friday 
temporarily blocked a lower court from 
requiring the Trump administration to release 
internal documents related to its September 
decision to end a program protecting 
undocumented immigrants who came to the 
U.S. as children. 
The court’s emergency action halting the 
document release comes just days after it 
issued an emergency order for the White 
House in another major case, allowing 
President Donald Trump’s latest travel ban 
affecting six predominantly Muslim 
countries to be fully implemented during 
litigation over the policy. 
Federal courts in San Francisco had ordered 
the White House and several agencies to turn 
over the materials in response to suits filed by 
the states of California, Maine, Maryland and 
Minnesota, among other parties, over plans to 
end the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals, an Obama administration program 
that has allowed some 800,000 young 
people to work in the U.S. since 2012. 
DACA, as the program is known, is 
scheduled to end in March. Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions recommended the policy shift 
in September, reiterating his long-held belief 
that President Barack Obama had 
overstepped his authority on behalf of illegal 
immigrants. 
“The Department of Justice is pleased with 
the Supreme Court’s decision today putting 
on hold the district court’s overreach,” said 
department spokesman Devin O’Malley. 
“The Department of Homeland Security 
acted within its lawful authority in deciding 
to wind down DACA in an orderly manner, 
and the Justice Department believes the 
courts will ultimately agree.” 
“What is the Trump administration trying so 
hard to hide?” California Attorney General 
Xavier Becerra said after the court’s action. 
“The administration owes the American 
people a real explanation for its decision to 
upend the lives of 800,000 Dreamers, 
stripping them of their ability to work and 
study, stirring fear and threatening our 
economy.” 
The challengers argue that the termination 
violates both the Constitution and the 
Administrative Procedure Act, and sought 
records documenting the method by which 
the government reached its decision. They 
argued that access to the records was crucial 
in assessing whether the administration 
changed policy positions in an arbitrary 
manner. 
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The government produced 256 pages, of 
which 192 were court opinions from 
litigation over a separate Obama-era 
program, never implemented because of 
court orders, that would have temporarily 
protected from deportation illegal 
immigrants whose children are U.S. citizens. 
U.S. District Judge William Alsup, of the 
Northern District of California, said the 
administration released very few documents 
related to its decision and “excluded highly 
relevant materials from the administrative 
record.” He ordered the government to 
provide DACA-related materials considered 
by Elaine Duke, who was then-acting 
secretary of Homeland Security, and by 
officials who provided input or advice on 
canceling the program. Judge Alsup’s 
decision was upheld by the Ninth U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
The Trump administration asked the 
Supreme Court to block that disclosure, 
maintaining that its decision to cancel DACA 
fell beyond judicial review, and that even if 
the lawsuits could proceed, it had no 
obligation to disclose the records. 
The Supreme Court, voting 5-to-4 along 
conservative-liberal lines, halted release of 
the materials while considering the 
government’s arguments. The court gave the 
challengers until Dec. 13 to file their legal 
response. 
The majority acted without comment. 
The dissenters, however, contended that the 
government had scant justification to 
withhold the documents. 
“Judicial review cannot function if the 
agency is permitted to decide unilaterally 
what documents it submits to the reviewing 
court as the administrative record,” Justice 
Stephen Breyer wrote in a 10-page dissent, 
joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. 
“Effective review depends upon the 
administrative record containing all relevant 
materials presented to the agency, including 
not only materials supportive of the 
government’s decision but also materials 
contrary to the government’s decision,” the 
dissent said. 
In an unusual move, Judge Alsup submitted a 
statement to the Supreme Court explaining 
his discovery orders. 
The government’s petition “leaves the 
incorrect impression that the district court 
endorsed unfettered discovery toward 
defendants,” Judge Alsup wrote. Instead, he 
says, “any discovery should be ‘limited, 
narrowly directed, [and] reasonable.’ ” 
Judge Alsup wrote that he reviewed 84 
DACA-related documents the government 
produced and ruled that 48 of them didn’t 
qualify for a privilege allowing the 
government to withhold them. 
Additionally, he said that while the 
government acknowledged that “verbal 
inputs” likely influenced the decision to 
cancel DACA, they were omitted from the 
administrative record. 
Separately, the Trump administration has 
been fighting a similar order to produce 
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documents in a New York lawsuit filed by 16 
states and DACA recipients. 
A federal trial judge in Brooklyn ordered the 
government in October to turn over materials 
considered by the departments of Justice and 
Homeland Security in connection with 
ending DACA. 
The Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
had paused the order until U.S. District Judge 
Nicholas Garaufis considered whether the 
administration’s withdrawal of the 
immigration policy was “immune from 
judicial review,” as Justice Department 
lawyers had argued. 
Judge Garaufis rejected those arguments in a 
ruling last month, clearing the way for the 
lawsuit to move forward. The Second Circuit 
is considering whether to lift the hold on his 





























November 26, 2018  
 
If you read headlines in the last month, you 
might think that the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals program, known as 
DACA, was in good shape. "Dreamers Win 
Round in Legal Battle to Keep DACA," 
the New York Times announced on 
November 8th, the day a federal appeals court 
upheld a California judge's injunction 
forbidding the Trump administration from 
rescinding the program. "Today's decision is 
a tremendous victory," Xavier Becerra, 
California's attorney general, said in a 
statement. 
For many Dreamers (as DACA recipients are 
commonly called), however, the month's 
news, like other supposed wins for DACA, 
inspired little optimism. 
"I see a lot of people call [these court 
decision] victories," says Indira Marquez 
Robles, a DACA recipient attending 
university in Atlanta. "In a way, I do see it as 
a victory. But with these victories, there's no 
real change. I always feel like it's more like 
just holding on." 
Legal experts tend to agree with Marquez 
Robles. Though DACA has scored a string of 
legal successes since the Trump 
administration attempted to end the program, 
these have done little to protect the program. 
For the past 14 months, as her DACA status 
has remained uncertain, Marquez Robles and 
her mother have taken turns sending each 
other news and updates from the courts. Their 
near-daily check-ins about the program 
began in September of 2017, when the 
Trump administration announced its decision 
to end the Obama-era program that protects 
certain undocumented immigrants who 
arrived in the country as children from 
deportation. 
That announcement threw DACA recipients 
like Marquez Robles into a state of 
deep uncertainty. Besides the sudden 
inability to renew their DACA status, 
Dreamers had to contend with a new threat: 
The government had their names on a list of 
all DACA applicants. What if the immigrant-
hostile Trump administration used that list to 
locate and deport young immigrants and their 
families? 
A slew of subsequent court cases assuaged 
these immediate worries, at least temporarily. 
Three judges, in three separate cases in 
California, Washington, D.C., and New 
York, issued injunctions preventing the 
Trump administration from rescinding the 
program. Though the administration can still 
reject new applications, the injunctions 
mandate that the government continue to 
accept DACA renewals, as ending the 
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program for existing recipients would be, 
according to the California judge, "arbitrary 
and capricious." (That judge's opinion, 
in Regents of the University of California v. 
Department of Homeland Security, was the 
one that was upheld by the Ninth Circuit 
earlier this month.) Marquez Robles renewed 
her status this year, as have thousands of 
other Dreamers since the California court 
first issued the injunction. 
Another court case, this one in Maryland, 
dealt with the issue of the list—the 
government's collection of DACA-recipient 
names. Two different agencies come into 
play in the decision. The first, United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, is the 
agency that actually has the list. The 
Department of Homeland Security 
houses USCIS, as well as the primary agency 
tasked with immigration enforcement: 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
As of now, USCIS has not shared the list of 
names with ICE, and is barred from doing so 
by the federal court in Maryland. In 
the case, Casa de Maryland v. DHS, the court 
issued an injunction barring the federal 
government from sharing DACA-related 
information with immigration enforcement, 
except in limited scenarios—for instance, if a 
DACA recipient has already been served a 
notice to appear in court. 
As a result of these court decisions, DACA 
recipients have gained back many of the 
protections that disappeared back in 
September of 2017. But those protections are 
not set in stone. There has been no final 
decision that determines DACA's status; all 
the aforementioned court decisions are still 
winding their way through an appeals 
process. Depending on how higher courts 
rule in the coming months, the injunctions 
protecting Dreamers could disappear for 
good. 
But Marquez Robles says she's noticed that 
the public's attention toward the program's 
fate has steadily diminished since last year. 
Teachers and other people in her life used to 
check in on her, but now the issues facing 
DACA recipients seems to have slipped out 
of many peoples' minds. 
"There was this whole surge of 'Defend 
DACA' when it first got canceled," Marquez 
Robles says. "Nowadays, some people still 
talk about it. But I have to rely on the people 
I've worked with in advocacy organizations, 
or [other DACA recipients]. We check up on 
each other." 
Though DACA recipients and their advocates 
remain anxious about DACA's status, the 
program seems to have lost the 
public's attention. And the periodic headlines 
declaring new "victories" might create the 
illusion, for those less informed, that DACA 
is winning its fight. 
In reality, DACA is on the ropes. Right now, 
the most immediate threats to the program 
come from a judge in Houston, Texas, and the 
Supreme Court. 
In Texas, U.S. District Judge Andrew Hanen, 
one of the most notoriously anti-immigrant 
judges in the country—under 
President Barack Obama, Hanen struck down 
parts of DACA and prohibited a program that 
would have protected undocumented parents 
of U.S. citizens—is currently hearing Texas 
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v. Nielsen, a case that could end DACA. 
Unlike the court cases in California and other 
states, Texas v. Nielsen does not consider 
whether or not the Trump administration has 
a right to end DACA, but instead considers 
whether or not DACA is constitutional in the 
first place. A coalition of states, led by Texas, 
sued the federal government, alleging that the 
program is illegal. Though Hanen surprised 
legal observers by declining to issue a 
preliminary injunction suspending DACA, he 
has given strong indications that he intends to 
rule DACA illegal. "If the nation truly wants 
a DACA program it is up to Congress to say 
so," Hanen said in August. 
With the possibility of multiple competing 
court rulings in the country, it's likely that the 
nation's highest court will soon weigh in—
and when it comes to ending DACA, the 
Trump administration has given indication 
that it likes its chances. As Mayra Joachin, a 
staff attorney with the National Immigration 
Law Center, explains, the Trump 
administration took the "rare and unusual" 
step of asking the Supreme Court to take up 
the Regentscase in California before it even 
got to the Ninth Circuit. 
Joachin says that there is a "high likelihood" 
that the Supreme Court will soon take up 
the Regents case. Though the timeline is 
difficult to predict, Joachin says that the 
Court will likely announce its decision to take 
up the case by early January, and then hear 
oral arguments sometime in March and April. 
Until then, the DACA program's status will 
likely remain the same, unless the Supreme 
Court cancels the lower court's injunction. 
"Where do I think this is going to go? I don't 
have a crystal ball," says Shoba Wadhia, a 
law professor and director of the Center for 
Immigrants' Rights Clinic. "But I think one 
thing is clear: No court has found DACA to 
be unconstitutional, and multiple courts 
believe the government's justification for 
ending DACA was arbitrary and a mistake of 
law." 
Wadhia co-authored a letter signed by over 
100 law professors nationwide that argued 
DACA is perfectly constitutional. However, 
despite many legal scholars' belief in the 
program's legality, the fact that the Trump 
administration has asked the Supreme Court 
to take up the Regents case could indicate 
that they believe the Court—full with 
Trump's two recent conservative 
appointees—will rule in the administration's 
favor. 
With so many court cases, the future of 
DACA is impossible to predict, but it's likely 
that the judicial process protecting the 
program will soon run out of steam, and the 
program will lose its last defense. The 
Supreme Court could rule against DACA in 
the Regents case, or could confirm Hanen's 
ruling if he eventually rules against the 
program. The Casa de Marylandcase, which 
stops ICE from getting a list of DACA 
recipients, is still being appealed, so even that 
last protection could vanish. 
For Joachin and others in the undocumented 
advocacy community, there is some hope that 
Congress will step in and save the program 
before it meets its end in the courts. 
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"It's difficult to predict what will actually 
pass within the new Congress, but statements 
from [likely Speaker of the House] Nancy 
Pelosi indicate that protecting DACA will be 
a priority for Democrats," Joachin says. 
The Congressional Progressive Caucus has 
also indicated that DACA is a priority. 
As so much remains up in the air, Marquez 
Robles says she's begun to feel numb to the 
constantly changing legal situation. "It's been 
a normalized process, being in this limbo," 
she says. With her future, and the future of 
thousands of other Dreamers still in question, 
she says all she can do now is focus on her 
studies. "So much is uncertain and unclear, 
but I'm still in college," she says. "I don't 
want to disregard that privilege, and I want to 




















Kansas v. Garcia 
 
Ruling Below: State v. Garcia, 401 P.3d 588 (2017).  
 
Overview: Ramiro Garcia was stopped for speeding and, upon further information, police found 
out that he illegally used social security number on various federal and state forms. He was charged 
with identity theft under state law.  
 
Issue: (1) Whether the Immigration Reform and Control Act expressly pre-empts the states from 
using any information entered on or appended to a federal Form I-9, including common 
information such as name, date of birth, and social security number, in a prosecution of any person 
(citizen or alien) when that same, commonly used information also appears in non-IRCA 
documents, such as state tax forms, leases, and credit applications; and (2) whether the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act impliedly preempts Kansas’ prosecution of respondents. 
 




RAMIRO GARCIA, Defendant- Appellant 
 
Supreme Court of Kansas 
 
Decided on September 8, 2017 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
BEIER, Supreme Court Judge: 
 
This companion case to State v. Morales 
and State v. Ochoa-Lara, this day decided, 
involves defendant Ramiro Garcia's 
conviction on one count of identity theft. 
The State's basis for the charge was Garcia's 
use of the Social Security number of Felisha 
Munguia to obtain restaurant employment. A 
Court of Appeals panel affirmed Garcia's 
conviction in an unpublished opinion. 
We granted Garcia's petition for review on 
three issues: (1) whether there was sufficient 
evidence that Garcia acted with an "intent to 
defraud," an element of identity theft; (2) 
whether the federal Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) preempted the 
prosecution; and (3) whether it was clearly 
erroneous for the district court judge not to 
give a unanimity instruction. Because we 
decide that Garcia's conviction must be 
reversed because the State's prosecution 
based on the Social Security number was 
expressly preempted, we do not reach 
Garcia's two other issues. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
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On August 26, 2012, Officer Mike Gibson 
pulled Garcia over for speeding. Gibson 
asked Garcia where he was going in such a 
hurry. Garcia replied that he was on his way 
to work at Bonefish Grill. Based on the 
results of a routine records check on Garcia, 
Gibson contacted Detective Justin Russell, 
who worked in the financial crimes 
department of the Overland Park Police 
Department. Russell was in the neighborhood 
and came to the scene to speak with Garcia. 
The day after speaking with Garcia, Russell 
contacted Bonefish Grill and obtained 
Garcia's "[e]mployment application 
documents, possibly the W-2, the I-9 
documents." Russell then spoke with Special 
Agent Joseph Espinosa of the Social Security 
Office of the Inspector General. Espinosa 
told Russell that the Social Security number 
Garcia had used on the forms belonged to 
Felisha Munguia of Edinburg, Texas. 
As a result of the investigation, Garcia was 
charged with one count of identity theft. The 
complaint alleged: 
"That on or about the 25th day of May, 2012, 
in the City of Overland Park, County of 
Johnson, and State of Kansas, RAMIRO 
ENRIQUEZ GARCIA did then and there 
unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously obtain, 
possess, transfer, use, sell or purchase any 
personal identifying information, or 
document containing the same, to wit: 
[S]ocial [S]ecurity number belonging to or 
issued to another person, to wit: Felisha 
Munguia, with the intent to defraud that 
person, or anyone else, in order to receive any 
benefit, a severity level 8, nonperson felony, 
in violation of K.S.A. 21-6107, K.S.A. 21-
6804 and K.S.A. 21-6807.  
Before trial, Garcia filed a motion to suppress 
the I-9 form he had filled out during the 
hiring process, relying on an express 
preemption provision in IRCA. At the 
hearing on the motion, Garcia noted, and the 
State agreed, that the State did not intend to 
rely on the I-9 as a basis of prosecution. 
Garcia then argued that, because the 
information contained on the I-9 was 
transferred to a W-4 form, the W-4 should be 
suppressed as well. The district judge refused 
to suppress the W-4. 
At trial, Khalil Booshehri, a manager at 
Bonefish Grill, testified that Garcia had been 
a line cook for the restaurant and had been a 
good employee. Booshehri testified that 
Garcia was paid for his work as a line cook, 
was allowed to eat while on duty, and was 
eligible for overtime pay. 
Jason Gajan, a managing partner at Bonefish 
Grill, testified about the restaurant's hiring 
process. The process typically begins with a 
short, informal interview when a person 
comes in looking for an application. If the 
manager determines that the person meets the 
restaurant's basic requirements, he or she is 
given a card with instructions explaining how 
to fill out an online application. 
With respect to Garcia's hiring specifically, 
the State introduced his employment 
application into evidence. The application 
contained basic information about Garcia's 
work history and education. The application 
did not disclose a Social Security number, 
although it contained a statement by Garcia 
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that, if hired, he could verify his identity and 
legal right to work in the United States. 
After receiving Garcia's application, 
Bonefish Grill decided to hire Garcia. 
Once a hiring decision has been made, the 
restaurant sends an e-mail to the new hire 
with a packet of information, including 
documents to fill out. Gajan believed that in 
addition to the information packet, new hires 
also received W-4 and I-9 forms. 
Garcia filled out electronic W-4 and K-4 tax 
forms, both of which were admitted into 
evidence. Each of the forms contained a 
Social Security number and was digitally 
signed by Garcia. Gajan testified that, in 
addition to the employee filling out the 
forms, Gajan would have had to see a paper 
Social Security card and then manually input 
the number from the card into an electronic 
document. After verifying the documents, 
Gajan would also have digitally signed the 
document himself. According to Gajan, he 
could not have proceeded with the hiring 
process if Garcia had not filled out the 
required forms. 
Gajan also testified about the benefits 
Bonefish Grill offered to employees and the 
benefits Garcia received. According to 
Gajan, Garcia was paid for the hours he 
worked at Bonefish Grill, including overtime 
pay on occasion. During his shifts, Garcia 
was allowed to eat at the restaurant. In 
addition, Bonefish Grill offered employees 
health and dental insurance, as well as paid 
vacation; but Gajan conceded that Garcia had 
not worked at Bonefish Grill long enough to 
receive these benefits. Gajan believed that 
Garcia would have received workers 
compensation benefits had he been injured on 
the job. 
The State's final witness was Espinosa. He 
testified that he had searched the "Social 
Security Master File Database" and 
determined that the Social Security number 
Garcia had used was not assigned to Garcia. 
The number was assigned to Felisha Mari 
Munguia, who was born in 1996. The 
database showed that Munguia had been 
issued a second Social Security card in 2000. 
Espinosa also provided examples of 
hypothetical consequences that might be 
caused by a person using someone else's 
Social Security number. In a "case 
specifically like this," if a person were to 
"come and work under your [S]ocial 
[S]ecurity number, it would report 
back wages for you[,] presumably 
making you insured into federal 
government programs that you may 
have not otherwise been entitled to. 
"Conversely to that, let's say that you 
were receiving some disability or 
retirement benefits from one of these 
government programs. These 
earnings could adversely affect you, 
because it would indicate that you are 
working when in fact you might not 
be working, and you could be 
terminated from those benefits." 
During cross-examination, Espinosa testified 
that he had never spoken to Munguia. 
In closing argument, the prosecutor 
acknowledged that Garcia was "a hard 
worker" and "did well at his job." He 
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conceded that "Mr. Booshehri did everything 
but tell you he was a very valuable employee. 
Mr. Gajan had nothing bad to say about him. 
He worked hard for Bonefish." But, 
according to the State, those facts did not 
matter because "in the State of Kansas, you 
cannot work under someone else's [S]ocial 
[S]ecurity number." The prosecutor also 
noted that Gajan "would not have hired 
[Garcia] if he did not have a [S]ocial 
[S]ecurity number." 
After deliberations, the jury found Garcia 
guilty of identity theft. The district judge later 
sentenced Garcia to 7 months in prison but 
granted 18 months' probation. 
This appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
Garcia challenges his conviction because, in 
his view, this identity theft prosecution 
against him was preempted by IRCA. 
All preemption arguments, including the as-
applied one advanced by Garcia in this case, 
are based upon the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution. The Supremacy 
Clause gives Congress the power to preempt 
state law. When evaluating whether a state 
law is preempted, "'[t]he purpose of Congress 
is the ultimate touchstone.' 
Before focusing on the use of the Kansas 
identity theft statute challenged here, it is 
helpful to review the general law of 
preemption under the precedents of the 
United States Supreme Court and this court. 
When all types, categories, and subcategories 
of preemption claims are considered, we 
discern eight possible ways a party may 
challenge an application of state law, alleging 
it is preempted by federal law. 
First, there are traditionally two basic types 
of such challenges: facial and as-
applied. When a party raises a facial 
challenge to application of state law, he or 
she claims that the law is preempted in all or 
virtually all cases.  
In contrast, when a party raises an as-applied 
preemption challenge, he or she argues that 
state law may be constitutional when applied 
in some cases but not in the particular 
circumstances of his or her case. In an as-
applied challenge, the law under scrutiny can 
itself be "textually neutral," meaning "one 
[cannot] tell that the" law undermines federal 
policy "by looking at the text [alone]. Only 
when studying certain applications of the 
laws" do conflicts arise.  
All of this said, "facial" and "as-applied" 
labels "parties attach to claims are not 
determinative" of the analysis a court will 
ultimately employ in a preemption case. And 
the boundary between the two types of 
challenges is not impenetrable. Still, as with 
other types of cases alleging that a law is 
unconstitutional, "[t]he distinction is both 
instructive and necessary, for it goes to the 
breadth of the remedy employed by the 
Court, not what must be pleaded in a 
complaint." Garcia challenges the use of law 
of general application to himself alone, i.e., 
advances an as-applied claim. The State does 
not challenge his characterization. The relief 
provided in this case will flow solely to 
Garcia. The fact that the holding in his favor 
may have wider application, Morales 
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and Ochoa-Lara, does not mean his 
preemption argument should be labeled 
"facial." 
Regardless of whether a particular challenge 
qualifies as facial or as-applied, any 
preemption claim also fits one of two other 
categories: express and implied. 
Express preemption depends upon the words 
used by Congress, which may explicitly limit 
a state's ability to legislate or apply its own 
constitutional or common law. "There is no 
doubt that Congress may withdraw specified 
powers from the States by enacting a statute 
containing an express preemption 
provision."  
Implied preemption arises when a federal 
statute's "structure and purpose" demonstrate 
that state law can have no application.  
Implied preemption is further analytically 
divided into two subcategories: field and 
conflict. 
A field preemption claim involves 
circumstances in which Congress has 
legislated so comprehensively on a subject 
that it has foreclosed any state regulation in 
that area. "Where Congress occupies an 
entire field, . . . even complementary state 
regulation is impermissible."  
Conflict preemption involves just that—
conflict between federal law and state law. A 
conflict preemption claim can arise in one of 
two situations, which have been labeled 
"impossibility" and "obstacle." 
Conflict-impossibility preemption arises in 
circumstances in which compliance with both 
federal and state law is, practically speaking, 
impossible.  
Conflict-obstacle preemption involves 
circumstances in which application of state 
law erects an obstacle to achievement of 
Congress' objectives.  
As we turn to evaluating the applicability of 
these preemption concepts in this case, we 
first address two preliminary matters: 
preservation of the preemption issue and the 
potential applicability of a presumption 
against preemption. 
Preservation of Preemption Issue 
As stated above, a party's label on his or her 
preemption challenge does not inevitably 
control the analysis a court can 
employ. Simply put, a court's analysis of a 
preemption challenge is not bound to color 
within any party's lines. This approach to 
preemption challenge analysis is consistent 
with the more widely applicable practice of 
allowing a party who properly preserves a 
federal claim to make any appellate argument 
in support of that claim.  
Here, Garcia's preemption issue was 
preserved in the district court through 
defense IRCA arguments in favor of 
suppression and a subsequent evidentiary 
objection. In his brief to the Court of Appeals, 
Garcia advanced express, field, and conflict-
obstacle preemption challenges—all as-
applied to Garcia only. The State responded 
in kind in its brief. In Garcia's petition for 
review to this court, he repeated his three-
pronged approach to preemption. It was not 
until oral argument that his counsel, when 
pressed, concentrated his argument on as-
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applied, field preemption. Again, even after 
this limitation, we are free to consider any 
type, category, or subcategory of preemption 
supported by the appellate record and 
applicable law. 
Potential Application of Presumption 
Against Preemption 
The United States Supreme Court has 
sometimes recited that it presumes no 
preemption. And we have recited and applied 
such a presumption in some but not all of this 
court's earlier preemption cases.  
But the reality is that under United States 
Supreme Court precedent, the necessity of 
indulging such a presumption in an express 
preemption case is far from clear. 
Three members of the current Court—Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts and 
Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. 
Alito—and the now departed Justice Antonin 
G. Scalia have recognized that the Court has 
not consistently applied the presumption to 
express preemption cases and have said it 
should not be so applied. And the wording of 
opinions authored by Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy betray at least some ambivalence 
about the merit of applying a presumption of 
Congressional intent when Congress has 
already included express preemption 
language in a statute.  
Indeed, careful review of a single case 
exposes the range of positions on application 
of the presumption in an express preemption 
case held by Court members. In that 
case, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Court 
considered whether federal law preempted 
state-law claims of negligence, strict liability, 
and implied warranty in a case regarding the 
manufacture of a balloon catheter. 
Justice Scalia, writing for a majority 
including Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, 
interpreted an express preemption clause 
without applying the presumption and held 
that state law was preempted. Justice Stevens 
concurred in part and in the judgment; he 
would not have applied the presumption and 
agreed that the state law was preempted. 
Finally, Justice Ginsburg dissented. She 
would have applied the presumption and 
would have held that the state law was not 
preempted.  
Lacking contrary clarity from the United 
States Supreme Court, we hold that it is 
unnecessary to apply a presumption against 
preemption when a court evaluates the merit 
of an express preemption claim, as long as the 
language of the congressional enactment at 
issue is clear. This makes logical and legal 
sense. There is simply no need to presume 
congressional intent when Congress has 
stated its intent explicitly. We agree that 
"[w]hen Congress has considered the 
issue of pre-emption and has included 
in the enacted legislation a provision 
explicitly addressing that issue, and 
when that provision provides a 
'reliable indicium of congressional 
intent with respect to state authority,' 
'there is no need to infer 
congressional intent to pre-empt state 
laws from the substantive provisions' 
of the legislation.  
This approach also has the considerable 
virtue of consistency with our modern rubric 
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for statutory interpretation and construction 
in all other contexts. "The fundamental rule 
of statutory interpretation is that the intent of 
the legislature is dispositive if it is possible to 
ascertain that intent. Our "primary 
consideration in ascertaining the intent of the 
legislature" is the language of a statute; we 
think "the best and only safe rule for 
determining the intent of the creators of a 
written law is to abide by the language that 
they have chosen to use." This court does not 
move from interpretation of plain statutory 
language to the endeavor of statutory 
construction, including its reliance on extra-
textual legislative history and canons of 
construction and other background 
considerations, unless the plain language of 
the legislature or Congress is ambiguous.  
Express Preemption 
"The Government of the United States has 
broad, undoubted power over the subject of 
immigration and the status of aliens." In line 
with that power, Congress enacted 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 
which "established a 'comprehensive federal 
statutory scheme for regulation of 
immigration and naturalization' and set 'the 
terms and conditions of admission to the 
country and the subsequent treatment of 
aliens lawfully in the country.'"  
In 1986, Congress supplemented the INA by 
enacting IRCA, which comprehensively 
regulates employment of aliens. According to 
a 1986 House Report, Congress sought "to 
close the back door on illegal immigration so 
that the front door on legal immigration may 
remain open," and it attempted to achieve this 
goal predominantly through employer 
sanctions.  
Section 101 of IRCA became 8 U.S.C. § 
1324a. It provides in pertinent part that the 
employment of unauthorized aliens is 
unlawful. It also establishes an employment 
verification system that requires employers to 
attest to their employee's immigration status. 
Failure to comply with the requirements can 
result in civil penalties, and a pattern or 
practice of violations can result in both civil 
and criminal penalties against an employer. 
In turn, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2 was promulgated 
in 1987 by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, which was then part 
of the Department of Justice, to implement 8 
U.S.C. § 1324a. The regulation provides for 
an employment verification system, and its § 
274a.2 identifies Form I-9 as the form to be 
used by an employer when verifying such 
eligibility. The employer must ensure that a 
potential employee completes the I-9, must 
examine the potential employee's 
identification and work authorization 
documents, must complete the employer 
portion of the I-9, and must sign an 
attestation. A Social Security card is one of 
the documents an employer may examine to 
establish employment eligibility.  
Congress included an express preemption 
clause having to do with employers in IRCA. 
It also included the following language: 
"A form designated or established by 
Attorney General under this 
subsection and any information 
contained in or appended to such 
form, may not be used for purposes 
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other than for enforcement of this 
chapter and sections 1001, 
1028, 1546, and 1621 of Title 18."  
Title 18 of the United States Code (2012) 
deals with Crimes and Criminal 
Procedure. Section 1001 deals with fraud and 
false statements generally; § 1028 deals with 
fraud and related activity in connection with 
identification documents, authentication 
features, and information; § 1546 deals with 
fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other 
documents; and § 1621 deals with perjury 
generally. Despite references in the 
legislative history to Congress emphasizing 
penalties for employers rather employees, 
IRCA specifically amended § 1546 to 
include criminal sanctions against an alien 
who commits fraud in the employment 
eligibility verification process.  
Of course, the case before us does not arise 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b). Rather, it is a 
State prosecution under a generally 
applicable statute prohibiting identity 
theft. The State seeks to punish an alien who 
used the personal identifying information of 
another to establish the alien's work 
authorization. Again, this means that Garcia's 
preemption challenge, no matter which 
category, is an as-applied type. He does not 
seek to prevent all prosecutions under the 
state law. His challenge can fairly be 
characterized as "facial" in the traditional 
sense only insofar that its holding will apply 
to other aliens in his position, i.e., those who 
use the Social Security card or other 
document listed in federal law of another for 
purposes of establishing employment 
eligibility.  
Garcia has relied heavily on Arizona, to 
support what his counsel termed his field 
preemption argument. But Arizona actually 
has limited influence on that particular 
argument. 
In Arizona, the Supreme Court determined 
that Congress has fully occupied the field of 
alien registration. On the other hand, the only 
provision considered in that case that is 
somewhat analogous to the prosecution's use 
of the identity theft statute in this case 
was section 5(C), which made it a 
misdemeanor for an alien to seek or engage 
in work. Section 5(C) was not field 
preempted. Rather, it was preempted under 
conflict-obstacle theory because it 
"involve[d] a conflict in the method of 
enforcement."  
Garcia has also directed our attention to 
the Puente Arizona v. Arpaio series of federal 
decisions. 
The first time Puente Arizona came before a 
district judge, the judge was considering 
whether two Arizona state statutes were 
constitutional. The plaintiffs were a civil 
rights organization and separate individuals, 
including at least one who had been 
convicted under the challenged laws, which 
criminalized "the act of identity theft done 
with the intent to obtain or continue 
employment" and forgery generally. 
Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, 
asking the district judge to enjoin 
enforcement of the laws. The plaintiffs 
invoked IRCA to claim that the laws were 
facially preempted and as applied, under both 
field and conflict principles. The district 
judge ruled that the plaintiffs had 
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demonstrated a likelihood of success for 
facial field and facial conflict preemption and 
granted a temporary injunction.  
On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding 
that the neutral application of the laws to all 
defendants was fatal to the facial challenge. 
The circuit panel remanded to the same 
district judge for consideration of the 
plaintiffs' as-applied challenges.  
On remand, the district judge considered the 
plaintiffs' conflict and field preemption 
arguments. He treated the language in 8 
U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) as a "use limitation" 
and ruled that Congress intended "to preempt 
a relatively narrow field: state prosecution of 
fraud in the I-9 process."  "[U]se limitation 
certainly is relevant in assessing Congress's 
intent for preemption purposes, but the focus 
of the provision is quite narrow. It applies 
only to Form I-9 and documents appended to 
the form." On field preemption, the judge 
ruled that he could not conclude that 
Congress had "expressed a clear and manifest 
intent to occupy the field of unauthorized 
alien fraud in seeking employment. The 
focus of the criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
1546, is the I-9 process." The district judge 
also determined prosecution of aliens under 
the state statutes was not preempted because 
of conflict either because of the impossibility 
of enforcing both state and federal law or 
because enforcement of state law erected a 
barrier or obstacle to full realization of 
federal policy goals. "The Court sees no 
strong showing of conflict between the 
application of the identity theft and forgery 
statutes outside the I-9 process and federal 
statutes that are limited to that process."  
In a still later decision in the series, the 
district judge addressed the plaintiffs' 
argument that its November 2016 preemption 
decision in favor of the plaintiffs was 
narrower than it should be, and he "clarified" 
his preemption holding. Specifically, the 
judge recognized that the federal I-9 
verification system, which requires a 
prospective employee to present certain 
documents demonstrating employment 
eligibility to the prospective employer and 
permits the employer to retain copies of those 
documents, potentially including among 
them a Social Security card, 
"suggests that Congress intended to 
protect more than the I-9 and 
documents physically attached to it. 
The Court sees no logical reason why 
Congress would prohibit state law-
enforcement officers from using the 
Form I-9 and documents physically 
attached to it, and yet permit them to 
use [designated employment 
eligibility documents including 
Social Security cards] submitted with 
[the] I-9 simply because they were 
never stapled to the I-9 or  were 
stored by the employer in a folder 
separate from the I-9. This is 
particularly true when one considers 
other statutory sections. 
"Section 1324a(d) provides guidance for 
future variations of the federal employment 
verification system. It makes clear that even 
if the Form I-9 is replaced or new 
documentation requirements are created, the 
use limitation will continue to prohibit use of 
the employment verification system for non-
enumerated purposes. The statute sates that 
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'[t]he system may not be used for law 
enforcement purposes, other than for 
enforcement of this chapter or sections 
1001, 1028, 1546, and 1621 of Title 18. This 
suggests that Congress intended to bar the use 
of the verification process itself, not just the 
I-9 and physically attached documents, in 
state law enforcement. Additionally, § 
1324a(d)(2)(C) provides that '[a]ny personal 
information utilized by the system may not be 
made available to Government agencies, 
employers, and other persons except to the 
extent necessary to verify that an individual 
is not an unauthorized alien.' This limitation 
is not restricted to information contained in 
or appended to any specific document, but 
applies generally to the federal employment 
verification system. 
"Statutes imposing criminal, civil, and 
immigration penalties for fraud committed in 
the employment verification process also 
reflect a congressional intent to regulate more 
than the Form I-9 and physically attached 
documents. . . . 
. . . . 
". . . The Court continues to hold the view that 
Congress did not intend to preempt state 
regulation of fraud outside the federal 
employment verification process, as stated in 
its summary judgment ruling . . . . But the 
Court concludes from the provisions 
reviewed above that Congress's preemptive 
intent was not limited to the Form I-9 and 
physically attached documents. Congress 
also regulated—and intended to preempt 
state use of—other documents used to show 
employment authorization under the federal 
system. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, 'field 
preemption can be inferred . . . where there is 
a regulatory framework so pervasive . . . that 
Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.'  
"This conclusion is supported by the 
legislative history of the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act, which reflects Congress's 
'[c]oncern . . . that verification information 
could create a "paper trail" resulting in the 
utilization of this information for the purpose 
of apprehending undocumented aliens. If 
documents presented solely to comply with 
the federal employment verification system 
could be used for state law enforcement 
purposes so long as they were not physically 
attached to a Form I-9, this congressional 
intent easily would be undermined. 
"The Court's conclusion is also supported by 
recent decisions from other 
courts. Reviewing the use limitation and 
several other provisions of § 1324a, the 
Supreme Court found that 'Congress has 
made clear . . . that any information 
employees submit to indicate their work 
status "may not be used" for purposes other 
than prosecution under specific federal 
criminal statues for fraud, perjury, and 
related conduct.' The Ninth Circuit reached a 
similar conclusion.   
"In summary, the Court concludes that 
Congress clearly and manifestly intended to 
prohibit the use of the Form I-9, documents 
attached to the Form I-9, and documents 
submitted as part of the I-9 employment 
verification process, whether attached to the 
form or not, for state law enforcement 
purposes . . . . Defendants are preempted from 
(a) employing or relying on (b) any 
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documents or information (c) submitted to an 
employer solely as part of the federal 
employment verification process (d) for any 
investigative or prosecutorial purpose under 
the Arizona identi[t]y theft and forgery 
statutes. As Plaintiffs concede, Defendants 
may use [designated employment eligibility 
documents including Social Security cards] 
submitted in the I-9 process if they were also 
submitted for a purpose independent of the 
federal employment verification system, such 
as to demonstrate the ability to drive or as 
part of a typical employment application."  
Although we might be inclined to agree with 
the ultimate Puente Arizona decision from 
the district judge, it nevertheless has 
limited influence today because we dispose 
of this case under the plain and unambiguous 
language of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5), an 
effective express preemption provision 
having to do with employees as well as 
employers. When the Puente Arizona district 
judge was considering the plaintiffs' as-
applied challenges, he was focused only on 
field and conflict preemption analysis. No 
party was urging express preemption, which 
provides a much more direct route to a similar 
result. The language in 8 U.S.C. § 
1324a(b)(5) explicitly prohibited state law 
enforcement use not only of the I-9 itself but 
also of the "information contained in" the I-9 
for purposes other than those enumerated. In 
short, in March of this year, the Puente 
Arizona district judge admirably recognized 
that he had unduly narrowed his 
interpretation of the "use limitation" in the 
statute. It had simply been incorrect to say 
that only use of the I-9 and attached 
documents was covered. But his focus on 
whether other documents need or need not be 
attached to the I-9 at some point still ignored 
the "information contained in" plain language 
of the statute. 
We do not ignore this language. It is 
Congress' plain and clear expression of its 
intent to preempt the use of the I-9 form and 
any information contained in the I-9 for 
purposes other than those listed 
in §1324a(b)(5). Prosecution of Garcia—an 
alien who committed identity theft for the 
purpose of establishing work eligibility—is 
not among the purposes allowed in IRCA. 
Although the State did not rely on the I-9, it 
does not follow that the State's use of the 
Social Security card information was allowed 
by Congress. "A State may not evade the pre-
emptive force of federal law by resorting to 
creative statutory interpretation or 
description at odds with the statute's intended 
operation and effect."  
The "key question" when evaluating whether 
a state law is preempted is congressional 
intent. That intent is spelled out for us in 8 
U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5): States are prohibited 
from using the I-9 and any information 
contained within the I-9as the bases for a state 
law identity theft prosecution of an alien who 
uses another's Social Security information in 
an I-9. The fact that this information was 
included in the W-4 and K-4 did not alter the 
fact that it was also part of the I-9. 
Because we can dispose of Garcia's 
preemption claim based on the express 
preemption language in 8 U.S.C. § 
1324a(b)(5), we need not decide the merits of 





We reverse Garcia's conviction because the 
State's identity theft prosecution of him based 
on the Social Security number contained in 
the I-9 used to establish his employment 
eligibility was expressly preempted. 
BILES, Senior Supreme Court Judge, 
dissenting:  
I disagree that 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) 
(2012) creates an as-applied, express federal 
preemption barring Ramiro Garcia's state law 
prosecution for identity theft when he used 
someone else's Social Security number to 
complete tax forms while being hired as a 
restaurant worker. The majority's rationale 
sets up a sweeping prohibition against 
identity theft prosecutions for such crimes 
generally occurring in the employment 
process. I also cannot conclude any other 
federal preemption theory carries the day 
under these facts, so I dissent. 
Garcia was convicted under our state's 
identity theft law for using someone else's 
Social Security number to receive a 
benefit, i.e., employment. The statute does 
not make it illegal to attempt to secure 
employment as an unauthorized alien. The 
specific conduct for which Garcia was 
convicted was using someone else's Social 
Security number in completing his federal 
W-4 and state K-4 tax forms. Garcia's 
immigration status was not relevant to 
whether this conduct was unlawful, and the 
conduct was independent of the federal 
employment verification system. The tax 
forms are used solely to calculate federal and 
state income tax withholdings—not to verify 
a person's authority to work in the United 
States. 
Under these circumstances, the question put 
to us is whether Garcia's use of someone 
else's identifying information within the 
employment setting sufficiently implicates 
the narrow area controlled by Congress 
through the federal Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). In answering 
that question, the majority holds states cannot 
use the Form I-9 or any information 
contained in it, and the fact that one uses the 
information elsewhere―the W-4, K-4, and 
employment application―does not save the 
case from the preemption explicitly intended 
by Congress when it passed IRCA. The 
majority concludes this is an as-applied, 
express preemption, which states: "A form 
designated or established by the Attorney 
General under this subsection and any 
information contained in or appended to such 
form, may not be used for purposes other than 
for the enforcement of this chapter 
and sections 1001, 1028, 1546, and 1621 of 
Title 18."  
This rationale is sweeping because 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a(b) requires an employer to verify 
that an "individual" is not an unauthorized 
alien, which means employers must verify all 
job applicants irrespective of their immigrant 
or nonimmigrant status. Under the majority's 
view, federal law effectively 
prevents any prosecution under the Kansas 
identity theft crime occurring in the 
employment context if it relies on 
information that also just happens to be on or 
attached to a Form I-9. This cannot reflect 
congressional intent. 
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The crux of the express preemption question 
is whether the phrase "any information 
contained in" the form applies literally to all 
information on the Form I-9, wherever else it 
might be found; or more narrowly to the 
contents of the completed Form I-9. 
While the majority takes the former view, I 
take the latter because the Form I-9 and the 
W-4 and K-4 forms were supplied for 
different and independent purposes. In 
Garcia's case, the Form I-9 was not admitted 
into evidence, so no information necessarily 
gleaned from it was "used" in the State's 
prosecution. Garcia was not convicted for 
using someone else's identity on Form I-9 to 
deceive his employer as to his work 
authorization. Instead, Garcia was convicted 
for using another person's Social Security 
number on tax withholding forms. 
The majority reaches its decision through a 
unique and overly literal interpretation of 8 
U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5). The majority reads the 
provision to create a congressional 
"information-use preemption" rather than a 
"Form I-9-use limitation." In doing so, the 
majority stretches statutory interpretation 
past the breaking point and dismisses 
contrary caselaw. 
In Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, a federal district 
court looked at this same statutory language 
and ruled Congress preempted "a relatively 
narrow field: state prosecution of fraud in the 
I-9 process." That same court in a follow-up 
opinion most recently explained the scope of 
this preemption by stating: 
"In summary, the Court concludes 
that Congress clearly and manifestly 
intended to prohibit the use of the 
Form I-9, documents attached to the 
Form I-9, and documents submitted 
as part of the I-9 employment 
verification process, whether attached 
to the form or not, for state law 
enforcement purposes. Further, as the 
Supreme Court found in Smith v. 
United States, the ordinary meaning 
of the term 'use' is '"to employ" or "to 
derive service from."' The Court will 
adopt this ordinary meaning of the 
word 'use.' Thus, the Court holds that 
Defendants are preempted from (a) 
employing or relying on (b) any 
documents or information (c) 
submitted to an employer solely as 
part of the federal employment 
verification process (d) for any 
investigative or prosecutorial purpose 
under the Arizona identify theft and 
forgery statutes. As Plaintiffs 
concede, Defendants may use List A, 
B, or C documents submitted in the I-
9 process if they were also submitted 
for a purpose independent of the 
federal employment verification 
system, such as to demonstrate ability 
to drive or as part of a typical 
employment application.”  
The Garcia majority attempts to minimize 
the Puente Arizona court's analysis by 
asserting "no party was urging express 
preemption." 306 Kan. at    , slip op. at 18. 
But a careful review of both the 2016 and 
2017 district court decisions demonstrate that 
the court did not "overlook" the language in 8 
U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5). The Puente 
Arizona court was familiar with the statutory 
language and the arguments arising from it—
including express preemption. The court 
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simply interpreted the law differently than 
the majority does. 
Indeed, no other court has interpreted 8 
U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) as the majority has. 
There are several decisions, including those 
from our own state, that have come to 
opposite or unsupportive conclusions. For 
instance, in Arizona v. United States, the 
United States Supreme Court noted, "IRCA's 
express preemption provision, which in most 
instances bars [s]tates from imposing 
penalties on employers of unauthorized 
aliens, is silent about whether additional 
penalties may be imposed against the 
employees." The Arizona Court recognized 
IRCA's express preemption provision on the 
employer side but not on the employee side 
of the equation. 
The Iowa Supreme Court recently held that 
state's identity theft law is not facially 
preempted by IRCA. Instead, a bare majority 
of the Martinez court 
held implied preemption theories applicable 
to that state's identity theft law, which is 
largely similar to ours. Both Kansas' and 
Iowa's statutes are alike in that they apply to 
any person, regardless of immigration status, 
and they apply in any situation―not just the 
employment authorization verification 
process. 
Another example is State v. Reynua. In that 
case, the Reynua court stated, "[W]e cannot 
read [8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5)] so broadly as 
to preempt a state from enforcing its laws 
relating to its own identification documents." 
The court reasoned, "It would be a significant 
limitation on state powers to preempt 
prosecution of state laws prohibiting 
falsification of state-issued identification 
cards, let alone to prohibit all use of such 
cards merely because they are also used to 
support the federal employment-verification 
application." The Reynua court's rationale 
fully protects federal interests, while 
the Garcia majority's broad reading of 8 
U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) constitutes a 
"significant limitation" on our state's police 
power to protect its citizens from identity 
theft. 
The Garcia majority's rationale also runs 
counter to a unanimous string of Kansas 
Court of Appeals decisions that have 
expressly considered this question.  
Despite my conclusion that as-applied 
express preemption is not applicable, I admit 
to being attracted to the notion that the 
Kansas statute is preempted as applied in this 
case under implied theories of either field or 
conflict preemption, as the Iowa Supreme 
Court majority recently held. The possibility 
of dual enforcement tracks—state and 
federal—is concerning because of the 
prosecutorial discretion contemplated in the 
federal IRCA statutory scheme and the 
discretion our state affords to its prosecutors. 
Spotty statewide enforcement would seem to 
manifest the evil—robing the federal 
government of its discretion—foreseen by 
Iowa's Chief Justice Cady in his 
separate Martinez concurring opinion.  
This apprehension is particularly noteworthy 
because the identity theft cases reaching our 
Kansas appellate courts involving 
unauthorized immigrants seem to be arising 
from just one prosecuting jurisdiction, which 
suggests other Kansas prosecutors may be 
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exercising their discretion differently. I 
would view an as-applied conflict 
preemption challenge raised under the proper 
facts to be a close call. But in the end, the 
balance is tipped by our state's longstanding 
caselaw recognizing that "'"[i]n the absence 
of express preemption in a federal law, there 
is a strong presumption that Congress did not 
intend to displace state law."  
This strong presumption, combined with the 
caselaw recited above and my concern about 
the sweeping potential impact of the 
majority's rationale, cause me to dissent. 
STEGALL, Supreme Court Judge, 
dissenting:  
I join Justice Biles' dissent fully with respect 
to express preemption. Today's decision 
appears to wipe numerous criminal laws off 
the books in Kansas—starting with, but not 
necessarily ending with, laws prohibiting 
identity theft. For this reason, I doubt the 
logic of today's decision will be extended 
beyond the narrow facts before us. But rather 
than take solace in this hope, I find in it the 
irrefutable fact that today's logic is wrong. 
"It is well established that within 
Constitutional limits Congress may pre-empt 
state authority by so stating in express 
terms."  Thus, as a first principle, Congress 
cannot preempt state law in matters that lie 
outside Congress' limited, prescribed powers. 
Moreover, additional limits on federal 
preemption have been crafted to guard the 
prerogatives of states in order not to "disturb" 
the "federal-state balance."  
Even if the majority's interpretation of 8 
U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) (2012) is correct, and 
Congress intended to expressly preempt state 
use of all information contained in a person's 
I-9 form, it is doubtful Congress has such 
sweeping powers to interfere with the 
legitimate government of the states. Can it 
really be true that the state of Kansas is or 
could be expressly preempted from using—
for any purpose—the name of any citizen 
who has completed an I-9 form? A name is 
"information" after all. To ask the question is 
to answer it. 
Therefore, even if I were convinced by the 
majority's statutory analysis—I am not—I 
would question the majority's implicit 
holding that Congress has, in the first place, 
the constitutional power to prohibit states 
from using any information found on a 
federal I-9 form. If such a power did exist, 
the delicate federal-state balance achieved by 
our system of federalism would not merely be 
disturbed, it would be obliterated. 
Finally, I likewise join my colleague in 
dissent with respect to implied 
preemption.  Unlike Justice Biles, however, I 
do not find the question a particularly close 
call. 













March 18, 2019 
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider letting 
states prosecute undocumented immigrants 
for identity theft if they use someone else’s 
Social Security number to apply for a job, 
agreeing to take up what could be a polarizing 
fight. 
Heeding calls from Kansas and the Trump 
administration, the justices said they’ll 
decide whether the Kansas Supreme Court 
was right to say that only the federal 
government has the power under U.S. 
immigration law to press those types of 
prosecutions. 
A victory for Kansas would give states a new 
tool for battling illegal immigration, letting 
them be more aggressive on an issue handled 
primarily at the federal level. The court will 
hear the case during the nine-month term that 
starts in October. 
Kansas says the dispute is more about 
identity theft than illegal immigration. The 
state is trying to reinstate the convictions of 
three men who got restaurant jobs using 
another person’s Social Security number. 
“Identity crime is a problem that far exceeds 
the capacity of the United States alone to 
prosecute,” Kansas Attorney General Derek 
Schmidt argued in court papers. 
In throwing out the convictions, the top 
Kansas court said the 1986 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act bars state 
prosecutions based on information contained 
in the federal I-9 form, which employers use 
to verify work eligibility. The court pointed 
to a provision in the law that lets prosecutors 
use the I-9 “and any information contained in 
or appended to such form” only for specified 
federal crimes. 
“It is Congress’s plain and clear expression 
of its intent to preempt the use of the I-9 form 
and any information contained in the I-9 for 
purposes other than those listed,” the Kansas 
Supreme Court said in one of the cases, 
involving Ramiro Garcia. 
Withholding Forms 
Kansas says prosecutors didn’t rely on the I-
9 form and instead used Garcia’s tax 
withholding forms, which also contained the 
stolen Social Security number. The state said 
the “most natural reading” of the disputed 
provision is that it bars the use of the I-9 form 
itself and any attached documents, but not 
information that also appears on other forms. 
The Supreme Court said in a 2012 case 
involving Arizona that Congress had set up a 
“comprehensive framework” for preventing 
the employment of people who are illegally 
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in the country. The 1986 law doesn’t impose 
criminal penalties on undocumented 
immigrants but does allow federal 
prosecutions for fraud. 
Lawyers for Garcia and the other two men 
say Kansas’s position can’t be squared with 
the 2012 ruling. “State prosecutions of 
offenses relating to employment eligibility 
conflict with the comprehensive federal 
regime,” they argued. 
The Trump administration disagrees, saying 
state prosecutions won’t interfere with 
federal authority. 
Kansas’s identity-theft law “does not regulate 
employment,” U.S. Solicitor General Noel 
Francisco argued. “It regulates the use of 
another person’s identity with the intent to 
commit fraud.” 









































































March 18, 2019  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed 
to consider a bid by Kansas to revive the 
state’s policy of prosecuting people for 
identity theft for using other people’s Social 
Security numbers to gain employment in a 
case linked to immigration issues. 
The justices will hear the state’s appeal of a 
2017 Kansas Supreme Court ruling that 
voided the convictions of three restaurant 
workers and found that a 1986 federal law, 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 
prevents states from pursuing such 
prosecutions. 
The three men - Ramiro Garcia, Donaldo 
Morales and Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara - had 
provided their employers Social Security 
numbers that were not their own before being 
prosecuted for identity theft. 
President Donald Trump has taken a hard line 
against illegal immigrants. His 
administration filed court papers siding with 
Kansas urging the justices to take up the 
appeal. 
Lawyers on both sides refused to comment on 
why the three men did not have or did not use 
their own Social Security numbers, saying it 
was not relevant to the legal question. People 
who enter the country illegally do not get 
assigned Social Security numbers, which are 
given by the U.S. government to all legal 
residents. 
The number is primarily used to identify 
people for employment and tax purposes. Its 
original purpose was to track each person’s 
payments into the Social Security program, 
which provides money for retirees and people 
eligible for other social welfare programs. 
The state appeals court found that the federal 
law defined the circumstances under which 
immigrants can be penalized for providing 
incorrect information to employers. The law 
required employers to fill out a form, known 
as the I-9, attesting that they have reviewed 
prospective employees’ documents and can 
confirm they are authorized to work in the 
United States. The law also stated that the 
form “may not be used for purposes other 
than for enforcement of this act.” 
Lawyers for the three men said that because 
they were using the Social Security numbers 
listed on their I-9 forms to establish their 
eligibility to work, they cannot be prosecuted 
under state law. The cases were prosecuted in 
Johnson County, located near Kansas City, 
Missouri. 
The U.S. Justice Department said the federal 
law, signed by former President Ronald 
Reagan, does not prevent the use of 
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information contained on the I-9 form if the 
same false information is also included on 
other forms, namely federal and state tax 
forms. During the prosecutions, the state 
specifically said it was not relying on the I-9 
forms. 
“Nothing in the statute suggests that 
Congress intended to carve out an exception 
to generally applicable state laws for the 
exclusive benefit of unauthorized aliens,” 
Solicitor General Noel Francisco, the Trump 
administration’s top Supreme Court lawyer, 
said in the court filing. 
Kansas is one of several conservative-leaning 










































Tiffany Hu  
 
June 3, 2019 
 
The federal government and several others 
have urged the U.S. Supreme Court to 
reinstate the state convictions of three 
unauthorized immigrants who used stolen 
Social Security numbers to gain employment, 
saying the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act does not preempt the use of information 
on I-9 documents for state identity theft 
prosecutions.  
The solicitor general, a state coalition led by 
Indiana, and conservative groups the Eagle 
Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund and 
the Immigration Reform Law Institute each 
penned amicus briefs Friday backing the state 
of Kansas' challenge of a Kansas Supreme 
Court ruling that the state convictions of 
Ramiro Garcia, Donaldo Morales and 
Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara were preempted by 
the IRCA, which requires employers to verify 
their employees' immigration status through 
the use of the I-9 form. The justices agreed to 
take up the case in March.  
In its brief to the high court, the solicitor 
general's office told the justices that the 
relevant statute only bars the use of 
information on I-9 documents in criminal 
prosecutions. Nothing in the statute 
prevented the state from prosecuting the trio 
based on the tax forms on which the Social 
Security numbers were entered, the solicitor 
general said.  
Furthermore, under the Kansas Supreme 
Court's ruling, the state would not be able to 
use any information contained in an I-9 form, 
including an individual's name, even if the 
information was actually obtained from 
different and unrelated documents, the 
solicitor general argued.  
"Because virtually everyone who has a job — 
citizens and aliens alike — must submit an I-
9, the decision below would preclude the use 
of basic identity information in most state and 
many federal law-enforcement operations," 
the government's brief states. 
"Unsurprisingly, every other court to 
consider the question has found that result 
irreconcilable with the statutory text, 
structure and purpose."  
The prosecutions were also not impliedly 
preempted, as the immigrants had contended, 
the solicitor general said. Congress has not 
yet "occupied" the area of law concerning the 
employment of unauthorized immigrants, 
and even if it had, the three prosecutions 
would not be preempted because they were 
for identity theft and falsifying documents, 
which does not apply only to those who 
unlawfully entered the U.S., according to the 
solicitor general.  
"Respondents' contrary position would mean 
that Kansas could prosecute a U.S. citizen or 
 347 
authorized alien who presents an employer 
with a false social security number, but could 
not prosecute an unauthorized alien who does 
the same," the brief states. "Nothing in IRCA 
or elsewhere suggests that Congress intended 
to carve out an exception to generally 
applicable state laws for the exclusive benefit 
of unauthorized aliens."  
The amicus brief filed by the state coalition 
similarly argued that the Kansas Supreme 
Court improperly determined that the state 
could not use information on the I-9 
regardless of whether it had an independent 
source, saying that this ruling encouraged 
"would-be thieves" to skirt prosecution by 
including information that was stolen in their 
I-9 forms.  
Indiana Solicitor General Thomas Fisher told 
Law360 on Tuesday that the Kansas Supreme 
Court's ruling was based on a "clear 
misinterpretation" of the statute and, if kept 
in place, would "dramatically diminish" the 
state's ability to crack down on identity theft 
crimes.  
"If the Kansas decision were affirmed, states 
would be left unable to enforce laws against 
identity theft," Fisher said by email. "In fact, 
under such a scenario, individuals 
committing identity theft could effectively 
immunize themselves from state prosecution 
by simply falsifying federal employment 
eligibility verification forms among whatever 
other documents they falsify."  
The Immigration Reform Law Institute 
argued that the prosecutions were not 
preempted by the statute, while the Eagle 
Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund's 
brief focused on the constitutionality of the 
Kansas Supreme Court's reading of the 
statute.  
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also filed a 
brief on Friday, though it said that it was not 
taking any sides in the case. Instead, the 
Chamber urged the justices to use the case to 
make clear that a presumption against 
preemption should be rejected when a statute 
has an express preemption clause, noting the 
"lingering uncertainty" from the lower courts.  
An attorney for the Chamber declined to 
comment Monday. Counsel for the other 
parties and a representative for the U.S. 
Department of Justice did not immediately 
respond to requests for comment.  
Garcia, Morales and Ochoa-Lara, who all 
used other Social Security numbers to be 
employed at various restaurants, were 
separately prosecuted and convicted of 
identity theft or making false statements after 
law enforcement officers found that the three 
had used other people's Social Security 
numbers on various government forms, 
including the I-9 form and the W-4 and K-4 
tax withholding forms. In each case, the I-9 
form-related charge was dismissed, and the 
three were convicted based on their false 
statements in the other forms.  
The Kansas Court of Appeals upheld those 
convictions, but in September 2017, the 
Kansas Supreme Court reversed, finding in 
all three cases that their state convictions 
were preempted by the IRCA.  
"Prosecution of Garcia — an alien who 
committed identity theft for the purpose of 
establishing work eligibility — is not among 
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the purposes allowed in IRCA," the opinion 
in Garcia's case says. "Although the state did 
not rely on the I-9, it does not follow that the 
state's use of the Social Security card 
information was allowed by Congress."  
Kansas filed its petition for a writ of certiorari 
in December 2017, arguing that the Kansas 
Supreme Court's ruling raises "serious 
constitutional questions" about whether 
federal immigration law can trump states' 
power to enact and enforce criminal laws. 
Identity theft is also becoming increasingly 
common and has broad implications for U.S. 
citizens and immigrants alike, the state said.  
Kansas also argued that the state supreme 
court's overly broad reading of the IRCA 
effectively prevents the state from 
prosecuting even citizens and lawful 
immigrants who have included false 
information on their I-9 forms, which would 
"not even arguably be interfering with federal 
immigration law prerogatives" outlined in the 
IRCA. Allowing such an outcome "does not 
pass the laugh test," it said.  
In a March 2018 reply brief, the immigrants 
implicated in the case countered that the 
Kansas Supreme Court had reached the right 
decision in respecting the federal 
government's "sole authority to determine 
who is authorized to work." States, however, 
cannot expand or restrict work authorization, 
they said.  
The state of Kansas is represented by Derek 
Schmidt, Jeffrey A. Chanay, Toby Crouse, 
Kristafer Ailslieger, Bryan C. Clark, Natalie 
Chalmers, Dwight R. Carswell and Steven J. 
Obermeier of the Office of the Attorney 
General of Kansas.  
Garcia, Morales and Ochoa-Lara are 
represented by Paul W. Hughes and Michael 
B. Kimberly of McDermott Will & Emery 
LLP.  
The government is represented by U.S. 
Solicitor General Noel J. Francisco and 
Joseph H. Hunt, Jeffrey B. Wall, Hashim M. 
Mooppan, Christopher G. Michel, Mark B. 
Stern and Lindsey Powell of the DOJ's Civil 
Division.  
The state coalition is represented by Curtis T. 
Hill Jr., Thomas M. Fisher, Kian J. Hudson 
and Julia C. Payne of the Indiana Attorney 
General's Office, and other attorneys.  
The Eagle Forum Education & Legal 
Defense Fund is represented by Lawrence J. 
Joseph.  
The Immigration Reform Law Institute is 
represented in-house by Christopher J. Hajec 
and Lew J. Olowski.  
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is 
represented by Daryl Joseffer and Jonathan 
Urick of the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center 
and Kathleen M. Sullivan of Quinn Emanuel 
Urquhart & Sullivan LLP.  
The case is Kansas v. Ramiro Garcia, case 











Jack Cashill  
 
September 8, 2017  
 
Friday, in a stunning decision, the Kansas 
Supreme Court ruled in essence that the State 
of Kansas cannot prosecute illegal aliens for 
most common forms of identity theft. The 
ruling in State of Kansas v. Ramiro 
Garcia grants Kansas citizens no such 
license. 
What follows may read like an article from 
the Onion, but unfortunately it is not. Writing 
in dissent, Justice Dan Biles observed, “The 
majority’s rationale sets up a sweeping 
prohibition against identity theft prosecutions 
for such crimes generally occurring in the 
employment process.” Justice Caleb Stegall 
agreed, “Today’s decision appears to wipe 
numerous criminal laws off the books in 
Kansas—starting with, but not necessarily 
ending with, laws prohibiting identity theft.” 
These Justices did not overstate the enormity 
of this decision whose majority opinion was 
written by the predictably liberal Justice 
Carol Beier. Said Biles, “The majority 
stretches statutory interpretation past the 
breaking point.” 
The facts in the case are beyond dispute. In 
August 2012, an Overland Park police officer 
pulled Garcia over for speeding. When asked 
where he was going in such a hurry, Garcia 
said he was on his way to work at Bonefish 
Grill. A routine records check revealed that 
Garcia had secured his job using someone 
else’s social security number. As a result of 
the investigation, Garcia was charged with 
one count of identity theft under Kansas law 
and eventually convicted in a jury trial. The 
district judge sentenced Garcia to seven 
months in prison but granted 18 months’ 
probation. 
On appeal, Garcia’s attorneys argued that the 
federal government has preemptive power 
over immigration and the status of aliens, 
specifically in regards to an alien who 
commits fraud in the employment eligibility 
verification process. In a nutshell, the 
majority on the court bought that argument. 
Wrote Beier, “States are prohibited from 
using the I-9 and any information contained 
within the I-9 as the bases for a state law 
identity theft prosecution of an alien who 
uses another’s Social Security information in 
an I-9. The fact that this information was 
included in the W-4 and K-4 did not alter the 
fact that it was also part of the I-9.” Implied, 
but not stated, was that citizens have no such 
immunity from state prosecution. 
Biles dissented vigorously. “The specific 
conduct for which Garcia was convicted was 
using someone else’s Social Security number 
in completing his federal W-4 and state K-4 
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tax forms,” he argued. “Garcia’s immigration 
status was not relevant to whether this 
conduct was unlawful, and the conduct was 
independent of the federal employment 
verification system.” 
Continued Biles: “Under the majority’s view, 
federal law effectively prevents any 
prosecution under the Kansas identity theft 
crime occurring in the employment context if 
it relies on information that also just happens 
to be on or attached to a Form I-9. This 
cannot reflect congressional intent.” 
The irony of this decision is that in most 
instances–sanctuary city edicts, federal vote 
fraud investigation–the left supports the 
rights of states to resist federal oversight of 
immigration related issues. But then again, 





















Hernandez v. Mesa 
 
Ruling Below: Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018).   
 
Overview: U.S. Customs & Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa shot and killed 15-year-ago Mexican 
national Hernandez. The Hernandez family filed charged against Mesa. Hernandez claimed that 
the federal law enforcement officer violated Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights for which there 
is no alternative legal remedy. 
 
Issue: Whether, when the plaintiffs plausibly allege that a rogue federal law-enforcement officer 
violated clearly established Fourth and Fifth amendment rights for which there is no alternative 
legal remedy, the federal courts can and should recognize a damages claim under Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.  
 
Jesus C. HERNANDEZ, Individually and as the surviving father of Sergio Adrian 
Hernandez Guereca, and as Successor-in-Interest to the Estate of Serio Adrian Hernandez 
Guereca; Maria Guadalupe Guereca Bentacour, Individually and as the surviving mother 
of Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, and as Successor-in-Interest to the Estate of Serio 




Jesus MESA, Jr., Defendant- Appellee 
 
Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit 
 
Decided on March 20, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
JONES, Circuit Judge:
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
This appeal returned to the court en banc 
following remand from the United States 
Supreme Court. Prompted by the High Court, 
we have carefully considered a question 
antecedent to the merits of the Hernandez 
family's claims against United States 
Customs & Border Patrol Agent Mesa: 
whether federal courts have the authority to 
craft an implied damages action for alleged 
constitutional violations in this case. We hold 
that this is not a garden variety excessive 
force case against a federal law enforcement 
officer. The transnational aspect of the facts 
presents a "new context" under Bivens, and 
numerous "special factors" counsel against 
federal courts' interference with the 




Because the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed 
on the pleadings, the alleged facts underlying 
this tragic event are taken as true. Sergio 
Hernandez was a 15-year-old Mexican 
citizen without family in, or other ties to, the 
United States. On June 7, 2010, while at play, 
he had taken a position on the Mexican side 
of a culvert that marks the boundary between 
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, and El Paso, 
Texas. The FBI reported that Agent Mesa 
was engaged in his law enforcement duties 
when a group of young men began throwing 
rocks at him from the Mexican side of the 
border. From United States soil, the agent 
fired several shots toward the assailants. 
Hernandez was fatally wounded. 
Hernandez's parents alleged numerous claims 
in a federal lawsuit against Agent Mesa, other 
Border Patrol officials, several federal 
agencies, and the United States government. 
The federal district court dismissed all 
claims, but was reversed in part by a divided 
panel of this court. The panel decision 
allowed only a Bivens claim, predicated 
on Fifth Amendment substantive due 
process, to proceed against Agent Mesa 
alone. This court elected to rehear the appeal 
en banc. Without ruling on the cognizability 
of a Bivens claim in the first instance, we 
concluded unanimously that the plaintiffs' 
claim under the Fourth Amendment failed on 
the merits and that Agent Mesa was shielded 
by qualified immunity from any claim under 
the Fifth Amendment. We rejected the 
plaintiffs' remaining claims.  
The Supreme Court granted certioriari and 
heard this case in conjunction with Ziglar v. 
Abbasi. In Abbasi, the Court reversed the 
Second Circuit and refused to imply 
a Bivens claim against policymaking 
officials involved in terror suspect detentions 
following the 9/11 attacks. The Court, 
however, remanded for reconsideration by 
the appeals court whether a Bivens claim 
might still be maintained against a prison 
warden. 
The Court's decision in this case tagged 
onto Abbasi by rejecting this court's 
approach and ordering a remand for us to 
consider the propriety of 
allowing Bivens claims to proceed on behalf 




The plaintiffs assert that Agent Mesa used 
deadly force without justification against 
Sergio Hernandez, violating 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, where the 
fatal shot was fired across the international 
border. No federal statute authorizes a 
damages action by a foreign citizen injured 
on foreign soil by a federal law enforcement 
officer under these circumstances. Thus, 
plaintiffs' recovery of damages is possible 
only if the federal courts approve 
a Bivens implied cause of 
action. Abbasi instructs us to 
determine initially whether these 
circumstances present a "new context" 
for Bivens purposes, and if so, whether 
"special factors" counsel against implying a 
damages claim against an individual federal 
officer. To make these determinations, we 
review Abbasi's pertinent discussion about 
"Bivens and the ensuing cases in [the 
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Supreme Court] defining the reach and the 
limits of that precedent."  
In Abbasi, the Court begins by explaining 
that when Congress passed what is now 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 in 1871, it enacted no 
comparable law authorizing damage suits in 
federal court to remedy constitutional 
violations by federal government agents. In 
1971, the Bivens decision broke new ground 
by authorizing such a suit for Fourth 
Amendment violations by federal law 
enforcement officers who handcuffed and 
arrested an individual in his own home 
without probable cause. Within a decade, the 
Court followed up by allowing 
a Bivens action for employment 
discrimination, violating equal protection 
under the Fifth Amendment, against a 
Congressman. The Court soon after approved 
a Bivens claim for constitutionally 
inadequate inmate medical care, violating 
the Eighth Amendment, against federal 
jailers. According to the Court in Abbasi, 
these three cases coincided with the "ancien 
regime in which "the Court followed a 
different approach to recognizing implied 
causes of action than it follows now."  
The "ancien regime" was toppled step by step 
as the Court, starting in the late 1970s, 
retreated from judicially implied causes of 
action and cautioned that where Congress 
"intends private litigants to have a cause of 
action," the "far better course" is for 
Congress to confer that remedy explicitly. 
Abbasi acknowledges that the Constitution 
lacks as firm a basis as congressional 
enactments for implying causes of action; but 
the "central" concern in each instance arises 
from separation-of-powers 
principles. Consequently, the current 
approach renders implied Bivens claims a 
"disfavored" remedy. The Court then lists the 
many subsequent cases that declined to 
extend Bivens under varying circumstances 
and proffered constitutional violations.  
Abbasi goes on to reiterate with an exacting 
description the two-part analysis for 
implying Bivens claims. We turn to the two 
inquiries by comparing Abbasi's separation-
of-powers considerations and its facts to the 
present case 
A. NEW CONTEXT 
The plaintiffs assert that because the 
allegedly unprovoked shooting of a civilian 
by a federal police officer is a prototypical 
excessive force claim, their case presents no 
"new context" under Bivens. This court, 
including our colleagues in dissent, 
disagrees. The fact that Bivens derived from 
an unconstitutional search and seizure claim 
is not determinative. The detainees 
in Abbasi asserted claims for, inter alia, strip 
searches under both the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, but the Supreme Court found a 
"new context" despite similarities between 
"the right and the mechanism of injury" 
involved in previous 
successful Bivens claims. As Abbasi points 
out, the Malesko case rejected a 
"new" Bivens claim under the Eighth 
Amendment, whereas an Eighth 
Amendment Bivens claim was held 
cognizable in Carlson; 
and Chappell rejected a Bivens employment 
discrimination claim in the military, although 
such a claim was allowed to proceed in Davis 
v. Passman. The proper inquiry is whether 
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"the case is different in a meaningful way" 
from prior Bivens cases.  
Among the non-exclusive examples of such 
"meaningful" differences, the Court points to 
the constitutional right at issue, the extent of 
judicial guidance as to how an officer should 
respond, and the risk of the judiciary's 
disruptive intrusion into the functioning of 
the federal government's co-equal branches. 
The Court found it an easy conclusion that 
there were meaningful differences between 
prior Bivens claims and claims alleged 
in Abbasi for unconstitutional "confinement 
conditions imposed on illegal aliens pursuant 
to a high-level executive policy created in the 
wake of a major terrorist attack on American 
soil." Even more significant, the Court 
decided that claims against the prison warden 
for "compelling" allegations of detainee 
abuse and prison regulation violations also 
arose in a "new context" under Bivens. 
Despite close parallels between claims 
alleged against the warden and Carlson, the 
Court explained that "even a modest 
extension [of Bivens] is still an extension," 
and the Court remanded for additional 
consideration of the "special factors." 
Pursuant to Abbasi, the cross-border shooting 
at issue here must present a"new context" for 
a Bivens claim. Because Hernandez was a 
Mexican citizen with no ties to this country, 
and his death occurred on Mexican soil, the 
very existence of any "constitutional" right 
benefitting him raises novel and disputed 
issues. There has been no direct judicial 
guidance concerning the extraterritorial 
scope of the Constitution and its potential 
application to foreign citizens on foreign soil. 
To date, the Supreme Court has refused to 
extend the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment to a foreign citizen residing in 
the United States against American law 
enforcement agents' search of his premises in 
Mexico. Language in Verdugo's majority 
opinion strongly suggests that the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to American 
officers' actions outside this country's 
borders. In Hernandez, the Supreme Court 
itself described the plaintiffs' Fourth 
Amendment claims as raising "sensitive" 
issues.  
Likewise, the plaintiffs can prevail on a 
substantive due process Fifth 
Amendment claim only if federal courts 
accept two novel theories. The first would 
allow a Bivens action to proceed based upon 
a Fifth Amendment excessive force claim 
simply because Verdugo might prevent the 
assertion of a comparable Fourth 
Amendment claim. The second theory would 
require the extension of 
the Boumediene decision, both beyond its 
explicit constitutional basis, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, 
the Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause, and 
beyond the United States government's de 
facto control of the territory surrounding the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility. 
Moreover, even nine years later, no federal 
circuit court has extended the holding 
of Boumediene either substantively to other 
constitutional provisions or geographically to 
locales where the United States has neither de 
facto nor de jure control. Indeed, the courts 
have unanimously rejected such extensions.   
The plaintiffs assert that because this is just a 
case in which one rogue law enforcement 
officer engaged in misconduct on the 
operational level, it poses no "new context" 
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for Bivens purposes. On the contrary, their 
unprecedented claims embody not merely a 
"modest extension"—
which Abbasi describes as a 
"new" Bivens context—but a virtual 
repudiation of the Court's holding. Abbasi is 
grounded in the conclusion that Bivens 
claims are now a distinctly "disfavored" 
remedy and are subject to strict limitations 
arising from the constitutional imperative of 
the separation of powers. The newness of this 
"new context" should alone require dismissal 
of the plaintiffs' damage claims. 
Nevertheless, we turn next to the "special 
factors" analysis assuming arguendo that 
some type of constitutional claims could be 
conjured here. 
B. SPECIAL FACTORS 
The plaintiffs argue that this case involves no 
"special factors"—no reasons the court 
should hesitate before extending Bivens. 
However remarkable this position may seem, 
it is unremarkable that the plaintiffs hold it. 
Indeed, they must. The presence of "special 
factors" precludes a Bivens extension. 
Given Abbasi's elucidation of the "special 
factors" inquiry, there is more than enough 
reason for this court to stay its hand and deny 
the extraordinary remedy that the plaintiffs 
seek. 
Abbasi clarifies the concept of "special 
factors" by explicitly focusing the inquiry on 
maintaining the separation of powers: 
"separation-of-powers principles are or 
should be central to the analysis." 
Before Abbasi, the Court had instructed 
lower courts to perform "the kind of remedial 
determination that is appropriate for a 
common-law tribunal." Underscoring the 
Court's steady retreat from the "ancien 
regime" discussed above, that language 
appears nowhere 
in Abbasi. Instead, Abbasi instructs courts to 
"concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well 
suited, absent congressional action or 
instruction, to consider and weigh the costs 
and benefits of allowing a damages action to 
proceed." In light of this guidance, the 
question for this court is not whether this case 
is distinguishable from Abbasi itself—it 
certainly is—but whether "there are sound 
reasons to think Congress might doubt the 
efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy." 
If such reasons exist, "the courts must refrain 
from creating the remedy in order to respect 
the role of Congress in determining the nature 
and extent of federal-court jurisdiction under 
Article III."  
Applying Abbasi's separation-of-powers 
analysis reveals numerous "special factors" at 
issue in this case. To begin with, this 
extension of Bivens threatens the political 
branches' supervision of national 
security. "The Supreme Court has never 
implied a Bivens remedy in a case involving 
the military, national security, or 
intelligence." In Abbasi, the Court stressed 
that "[n]ational-security policy is the 
prerogative of the Congress and the 
President." The plaintiffs note the Court's 
warning that "national security" should not 
"become a talisman used to ward off 
inconvenient claims." But the Court stated 
that "[t]his danger of abuse" is particularly 
relevant in "domestic cases." Of course, the 
defining characteristic of this case is that it 
is not domestic. National-security concerns 
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are hardly "talismanic" where, as here, border 
security is at issue.  
In particular, the threat of Bivens liability 
could undermine the Border Patrol's ability to 
perform duties essential to national 
security. Congress has expressly charged the 
Border Patrol with "deter[ring] and 
prevent[ing] the illegal entry of terrorists, 
terrorist weapons, persons, and contraband." 
Although members of the Border Patrol like 
Agent Mesa may conduct activities 
analogous to domestic law enforcement, this 
case involved shots fired across the border 
within the scope of Agent Mesa's 
employment. In a similar context—airport 
security—the Third Circuit recently denied 
a Bivens remedy for a TSA agent's alleged 
constitutional violations. Relying on Abbasi, 
the Third Circuit's analysis is instructive: 
[The plaintiff] asks us to imply 
a Bivens action for damages against a 
TSA agent. TSA employees [ ] are 
tasked with assisting in a critical 
aspect of national security—securing 
our nation's airports and air 
traffic. The threat of damages liability 
could indeed increase the probability 
that a TSA agent would hesitate in 
making split-second decisions about 
suspicious passengers. In light of 
Supreme Court precedent, past and 
very recent, that is surely a special 
factor that gives us pause. 
The same logic applies here. Implying a 
private right of action for damages in this 
transnational context increases the likelihood 
that Border Patrol agents will "hesitate in 
making split second decisions." Considering 
the "systemwide" impact of 
this Bivens extension, there are "sound 
reasons to think Congress might doubt [its] 
efficacy."  
Extending Bivens in this context also risks 
interference with foreign affairs and 
diplomacy more generally. This case is 
hardly sui generis: the United States 
government is always responsible to foreign 
sovereigns when federal officials injure 
foreign citizens on foreign soil. These are 
often delicate diplomatic matters, and, 
as such, they "are rarely proper subjects for 
judicial intervention." In fact, in 2014 the 
United States and Mexican governments 
established the joint Border Violence 
Prevention Council as a forum for addressing 
these sorts of issues. The incident involving 
Agent Mesa initiated serious dialogue 
between the two sovereigns, with the United 
States refusing Mexico's request to extradite 
Mesa but resolving to "work with the 
Mexican government within existing 
mechanisms and agreements to prevent 
future incidents."  
Given the dialogue between Mexico and the 
United States, the plaintiffs are wrong to 
suggest that Mexico's support for a 
new Bivens remedy obviates foreign affairs 
concerns. It is not surprising that Mexico, 
having requested Mesa's extradition, now 
supports a damages remedy against him. But 
the Executive Branch denied extradition and 
refused to indict Agent Mesa following a 
thorough investigation. It would undermine 
Mexico's respect for the validity of the 
Executive's prior determinations if, pursuant 
to a Bivens claim, a federal court entered a 
damages judgment against Agent Mesa. In 
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any event, diplomatic concerns "involve[ ] a 
host of considerations that must be weighed 
and appraised"—a sign that they must be 
"committed to those who write the laws 
rather than those who interpret them."  
Congress's failure to provide a damages 
remedy in these circumstances is an 
additional factor counseling 
hesitation. Abbasi emphasized that 
Congress's silence may be "relevant[] and . . 
. telling," especially where "Congressional 
interest" in an issue "has been frequent and 
intense." It is "much more difficult to believe 
that congressional inaction was inadvertent" 
given the increasing national policy focus on 
border security.  
Relevant statutes confirm that Congress's 
failure to provide a federal remedy was 
intentional. For instance, in section 1983, 
Congress expressly limited damage remedies 
to "citizen[s] of the United States or other 
person[s] within the jurisdiction thereof." 
Given that Bivens is a judicially implied 
version of section 1983, it would violate 
separation-of-powers principles if the 
implied remedy reached further than the 
express one. Likewise, under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act—a law that comprehensively 
waives federal sovereign immunity to 
provide damages remedies for injuries 
inflicted by federal employees—Congress 
specifically excluded "[a]ny claim arising in 
a foreign country." Congress also exempted 
federal officials from liability under the 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 
1991. Taken together, these statutes represent 
Congress's repeated refusals to create private 
rights of action against federal officials for 
injuries to foreign citizens on foreign soil. It 
is not credible that Congress would favor the 
judicial invention of those rights.  
Nor, under Abbasi, does the plaintiffs' lack of 
a damages remedy favor extending Bivens. 
The Supreme Court has held that "even in the 
absence of an alternative" remedy, courts 
should not extend Bivens if any special 
factors counsel hesitation. Thus, 
the absence of a remedy is only significant 
because the presence of one precludes 
a Bivens extension. Here, the absence of a 
federal remedy does not mean the absence of 
deterrence. Abbasi acknowledges the 
"persisting concern [ ] that absent 
a Bivens remedy there will be insufficient 
deterrence to prevent officers from violating 
the Constitution."  For cross-border 
shootings like this one, however, criminal 
investigations and prosecutions are already a 
deterrent. While it is true that numerous 
federal agencies investigated Agent Mesa's 
conduct and decided not to bring charges, the 
DOJ is currently prosecuting another Border 
Patrol agent in Arizona for the crossborder 
murder of a Mexican citizen.  The threat of 
criminal prosecution for abusive conduct is 
not hollow. In some instances, moreover, a 
state-law tort claim may be available to 
provide both deterrence and damages. That 
claim is unavailable here because the DOJ 
certified that Agent Mesa acted within the 
scope of his employment, and so the Westfall 
Act protects him from liability.  The 
plaintiffs concede that Agent Mesa was 
acting within the scope of his employment. 
Regardless, Abbasi makes clear that, when 
there is "a balance to be struck" between 
countervailing policy considerations like 
deterrence and national security, "[t]he 
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proper balance is one for the Congress, not 
the Judiciary, to undertake."  
Finally, the extraterritorial aspect of this case 
is itself a special factor that underlies and 
aggravates the separation-of-powers issues 
already discussed. The plaintiffs argue that 
extraterritoriality cannot constitute a special 
factor because this would multiply 
extraterritoriality's significance. But this 
misunderstands the Bivens inquiry and 
misreads Supreme Court precedent. The 
plaintiffs' argument relies on Davis v. 
Passman, in which the defendant argued that 
his conduct was immunized by the Speech or 
Debate Clause and, alternatively, that the 
Clause was a "special factor" 
for Bivens purposes. The Court held that the 
scope of the immunity and weight of the 
special factor were "coextensive." In other 
words, if the Clause did not immunize the 
defendant's conduct, then it was not a special 
factor. Similarly, the plaintiffs here suggest 
that extraterritoriality is not a "special factor" 
if the Constitution applies extraterritorially. 
This argument conflates the applicability of a 
constitutional immunity with the scope of a 
constitutional right, and thereby turns 
the Bivens inquiry upside 
down. Bivens remedies are not "coextensive" 
with the Constitution's protections. Indeed, 
in United States v. Stanley, the Supreme 
Court rejected a similar Davis-based 
argument, finding it "not an application but a 
repudiation of the 'special factors' 
limitation."  
Plaintiffs also suggest that relying on 
extraterritoriality as an indicator of a "new 
context" and as a "special factor" double 
counts the significance of extraterritoriality 
and stacks the deck against extending Bivens. 
But Abbasi explicitly states that one rationale 
for finding a "new context" is "the presence 
of potential special factors." To the extent 
that this court double counts the significance 
of extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court has 
not foreclosed our doing so. 
Indeed, the novelty and uncertain scope of an 
extraterritorial Bivens remedy counsel 
hesitation. As the Eleventh Circuit recently 
averred, the legal theory itself may constitute 
a special factor if it is "doctrinally novel and 
difficult to administer. An 
extraterritorial Bivens extension is 
"doctrinally novel." The Supreme Court "has 
never created or even favorably mentioned a 
non-statutory right of action for damages on 
account of conduct that occurred outside the 
borders of the United States." Nor has any 
court of appeals 
extended Bivens extraterritorially. 
Extraterritoriality, moreover, involves a host 
of administrability concerns, making it 
impossible to assess the "impact on 
governmental operations systemwide."   
But novelty is by no means the only problem 
with an extraterritorial Bivens remedy. The 
presumption against extraterritoriality 
accentuates the impropriety of extending 
private rights of action to aliens injured 
abroad. According to the Supreme Court, 
"[t]he presumption against extraterritorial 
application helps ensure that the Judiciary 
does not erroneously adopt an interpretation 
of U.S. law that carries foreign policy 
consequences not clearly intended by the 
political branches." Even when a statute's 
substantive provisions do apply 
extraterritorially, a court must "separately 
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apply the presumption against 
extraterritoriality" when it determines 
whether to provide a private right of action 
for damages. By extension, even if the 
Constitution applies extraterritorially, a court 
should hesitate to provide an extraterritorial 
damages remedy with "potential for 
international friction beyond that presented 
by merely applying U.S. substantive law to 
that foreign conduct."  
The D.C. Circuit squarely addressed the issue 
of extraterritoriality in the Bivens context and 
concluded that it constituted a "special 
factor." Like this case, the D.C. Circuit's 
decision in Meshal v. 
Higgenbotham involved a challenge to "the 
individual actions of federal law enforcement 
officers" for an injury that occurred on 
foreign soil. Refusing to extend Bivens, the 
court noted that "the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is a settled principle that the 
Supreme Court applies even in considering 
statutory remedies." Given this presumption, 
the court concluded that extraterritoriality 
was a special factor. Concurring, Judge 
Kavanaugh stressed that "[i]t would be 
grossly anomalous . . . to 
apply Bivens extraterritorially when we 
would not apply an identical statutory cause 
of action for constitutional torts 
extraterritorially." We agree. Not only would 
it be "anomalous," it would contravene the 
separation-of-powers concerns that lie at the 
heart of the "special factors" concept. 
Having weighed the factors against 
extending Bivens, we conclude that this is not 
a close case. Even before Abbasi clarified the 
"special factors" inquiry, we agreed with our 
sister circuits that "[t]he only relevant 
threshold— that a factor 'counsels 
hesitation'—is remarkably low."  Here, 
extending Bivens would interfere with the 
political branches' oversight of national 
security and foreign affairs. It would flout 
Congress's consistent and explicit refusals to 
provide damage remedies for aliens injured 
abroad. And it would create a remedy with 
uncertain limits. In its remand of Hernandez, 
the Supreme Court chastened this court for 
ruling on the extraterritorial application of 
the Fourth Amendment because the issue is 
"sensitive and may have consequences that 
are far reaching." Similar "consequences" are 
dispositive of the "special factors" inquiry. 
The myriad implications of an 
extraterritorial Bivens remedy require this 
court to deny it. 
For these reasons, the district court's 
judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED. 
JUDGMENT ON REHEARING EN 
BANC 
This cause was considered on the record on 
appeal and was argued by counsel. 
It is ordered and adjudged that the judgment 
of the District Court is affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs-
appellants pay to defendant-appellee the 
costs on appeal to be taxed by the Clerk of 
this Court. 
DENNIS, Circuit Judge, Concurring: 
In my view, we need not decide the difficult 
question of whether a Bivens remedy should 
be available under the circumstances of this 
case because, under Supreme Court 
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precedent, Agent Mesa is entitled to qualified 
immunity. I find compelling the plaintiffs' 
arguments that Hernández was entitled to 
protections under the Fourth Amendment in 
light of Boumediene v. Bush, and the 
circumstances surrounding the border area 
where Mesa shot and killed him. But the 
extraterritorial application of these 
protections to Hernández was not clearly 
established at the time of Mesa's tortious 
conduct. Mesa is therefore entitled to 
qualified immunity. 
 The plaintiffs contend that questions about 
the extraterritorial application of 
constitutional protections do not preclude 
Mesa's liability. After all, according to the 
complaint, Mesa essentially committed a 
cold-blooded murder. Surely every 
reasonable officer would know that Mesa's 
conduct was unlawful, the plaintiffs argue. 
While that is a fair point, I believe this 
argument is foreclosed by Supreme Court 
precedent, which holds that the right giving 
rise to the claim—here, Hernández's Fourth 
Amendment rights—must be clearly 
established.  
In Davis v. Scherer, the Supreme Court held, 
"A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation 
of constitutional or statutory rights may 
overcome the defendant official's qualified 
immunity only by showing that those rights 
were clearly established at the time of the 
conduct at issue." The Court stated that 
"officials can act without fear of harassing 
litigation only if they reasonably can 
anticipate when their conduct may give rise 
to liability for damages." In light of Davis, 
the plaintiffs' argument that Mesa forfeited 
his qualified immunity because his conduct 
was shockingly unlawful cannot succeed. I 
am therefore compelled to concur in 
affirming the district court's dismissal of the 
plaintiffs' claims. 
HAYNES, Circuit Judge, concurring:  
I concur in the judgment and with the 
majority opinion's conclusion 
that Bivens should not extend to the 
circumstances of this case. I write separately 
to note that when we previously heard this 
case en banc, it was consolidated with two 
other appeals, which alleged issues arising 
under the Alien Tort Statute and Federal Tort 
Claims Act. Those appeals and claims are not 
before us today, and they need not be 
addressed to resolve the Bivens claim against 
Mesa. 
PRADO, Circuit Judge, dissenting:  
Today's en banc majority denies Sergio 
Hernandez's parents a Bivens remedy for the 
loss of their son at the hands of a United 
States Border Patrol agent. The majority 
asserts that the transnational nature of this 
case presents a new context under Bivens and 
that special factors counsel against this 
Court's interference. While I agree that this 
case presents a new context, I would find that 
no special factors counsel hesitation in 
recognizing a Bivens remedy because this 
case centers on an individual federal officer 
acting in his law enforcement capacity. I 
respectfully dissent. 
I do not take issue with the majority's 
framework for analyzing whether there are 
special factors counseling hesitation. 
"[S]eparation-of-powers principles are or 
should be central to the analysis."  the 
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majority's analysis purports to consider these 
principles by appropriately asking "whether 
the Judiciary is well suited, absent 
congressional action or instruction, to 
consider and weigh the costs and benefits of 
allowing a damages action to 
proceed." However, in conducting this 
analysis, the majority is quickly led astray 
from the familiar circumstances of this case 
by empty labels of national security, foreign 
affairs, and extraterritoriality. These labels—
as we say in Texas—are all hat, no cattle. 
The majority repeatedly attempts to frame 
this case around the issue of whether aliens 
injured abroad can pursue Bivens remedies. 
That characterization, however, overlooks 
the critical who, what, where, when, and how 
of the lead actor in this tragic narrative. This 
case involves one federal officer "engaged in 
his law enforcement duties" in the United 
States who shot and killed an unarmed, 
fifteen-year-old Mexican boy standing a few 
feet away. The Supreme Court in Abbasi 
went to great lengths to indicate support for 
the availability of a Bivens remedy in exactly 
the circumstances presented here: an instance 
of individual law enforcement overreach. As 
the Court recently reaffirmed in no uncertain 
terms, Bivens is "settled law . . . in [the] 
common and recurrent sphere of law 
enforcement."  For the following reasons, I 
would retain Bivens in that common sphere 
and recognize a remedy for this senseless and 
arbitrary cross-border shooting at the hands 
of a federal law enforcement officer.  
The Supreme Court directed this Court "to 
consider how the reasoning and analysis 
in Abbasi may bear on this case," so that is 
where I begin. In Abbasi, aliens detained for 
immigration violations following the 
September 11 attacks brought a class action 
suit against high-level federal executive 
officials and detention facility wardens. The 
detainees alleged that they had been detained 
in harsh conditions, including that they were 
confined in tiny cells for over 23 hours a day, 
subjected to regular strip searches, denied 
basic hygiene products and most forms of 
communication, and subjected to regular 
verbal and physical abuse by guards. 
Detainee-plaintiffs brought 
their Bivens claims alleging that the 
detention and policies authorizing it violated 
their Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights. After finding the case 
presented a new Bivens context because it 
challenged "confinement conditions imposed 
on illegal aliens pursuant to a high-level 
executive policy created in the wake of a 
major terrorist attack"—a far cry from the 
three Bivens cases the Court had approved in 
the past—the Court determined that several 
special factors counseled hesitation that 
precluded a Bivens remedy against the 
executive officials.  
The Supreme Court's analysis of four special 
factors in Abbasi is particularly relevant 
given the vastly different circumstances 
presented in this case. First, the Court took 
issue with the fact that the detainees sought 
to hold high-level federal executive officials 
liable for the unconstitutional activity of their 
subordinates. The Court warned that 
"Bivens is not designed to hold officers 
responsible for the acts of their 
subordinates." Because "[t]he purpose 
of Bivens is to deter the officer," 
a Bivens claim should be "brought against the 
individual official for his or her own acts, not 
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the acts of others."  Relatedly, 
the Abbasi Court found it problematic that 
that the detainees challenged a broad 
governmental policy, specifically the 
government's response to the September 11 
attacks. The Court noted that "a Bivens action 
is not 'a proper vehicle for altering an entity's 
policy.'" Third, the Court disapproved of the 
fact that the detainees' claims challenged 
"more than standard 'law enforcement 
operations.'" Specifically, the Court found 
the detainees' claims involved "major 
elements of the Government's whole 
response to the September 11 attacks, thus . . 
. requiring an inquiry into sensitive issues of 
national security." Finally, the Court found it 
of "central importance" that Abbasi was not a 
"damages or nothing" case.  In contrast to 
suits challenging "individual instances of 
discrimination or law enforcement 
overreach," the Abbasi plaintiffs challenged 
"large-scale policy decisions concerning the 
conditions of confinement imposed on 
hundreds of prisoners" which could be 
remedied with injunctive and habeas relief. 
Not only are all four of these special factors 
notably absent here, but this case also 
presents the limited circumstances in 
which Abbasi indicated a Bivens remedy 
would exist. First, Hernandez's parents do not 
seek to hold any high-level officials liable for 
the acts of their subordinates. Instead, and 
strictlycomporting with Bivens, plaintiffs are 
suing an individual federal agent for his own 
actions. Relatedly, in suing an individual 
officer, Hernandez's parents do not challenge 
or seek to alter any governmental policy. To 
the contrary, the constitutional constraints 
Hernandez's parents seek mirror existing 
Executive Branch policy for Border Patrol 
agents. Department of Homeland Security 
regulations and guidelines already require 
Border Patrol agents to adhere to 
constitutional standards for the use of lethal 
force, regardless of the subject's location or 
nationality. Furthermore, as a case against a 
single federal officer, this suit would not 
require unnecessary inquiry or discovery into 
governmental deliberations or policy-
making—certainly not any more than any 
other regularly permissible Bivens suit 
alleging unconstitutional use of force by a 
Border Patrol agent. Third, this case has 
nothing to do with terrorism, nor does it 
involve a high-level governmental response 
to a major national security event. Rather, 
plaintiffs merely challenge "standard 'law 
enforcement operations.'" While the majority 
attempts to link this case to border security, 
which I address separately below, there is no 
question that a case which involves only one 
Border Patrol agent and a fifteen-year-old 
boy is a far cry from Abbasi, which involved 
broad and sensitive national security policies 
following the deadliest terrorist attack in U.S. 
history. Finally, unlike the detainees 
in Abbasi, who had several alternative 
remedies including habeas relief, this is a 
"damages or nothing" case for Hernandez's 
parents. It is uncontested that plaintiffs find 
no alternative relief in Mexican law, state 
law, the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 
the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), or federal 
criminal law for their tragic loss. Nor can 
injunctive or habeas relief redress the 
irreparable loss of life here. Indeed, 
individual instances of law enforcement 
overreach—as alleged here—are by "their 
very nature . . . difficult to address except by 
way of damages actions after the fact." Given 
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that a Bivens cause of action is plaintiffs' only 
available remedy, compensatory relief by 
way of Bivens is both 
necessary and appropriate in this case.  
The special factors identified by the majority 
do not convince me that the Judiciary is not 
"well suited . . . to consider and weigh the 
costs and benefits of allowing a damages 
action to proceed"—particularly given the 
relatively straight-forward events here. I 
disagree that recognizing a Bivens remedy in 
this case "threatens the political branches' 
supervision of national security." According 
to the majority, national security is 
implicated because the events giving rise to 
this suit took place at the border, thereby 
affecting border security and the operations 
of the Border Patrol. Relying on the Third 
Circuit's rejection of Bivens liability in the 
airport security context for a First 
Amendment retaliation claim, the majority 
also reasons that implying a Bivens remedy 
in the transnational context "increases the 
likelihood that Border patrol agents will 
'hesitate in making split second decisions.'"  
While the shooting in this case took place at 
the border, it does not follow that border 
security and the operations of the Border 
Patrol are significantly implicated. As the 
original panel majority noted, this case 
"involves questions of precisely Bivens-like 
domestic law enforcement and nothing 
more." Plaintiffs allege that an individual 
Border Patrol agent while on duty on U.S. 
soil shot and killed an unarmed fifteen-year-
old boy. If recognizing a Bivens remedy in 
this context implicates border security or the 
Border Patrol's operations, so too would any 
suit against a Border Patrol agent for 
unconstitutional actions taken in the course 
and scope of his or her employment. Yet, as 
the majority recognizes, Border Patrol agents 
are unquestionably subject to Bivens suits 
when they commit constitutional violations 
on U.S. soil. It make little sense to argue that 
a suit against a Border Patrol agent who 
shoots and kills someone standing a few feet 
beyond the U.S. border implicates border and 
national security issues, but at the same time 
contend that those concerns are not 
implicated when the same agent shoots 
someone standing a few feet inside the 
border. 
Moreover, the practical rationale given by the 
majority for not recognizing 
a Bivens remedy—that Border Patrol agents 
will hesitate making split-second decisions—
is one more commonly and more 
appropriately invoked in the qualified 
immunity context. Given that the qualified 
immunity analysis already incorporates this 
practical concern, it is odd to invoke it at this 
stage, particularly when such concerns could 
be raised in nearly any Bivens suit against a 
federal law enforcement officer. Indeed, 
although [**38]  the majority does not reach 
the issue of qualified immunity, Agent Mesa 
has and could continue to raise it as a possible 
defense to the constitutional claims against 
him. 
Finally, I am troubled by the majority's 
reliance on a First Amendment retaliation 
case to raise this "national security" concern. 
In Vanderklok, the Third Circuit considered 
whether under Bivens "a First 
Amendment claim against a TSA employee 
for retaliatory prosecution even exists in the 
context of airport security 
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screenings." Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 194. 
While the court refused to recognize such a 
claim in light of the new context presented 
and various special factors counseling 
hesitation, one such special factor the court 
found particularly relevant was the fact that 
"TSA employees typically are not law 
enforcement officers and do not act as such." 
The court noted that "TSA employees are not 
trained on issues of probable cause, 
reasonable suspicion, and other constitutional 
doctrines that govern law enforcement 
officers." Here, by contrast, Agent Mesa is a 
federal law enforcement officer well-trained 
on relevant constitutional doctrines and 
permissible use of force. In light of Agent 
Mesa's status as a federal law enforcement 
officer, the practical concerns raised 
in Vanderlock pertaining to non-officer TSA 
employees in the First 
Amendment retaliation context have little 
bearing here. 
Indeed, Abbasi itself cautions against taking 
the very path the majority errantly takes in 
this case. "[N]ational-security concerns must 
not become a talisman used to ward off 
inconvenient claims—a 'label' used to 'cover 
a multitude of sins.'" As one prominent legal 
scholar has warned, "national security" 
justifications are "increasingly becom[ing] 
the rule in contemporary civil litigation 
against government officers" and threaten to 
"dilute the effectiveness of judicial review as 
a deterrent for any and all unlawful 
government action—not just those actions 
undertaken in ostensibly in defense of the 
nation." When one looks to substantiate the 
invocation of national security here, one is 
left with the impression that this case more 
closely resembles ordinary civil litigation 
against a federal agent than a case involving 
a true inquiry into sensitive national security 
and military affairs, which are properly 
committed to the Executive Branch. On this 
record, I would not so readily abdicate our 
judicial role given the fundamental rights at 
stake here.  
The majority also invokes concerns about 
interference with foreign affairs and 
diplomacy as a special factor counseling 
hesitation. Asserting that the United States is 
always responsible to foreign sovereigns 
when federal officials injure foreign citizens 
on foreign soil, the majority argues that 
extending a Bivens remedy here implicates 
"delicate diplomatic matters." However, isn't 
the United States equally answerable to 
foreign sovereigns when federal officials 
injure foreign citizens on domestic soil? 
Again, the majority's argument proves too 
much. As plaintiffs persuasively argue, if 
there is a "U.S. foreign policy interest 
[implicated] in granting or denying 
a Bivens claim to foreign nationals, it is 
difficult to see how that interest would apply 
only if the injury occurred abroad." It also 
bears repeating that Agent Mesa's actions 
took place within the United States. 
I also fail to see how recognizing 
a Bivens remedy here would undermine 
Mexico's respect for the Executive Branch or 
create tension between Executive and 
Judicial determinations. No case holds that a 
court must first consider whether the 
Executive Branch has found evidence of 
criminality before determining whether a 
civil Bivens remedy exists for a given 
constitutional violation. Further, the majority 
fails to acknowledge that distinct standards of 
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proof govern civil and criminal proceedings 
making different outcomes in these 
proceedings hardly the stuff of an 
international diplomatic crisis. Even if one 
accepts that a Judicial finding 
of Bivens liability combined with an 
Executive Branch refusal to prosecute or 
extradite would undermine a foreign 
country's respect for the Executive Branch, it 
is difficult to explain how such concerns are 
only present when a foreign national is 
injured abroad, but not when a foreign 
national is injured in the United States. It is 
unclear how recognizing a Bivens remedy for 
the unconstitutional conduct of a single 
federal law enforcement officer acting 
entirely within the United States would 
suddenly inject this Court into sensitive 
matters of international diplomacy. Much as 
with national security, "the Executive's mere 
incantation of . . . 'foreign affairs' interests do 
not suffice to override constitutional rights."  
The majority also points to Congress's failure 
to provide a damages remedy as an additional 
factor counseling hesitation. Noting that the 
language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 limits damage 
remedies to "citizen[s] of the United States or 
other person[s] within the jurisdiction 
thereof," the majority first argues 
that Bivens as the "judicially implied version 
of section 1983" cannot reach further than § 
1983. However, it is just as likely that by 
specifying "other persons within the 
jurisdiction" Congress intended to extend a § 
1983 remedy beyond U.S. citizenship, rather 
than commenting on its availability for 
wrongful conduct by state actors with 
extraterritorial effects. Indeed, Congress 
enacted § 1983 "in response to the 
widespread deprivations of civil rights in the 
Southern States and the inability or 
unwillingness of authorities in those States to 
protect those rights or punish wrongdoers." 
Furthermore, while a Bivens action is often 
described as "analogous" to a § 1983 claim, 
Butts v. Martin, the Supreme Court has 
"never expressly held that the contours of 
Bivens and § 1983 are identical."  
The other statutes highlighted by the majority 
fail to indicate that Congress expressly 
intended to preclude a remedy in the 
circumstances presented here. For instance, 
the FTCA's exclusion of "claim[s] arising in 
a foreign country," was meant to codify 
"Congress's "unwilling[ness] to subject the 
United States to liabilities depending upon 
the laws of a foreign 
power." Notably, Bivens seeks to remedy 
violations of United States constitutional 
protections, and the FTCA expressly does 
"not extend or apply to a civil action . . . for a 
violation of the Constitution of the United 
States."  Additionally, any exception for 
federal officials under the Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1991 ("TVPA") has little to 
say about the availability of a Bivens claim 
here. The TVPA provides a remedy for 
extrajudicial killings and torture at the hands 
of individuals acting under color of foreign 
law. However, these individuals would not 
have been subject to Bivens liability anyways 
because Bivens is limited to federal officials 
acting pursuant to federal law.  
It is also important to note that Abbasi found 
Congress's failure to provide a remedy to the 
detainees in that case notable because 
Congressional interest in the government's 
response to the September 11 terrorist attack 
"ha[d] been 'frequent and intense' and some 
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of that interest ha[d] been directed to the 
conditions of confinement at issue."  By 
contrast here, Congressional interest in cross-
border shootings has been negligible making 
it more likely that congressional inaction is 
inadvertent rather than intentional. Indeed, as 
courts have recognized in the statutory 
interpretation context, drawing inferences 
from Congress's silence is a difficult and 
potentially dangerous exercise.  
Finally, the majority asserts that "the 
extraterritorial aspect of this case" is itself a 
special factor counseling hesitation. Looking 
to the fact that Hernandez was standing on 
Mexican soil when he was shot, the majority 
fears the uncertain scope of Bivens liability—
extending even to U.S.-based military drone 
operators—were we to recognize a Bivens 
remedy here. The majority's concern about 
the effects of such a decision is 
understandable and I do not take it lightly. 
However, the limited and routine 
circumstances presented here of individual 
law enforcement action as well as established 
Supreme Court precedent on Bivens claims 
in the military context assure me that there is 
little danger that recognizing a Bivens 
remedy here will open a Pandora's Box of 
liability. 
First, as I emphasize above, this case is 
not sui generis among Bivens cases. In the 
"common and recurrent sphere of law 
enforcement," courts across the country 
routinely administer Bivens claims against 
federal officers for unconstitutional actions 
occurring within the United States. I readily 
acknowledge Hernandez was standing on the 
Mexican side of the culvert when he was 
shot, but it cannot be forgotten that Agent 
Mesa was acting from the American side of 
the culvert. It is hard to understand how the 
mere fact that a plaintiff happens to be 
standing a few feet beyond an unmarked and 
invisible line on the ground would suddenly 
create a host of administrability concerns or a 
systemwide impact on governmental 
operations that would not otherwise exist if 
the plaintiff was standing a few feet within 
the United States. As ordinary Bivens 
litigation against a federal law enforcement 
officer seeking damages for unconstitutional 
use of force, "the legal standards for 
adjudicating the claim pressed here are well-
established and easily administrable."  
But even the majority's concerns about 
liability for overseas drone operations are 
also unlikely to materialize. Even assuming 
foreign nationals injured at the hands of U.S. 
military personnel overseas could state valid 
constitutional claims—a hotly debated 
topic—the Supreme Court has already 
repeatedly rejected Bivens claims in the 
military context.  Furthermore, it is likely that 
such claims would actually implicate various 
special factors counseling hesitation 
specifically identified in Abbasi such as 
requiring a true inquiry into national security 
issues, intruding upon the authority of the 
Executive Branch in military affairs, and 
actually causing officials "to second-guess 
difficult but necessary decisions concerning 
national-security policy."  
In sum, this Court is more than qualified to 
consider and weigh the costs and benefits of 
allowing a damages action to proceed. This 
case simply involves a federal official 
engaged in his law enforcement duties acting 
on United States soil who shot and killed an 
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unarmed fifteen-year-old boy standing a few 
feet away. I would elect to recognize a 
damages remedy for this tragic injury. As 
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, "[t]he 
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists 
in the right of every individual to claim the 
protection of the laws, whenever he receives 
an injury." In this case, I would recognize 
a Bivens remedy for this senseless cross-
border shooting at the hands of a federal law 












































May 28, 2019 
 
The Supreme Court agreed on Tuesday to 
decide whether the parents of a teenager 
killed by an American agent shooting across 
the Mexican border may sue him in federal 
court. The justices also issued a 
decision limiting suits by people who claim 
they were arrested for exercising their First 
Amendment rights. 
The case concerning the shooting, Hernandez 
v. Mesa, No. 17-1678, started in 2010, when 
Jesus Mesa Jr., a border guard, shot a fleeing 
15-year-old boy in the head, killing him. The 
boy, Sergio Hernández Guereca, had been 
playing with friends in the dry bed of the Rio 
Grande and was in Mexico when he was 
struck. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans, said Sergio’s 
family could not sue Mr. Mesa. 
“This is not a close case,” Judge Edith 
Jones wrote for the majority. Congress could 
pass a law allowing suits against federal 
officials by “aliens injured abroad,” she said. 
But without such a law, she wrote, federal 
courts should not “interfere with the political 
branches’ oversight of national security and 
foreign affairs.” 
The Supreme Court has considered the case 
once before, but it did not issue a definitive 
ruling. It is likely to do so after it hears 
arguments in the term that starts in October. 
The central question in the case is whether 
Congress must authorize lawsuits like the one 
brought by Sergio’s parents. 
In 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents, the Supreme Court ruled that 
congressional authorization was not always 
needed in suits against federal officials 
claiming violations of constitutional rights. 
But the court has grown increasingly uneasy 
about the decision, which concerned the 
unconstitutional search of a home in 
Brooklyn, and it has cautioned that the ruling 
should not be extended lightly to new 
contexts. 
The government of Mexico had urged the 
Supreme Court to hear the case against Mr. 
Mesa. “It is a priority to Mexico to see that 
the United States has provided adequate 
means to hold the agents accountable and to 
compensate the victims,” Mexico’s 
brief said. “The United States would expect 
no less if the situation were reversed and a 
Mexican government agent had killed a U.S. 
national.” 
 369 
The First Amendment case decided on 
Tuesday, Nieves v. Bartlett, No. 17-1174, 
arose from an encounter at the weeklong 
Arctic Man festival in Alaska, “an event 
known for both extreme sports and extreme 
alcohol consumption,” Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts Jr. wrote for the majority. “The 
mainstays are high-speed ski and 
snowmobile races, bonfires and parties.” 
“During that week,” the chief justice wrote, 
“the Arctic Man campground briefly 
becomes one of the largest and most raucous 
cities in Alaska.” 
One participant, Russell P. Bartlett, was 
arrested after yelling at police officers and 
refusing to answer questions. Afterward, Mr. 
Bartlett said, one officer told him, “Bet you 
wish you would have talked to me now.” 
He was charged with disorderly conduct and 
resisting arrest, but prosecutors dropped the 
charges, saying it was too expensive to 
pursue them given the distances involved. 
Mr. Bartlett sued, saying he had been arrested 
for exercising his First Amendment rights. 
The case was the court’s third attempt to 
answer the difficult question of whether the 
existence of probable cause was always 
enough to defeat a lawsuit claiming 
retaliatory arrest. 
Last year, the court ruled that Fane Lozman, 
a critic of a Florida city who was arrested at 
a City Council meeting, could pursue a case 
for retaliatory arrest, but only because the city 
appeared to have had an established and 
official policy of harassing him. The court 
also avoided providing an answer in a 2012 
case concerning Secret Service agents. 
In 2006, the court ruled in Hartman v. 
Moore that government officials could not be 
sued under the First Amendment for 
retaliatory prosecutions where there was 
probable cause to pursue the prosecution. 
On Tuesday, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that 
the same rule should apply to arrests, with 
one exception. Suits can proceed, he said, 
“when a plaintiff presents objective evidence 
that he was arrested when otherwise similarly 
situated individuals not engaged in the same 
sort of protected speech had not been.” 
Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Samuel A. Alito 
Jr., Elena Kagan and Brett M. Kavanaugh 
joined the majority opinion in the case. 
Justice Clarence Thomas joined most of the 
opinion, though he would have done without 
the exception. 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Neil M. 
Gorsuch issued partial dissents, with Justice 
Ginsburg noting that the power to arrest “can 
be abused to disrupt the exercise of First 
Amendment speech and press rights.” 
In her own dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
warned that “the majority’s approach will 
yield arbitrary results and shield willful 
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One need not look far these days to find 
agents of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection in the news—from the frontlines 
of the Trump administration’s controversial 
“zero tolerance” policy along the U.S.-
Mexico border to citizenship checkpoints 
along I-95 in northern Maine. Now more than 
ever, ensuring that CBP agents are held 
accountable if and when they violate 
individuals’ constitutional rights seems like 
an obvious imperative. 
In March, however, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court 
of Appeals (the federal appeals court with 
jurisdiction over Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Texas) held that, even if a CBP agent at the 
U.S.-Mexico border commits what one judge 
described as a “cold-blooded murder,” the 
victim’s family cannot sue him for damages. 
Among other things, the court of appeals 
concluded in Hernández v. Mesa that federal 
judges generally should not provide such 
relief in cases presenting any kind of 
“national security” or “foreign policy” 
concerns. In the process, the 5th Circuit 
implied that damages will never be available 
against CBP officers even for egregious 
violations of clearly established 
constitutional rights, and it did so at an 
especially inauspicious time to remove even 
the specter of deterrence from officers of the 
nation’s largest law enforcement agency. 
The Hernández case (in which I am co-
counsel to the plaintiffs) started with the fatal 
shooting, on June 7, 2010, of Sergio Adrián 
Hernández Güereca, a 15-year-old Mexican 
national who, according to his parents’ 
lawsuit, was playing with friends in the 
culvert along the U.S.-Mexico border outside 
El Paso (and was unarmed) when Jesus Mesa, 
a CBP agent, shot and killed him. 
Hernández’s parents brought a wrongful 
death action against Mesa, claiming, among 
other things, that the shooting was in 
violation of Hernández’s rights under the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Although the 
case posed interesting (and unanswered) 
questions about the extent to which the 
Constitution applies at (and just across) the 
border, it was resolved by the 5th Circuit, the 
first time around, on the basis of “qualified 
immunity”—the idea that, even if Mesa did 
violate Hernández’s rights, it was not “clearly 
established” at the time of the shooting that 
Mesa’s conduct was unconstitutional 
(because it was not “clearly established” if 
the Constitution applied to Hernández at all). 
Last June, however, the Supreme Court 
vacated and remanded the 5thCircuit’s 
decision, ruling that Mesa did not know at the 
time of the shooting that Hernández was a 
noncitizen, and therefore could not have 
known that the person at whom he was 
shooting might lack constitutional protection. 
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On remand, the 5th Circuit once again sided 
with Agent Mesa, this time arguing that 
federal courts generally should not recognize 
judge-made damages remedies, especially in 
cases raising the kinds of national security 
and foreign policy concerns that tend to arise 
at the border. In so ruling, the 5th Circuit 
purported to rely on the Supreme Court’s 
decision last year in Ziglar v. Abbasi, in 
which a four-justice majority (out of the six 
justices who heard the case) refused to 
recognize a damages remedy against senior 
government officials for their role in the 
roundup and detention of immigrants who 
were Muslim and/or of Arab descent after 
Sept. 11, 2001. 
Abbasi is a deeply disturbing decision, both 
in how it applies (and ignores) prior 
precedent and in its more fundamental 
framing of the role of the federal courts vis-
à-vis the political branches. But for all its 
flaws, Abbasi repeatedly stressed that its 
holding was “not intended to cast doubt on 
the continued force, or even the necessity” of 
judge-made damages remedies in search-
and-seizure cases, and that “[t]he settled law 
… in this common and recurrent sphere of 
law enforcement, and the undoubted reliance 
upon it as a fixed principle in the law, are 
powerful reasons to retain [them] in that 
sphere.” In other words, 
although Abbasi frowned on judge-made 
damages remedies to challenge high-level 
policy decisions by senior government 
officials in the midst of national security 
crises, it went out of its way to not similarly 
disavow damages remedies for “individual 
instances of … law enforcement overreach.” 
Only one of the six justices who participated 
in Abbasi (Clarence Thomas) disagreed. 
Moreover, unlike in Abbasi, the plaintiffs in 
the Hernández case have no other possible 
remedy. A federal statute bars them from 
suing Mesa under state tort law. And as with 
most claims against rogue law enforcement 
officers, there is no meaningful opportunity 
to challenge the officer’s conduct in advance 
through a suit for declaratory or injunctive 
relief. Thus, for plaintiffs like Hernández’s 
parents, the alternative to judge-made 
damages for Agent Mesa’s allegedly 
unconstitutional conduct is, well, nothing. It 
might be easy to understand, or at least 
accept, the federal courts’ skepticism at going 
out of their way to provide remedies in a one-
off case, where there is no real concern that 
the officer’s allegedly unconstitutional 
conduct could or would recur. But the tragic 
facts of Hernández’s case are, unfortunately, 
not the least bit aberrational. The federal 
appeals court in San Francisco is currently 
considering similar questions in a case 
arising out of a fatal cross-border shooting in 
Arizona, and there was just another fatal 
shooting by a CBP agent of an unarmed 
noncitizen along the border near Laredo, 
Texas. More generally, one need not look far 
to find CBP agents on the literal and 
figurative front lines in any number of other 
contemporary contexts—contexts in which 
there ought to be common cause in the need 
to deter constitutional abuse. 
To that end, on June 15, we brought the 
Hernández case back to the Supreme Court, 
asking the justices to review (and reverse) the 
5th Circuit’s ruling and to recognize that the 
federal courts can indeed hold CBP agents 
accountable if and when they violate the 
Constitution. Now more than ever, there 
ought to be common cause in ensuring that 
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CBP agents act consistently with the 
Constitution, and in providing remedies to 
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In 2010, a border patrol agent, standing in the 
United States, shot and killed a 15-year old 
Mexican boy standing across the border in 
Mexico. The Hernandez’s parents sued. Last 
June, the Supreme Court returned the case to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
(Fifth Circuit) for further legal proceedings. 
Hernandez v. Mesa. The Fifth Circuit has 
now ruled that the Hernandez family may not 
sue the border patrol agent under an implied-
cause-of-action Bivens theory.  
Bivens refers to Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, a 
1971 case in which the Supreme Court held 
that a victim of an unconstitutional search 
and seizure enjoyed an implied cause of 
action against the offending agents for 
damages in the absence of any other legal 
remedy. In later cases, the Supreme Court has 
hesitated to recognize an implied cause of 
action for other constitutional violations. 
Whether the Court will recognize an implied 
cause of action in these new-context cases 
turns on the existence of any special factors 
suggesting that the existence of any remedy 
for the constitutional violation should be left 
to Congress. The Court returned Hernandez 
to the Fifth Circuit for this “special factor” 
analysis. The Fifth Circuit identified special 
factors that it held precluded recognition of 
an implied cause of action.  
Background  
Although many of the facts are in dispute, all 
parties seem to agree that Border Patrol 
Agent Mesa shot and killed Sergio 
Hernandez across the U.S.-Mexico border. 
The boy’s parents sued Agent Mesa, the 
United States, and several federal agencies 
under various theories. The district court 
dismissed claims under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act and the Alien Tort Statute. The 
boy’s parents also asserted a Bivens cause of 
action for violations of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. They contended 
unsuccessfully that the shooting and death 
constituted use of excessive force and thus an 
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment and a substantive due process 
violation under the Fifth Amendment.  
Agent Mesa for his part invoked qualified 
official immunity. Qualified official 
immunity precludes a suit for money 
damages against government officials arising 
out of actions occurring in performance of 
their official duties. The immunity does not 
extend to conduct that is contrary to clearly 
established law with which an official would 
be familiar. Agent Mesa argued that no 
Fourth or Fifth Amendment precedent clearly 
covered conduct in a foreign nation.  
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A Fifth Circuit panel affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal of the Federal Tort Claims 
Act and Alien Tort statute claims. A full 
complement of the judges of the Fifth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, concluded that Agent Mesa 
was entitled to qualified immunity with 
respect to the Fifth Amendment Bivens claim. 
The judges affirmed dismissal of the Fourth 
Amendment claims because they concluded 
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply 
outside of the United States to foreign 
nationals without ties to the United States.  
The case arrived before the Supreme Court 
shortly after the Court had agreed to review 
another Bivens claims case, Ziglar v. Abbasi. 
Writing for the Court in Abbasi, Justice 
Kennedy emphasized the Court’s reluctance 
to recognize implied causes of action. Justice 
Kennedy explained that “Bivens will not be 
extended to a new context if there are ‘special 
factors’ counselling hesitation in the absence 
of affirmative action by Congress.” He stated 
further that “if there are sound reasons to 
think Congress might doubt the efficacy or 
necessity of a damages remedy as part of the 
system for enforcing the law and correcting a 
wrong, the courts must refrain from creating 
the remedy in order to respect the role of 
Congress in determining the nature and 
extent of federal-court jurisdiction under 
Article III.”  
The Supreme Court then turned to Mesa. The 
Court concluded the Fifth Circuit’s qualified 
immunity holding was in error because it 
failed to address the fact that Agent Mesa had 
no idea whether the boy was a U.S. citizen. 
The Court set aside the question of whether 
Hernandez’s Fourth Amendment rights had 
been violated and returned the case to the 
Fifth Circuit for a threshold determination of 
whether the Hernandez family enjoyed a 
Bivens implied cause of action.  
Back in the Fifth Circuit  
When the case returned from the Supreme 
Court, the Fifth Circuit decided that the case 
presented a “new context” for Bivens 
purposes and that “special factors” 
counselled against recognizing an expanded 
implied Bivens cause of action. If a case does 
not present a “new context” – that is, if a case 
is not “different in a meaningful way” from 
the cases in which the Supreme Court has 
recognized a Bivens implied cause of action 
– then an implied cause of action exists. The 
Fifth Circuit pointed out that Hernandez 
presents unresolved and novel Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment claims. 
As for special factors, the Fifth Circuit 
acknowledged the possibility of an implied 
cause of action in some new-context cases, 
but concluded that here the special factors 
were too many and too weighty for the 
plaintiffs to overcome. The Fifth Circuit 
identified five special factors that it believed 
indicated that establishing a cause of action 
should be left to Congress. First, the Border 
Patrol is statutorily authorized to deter and 
prevent illegal entry by terrorists, gun and 
drug smugglers, and unauthorized 
individuals, “duties essential to national 
security.” Second, “extending Bivens in this 
context also risks interference with foreign 
affairs and diplomacy.” Third, Congress 
might have, but refrained, from establishing 
a cause of action against federal officials in 
the Federal Tort Claims Act and elsewhere. 
Fourth, Congress has established other 
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remedies for the alleged in the form of 
criminal prosecution. Fifth, “the 
extraterritorial aspect of this case is itself a 
special factor that underlies and aggravates 
the separation-of-powers issues.”  
One judge concurred, but would have 
resolved the case on the basis of qualified 
official immunity. In his view, the absence of 
clearly established precedent settled the case 
in Agent Mesa’s favor. Two judges 
dissented. They agreed that the case 
presented the issue in a new context. 
However, they did not consider the 
majority’s special factors all that special. 
Instead, in their view, the “case simply 
involves a federal official engaged in his law 
enforcement duties acting on United States 
soil who shot and killed an unarmed fifteen-
year-old boy standing a few feet away.” They 
would have recognized an implied cause of 
action should the Hernandez family establish 
either a Fourth or Fifth Amendment 
violation.  
At this point, the Hernandez family is free to 
petition the Supreme Court to review the 
Fifth Circuit’s handiwork. It remains to be 
seen whether the family will petition for 
review and how the Court would respond to 
the petition if the family asks for review. On 
one hand, the Court in Abbasi characterized 
Bivens and its progeny as the work of an 
“ancient regime” (i.e., the standard of a 
bygone day), a view that would seem to 
foreclose future recognition of virtually any 
new Bivens implied causes of action. On the 
other hand, the special factors the Court 
identified in Abbasi were fairly unique (high 
level executive policy decisions relating to 
detention following the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks). The Court may want to take the 
opportunity to explain just how special 
Bivens-defeating special factors must be. In 
any event, Congress is free to address the 











“Supreme Court Revives Suit Against Border Agent in Shooting Death”  
 
 
The Wall Street Journal 
 
Jess Bravin  
 
June 26, 2017  
 
The Supreme Court on Monday revived a 
claim against a U.S. Border Patrol agent who 
shot and killed a Mexican teenager standing 
across the international border, directing a 
lower court that had dismissed the case to re-
examine whether youth’s parents are entitled 
to sue. 
In a separate case, the court was unable to 
resolve whether immigrants held in long-
term detention have a right to seek bail, and 
ordered a new argument on the issue. The 
case was heard in February by an eight-
member court, which apparently divided 
evenly on the issue. Justice Neil Gorsuch, 
confirmed in April, likely will provide the 
deciding vote when the case is argued again 
in the term that begins in October. 
The cross-border shooting case was among 
the most dramatic heard by the court during 
the term that ended Monday. According to 
the suit, 15-year-old Sergio Hernandez and 
his friends were playing a tag-like game in 
the dry concrete culvert built to channel the 
Rio Grande, dividing the U.S. city of El Paso, 
Texas, from Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. 
Border Patrol agent Jesus Mesa Jr. arrived on 
a bicycle and seized one of the youths, but 
when Sergio escaped to the Mexican side of 
the culvert, fatally shot him in the face. 
Had the victim been in the U.S. or held 
American citizenship, or had the shooter 
worked for a state or local agency, the parents 
most likely could sue for damages. 
But Congress hasn’t explicitly authorized 
lawsuits against federal officials for violating 
constitutional rights, and the Supreme Court 
has found only narrow circumstances when 
they potentially are liable for such 
misconduct. 
Monday’s unsigned decision directs the Fifth 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in New 
Orleans, to re-examine whether the 
Hernandez killing falls into such 
circumstances, especially under an opinion 
the high court issued last week further 
elaborating the “special factors” that 
determine whether federal officials may be 
sued. 
“The facts alleged in the complaint depict a 
disturbing incident resulting in a 
heartbreaking loss of life,” the court said. 
Whether Sergio’s parents “may recover 
damages for that loss in this suit depends on 
questions” the appeals court should first 
address. 
Although unsigned, Monday’s decision was 
adopted by a 5-3 vote. 
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In dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, said the parents 
should have been permitted to press their 
claim at trial. Among other reasons, Mr. 
Mesa “knowingly shot from United States 
territory into the culvert,” Justice Breyer 
wrote, without knowing on which side of the 
border the bullet would land” or  “whether he 
was shooting at a citizen of the United States 
or Mexico.” 
Justice Breyer’s dissent included a 1963 
blueprint showing a cross-section of the 
culvert, to buttress his argument that Sergio 
had been more in an international no-man’s-
land than deep into a foreign country, and a 
photo of President Lyndon Johnson and Lady 
Bird Johnson viewing the channel in 1968. 
Justice Clarence Thomas dissented on the 
other side, writing briefly that the Fifth 
Circuit properly dismissed the case. Justice 
Gorsuch wasn’t on the court when the case 

































































“Does the Constitution protect someone on the Mexican side of the border?”  
 
 
Los Angeles Times  
 
David G. Savage  
 
February 21, 2017  
 
The Supreme Court on Tuesday will take up 
the case of a Mexican teenager who was shot 
and killed by a U.S. border agent and try to 
decide a question that is also at the heart of 
the legal dispute over President Trump’s 
foreign travel ban: Does the Constitution 
protect foreign citizens who stand at the 
nation’s borders? 
Judges have blocked Trump’s order 
temporarily on the grounds it may violate the 
constitutional rights of foreign travelers from 
seven Muslim majority nations. Some of 
those foreigners live legally in this country 
and had traveled abroad, while others hold 
U.S. visas but have never been to the United 
States. However, the law in this area is far 
from clear, and it will likely remain so until 
the high court rules on the issue. 
The border shooting case touches on a similar 
question, and the outcome may affect the 
travel ban litigation. 
In June 2010, Sergio Hernandez, 15, was 
playing with two friends in the concrete 
culvert that marks the boundary between El 
Paso and Juarez, Mexico. Cellphone 
video shows the boys ran up the culvert on 
the U.S. side and touched the high fence. 
They turned to run back to the Mexican side 
when a U.S. border patrol agent on a bicycle 
came upon them. 
Officer Jesus Mesa Jr. grabbed one of the 
boys and turned his gun toward the other, 
Sergio, who had hidden behind a pillar about 
60 feet away on the Mexican side. The officer 
fired three shots and killed the teenager. 
Mesa initially claimed he acted in self-
defense because the boys were throwing 
rocks at him. While the video appeared to 
disprove that, Justice Department 
investigators later said Mesa was responding 
to reports of smugglers and he had 
encountered rocks being thrown. 
The killing of the teenager, who was unarmed 
and posed no apparent threat to the officer, 
provoked anger on the Mexican side of the 
border, but U.S. officials refused to extradite 
Mesa to face charges in Mexico. They also 
decided against prosecuting him under U.S. 
law. 
Sergio’s parents then sued Mesa, alleging 
the shooting was an unjustified violation of 
the Constitution. They cited the 4th 
Amendment’s ban on unreasonable seizures 
and the use of excessive force as well as the 
5th Amendment, which says no person shall 
“be deprived of life or liberty … without due 
process of law.” 
A federal judge threw out the suit on the 
grounds that the Constitution’s protections 
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stop at the border. Since the Mexican 
teenager was killed on the Mexican side, his 
family could not sue the border patrol agent, 
the judge said. 
A divided panel of the U.S. 5th Circuit Court 
of Appeals briefly revived the suit. The 
majority cited the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
cases regarding the U.S. detention facility at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in which the justices 
said the Constitution and the right to habeas 
corpus extended to the naval base on Cuban 
soil because U.S. authorities exercised 
complete control there. Similarly, the judges 
said, U.S. agents controlled the area on the 
U.S-Mexico border. 
The full 15-member appeals court then took 
up the case and decided that because the law 
was not clear, the border agent could not be 
held liable for violating it. 
The family appealed to the Supreme Court, 
arguing the justices should not permit a “law-
free zone in which U.S. agents can kill 
innocent civilians with impunity.” 
The case of Hernandez vs. Mesa will be the 
first argued in the Supreme Court by lawyers 
representing the Trump administration. 
In an interview, the family’s attorney, Robert 
Hilliard of Corpus Christi, Texas, said the 
case has similarities to the legal battle over 
Trump’s travel ban. “This is really about the 
separation of powers and whether the 
judiciary has a role in reviewing the conduct 
of the government,” he said. 
He was referring to the government’s 
contention in the border shooting case that 
the Supreme Court should throw out the suit 
and shield U.S. agents from all such claims.  
Defending the travel ban, government 
lawyers made a similar argument, contending 
judges had no authority to second-guess the 
president’s decision to exclude certain 
foreigners from entering the country. Last 
weekend, White House policy advisor 
Stephen Miller said in TV interviews that 
judges had no authority to block Trump’s 
order on foreign travelers. “The president’s 
powers here are beyond question,” he said. 
“We don’t have judicial supremacy in this 
country.” 
As usual, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy 
appears to hold the key vote. In the past, he 
has said the reach of the Constitution should 
turn on practical concerns, including whether 
U.S. officials are in control. If so, he could 
join with the court’s liberals to say the 
Constitution constrains U.S. agents operating 
on a border, thereby clearing the family’s 
lawsuit to proceed. Such a decision would 
surely be cited by lawyers and judges in the 
litigation over the travel ban. 
But he could also join with the court’s 
conservatives and refuse to open the door for 
noncitizens outside the country to bring legal 
claims against U.S. officials. If the court were 
to split, 4-4, the justices could choose to place 
a hold on the case and await the confirmation 
of a ninth justice. 
The Senate will begin hearings March 20 on 
Judge Neil Gorsuch, the president’s nominee 
to fill the vacancy.
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Barton v. Barr 
 
Ruling Below: Barton v. United States AG, 904 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 
Overview: Barton, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was admitted to the U.S. as a B-2 visitor and 
became a lawful permanent resident. He was arrested and charged with three counts of aggravated 
assault and one count each of first-degree criminal damage to property and possession of a firearm 
during the commission of a felony. The Department of Homeland Security charged Barton as 
deportable. He challenged the charges for removal. The U.S. Government argued that his crimes 
make him “inadmissible.” Barton claimed that since he is an already-admitted lawful permanent 
resident, he could not be rendered inadmissible. 
 
Issue: Whether a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United 
States can be “render[ed] … inadmissible” for the purposes of the stop-time rule, 8 U.S.C. 
§1229b(d)(1).   
 




U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit 
 
Decided on September 25, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
NEWSOM, Circuit Judge: 
 
The federal immigration laws give the 
Attorney General the discretion to cancel the 
removal of an otherwise removable lawful 
permanent resident who (among other 
conditions) "has resided in the United States 
continuously for 7 years after having been 
admitted in any status." Importantly for 
present purposes, though, the continuous-
residence requirement is subject to the so-
called "stop-time rule." The provision that 
embodies that rule—at issue here—states that 
any period of continuous residence 
terminates when the alien "commit[s] an 
offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of 
this title that renders the alien 
inadmissible to the United States 
under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or 
removable from the United States 
under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of 
this title, whichever is earliest."  
The question before us is whether a lawful-
permanent-resident alien who has already 
been admitted to the United States—and who 
isn't currently seeking admission or 
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readmission—can, for stop-time purposes, be 
"render[ed] ... inadmissible" by virtue of a 
qualifying criminal conviction. Other circuits 
have divided over the answer. For slightly 
different reasons, the Second and Fifth 
Circuits have both held that a lawful 
permanent resident needn't apply for 
admission to be "render[ed] ... inadmissible" 
under the stop-time rule (as has the Third 
Circuit, albeit in an unpublished 
opinion).  More recently, the Ninth Circuit 
disagreed, concluding that "a lawful 
permanent resident cannot be 'rendered 
inadmissible' unless he is seeking 
admission."  
For the reasons that follow, we agree with the 
Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits, and 




Andre Martello Barton is a native and citizen 
of Jamaica. Barton was initially admitted to 
the United States on May 27, 1989 as a B-2 
visitor for pleasure; approximately three 
years later, he successfully adjusted his status 
to lawful permanent resident. Since his 
admission, Barton has run afoul of the law on 
several occasions. Initially, on January 23, 
1996—for reasons that will become clear, the 
dates matter—Barton was arrested and 
charged with three counts of aggravated 
assault and one count each of first-degree 
criminal damage to property and possession 
of a firearm during the commission of a 
felony. He was convicted of all three offenses 
in July 1996. Then, a little more than a decade 
later—first in 2007 and then again in 2008—
Barton was charged with and convicted of 
violating the Georgia Controlled Substances 
Act. (For present purposes, only Barton's 
1996 crimes are relevant to determining 
whether he is eligible for cancellation of 
removal. Barton's 2007 and 2008 offenses 
occurred more than seven years after his 
admission to the United States—which, as we 
will explain, is the pertinent timeframe for 
establishing continuous residence under the 
cancellation statute.) 
The Department of Homeland Security 
subsequently served Barton with a notice to 
appear, charging him as removable on several 
grounds: (1) under 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for being convicted of an 
aggravated felony related to drug trafficking; 
(2) under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), for 
violating controlled-substance  laws; (3) 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C), for being 
convicted of illegally possessing a firearm; 
and (4) under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), 
for being convicted of two crimes involving 
moral turpitude not arising out of a single 
scheme. Barton admitted the factual 
allegations in the notice and conceded 
removability based on the controlled-
substance and gun-possession offenses but 
denied that he had been convicted of a 
trafficking-related aggravated felony or of 
two crimes involving moral turpitude not 
arising out of a single scheme. Barton also 
indicated that he intended to seek 
cancellation of removal as a lawful 
permanent resident. The immigration judge 
sustained the two conceded charges of 
removability, and the government later 




As promised, Barton subsequently filed an 
application for cancellation of removal 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which, as already 
explained, allows the Attorney General to 
cancel the removal of an otherwise 
removable lawful-permanent-resident alien 
if—in addition to other requirements not 
relevant here—the alien "has resided in the 
United States continuously for 7 years after 
having been admitted in any status." 
Importantly, though—as also explained—the 
continuous-residence requirement is 
subject to the "stop-time rule," which 
terminates the accrual of continuous 
residence when the alien commits a crime 
that (1) is listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) and 
(2) that renders the alien either 
"inadmissible" under § 1182(a)(2) or 
"removable" under 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2) or (a)(4).  
In his cancellation application, Barton 
acknowledged his prior criminal convictions 
and included as exhibits records that, as 
relevant here, showed that he had committed 
the crimes that resulted in his convictions for 
aggravated assault, criminal damage to 
property, and unlawful gun possession on 
January 23, 1996. The government moved to 
pretermit Barton's application, arguing that 
Barton hadn't accrued the required seven 
years of continuous residence after his May 
27, 1989 admission because, under the stop-
time rule, his continuous-residence period 
ended on January 23, 1996. 
In response, Barton contended that his 1996 
crimes didn't trigger the stop-time rule. As 
to § 1229b(d)(1)'s "removable" prong, 
Barton said that his 1996 offenses didn't 
qualify because they arose from a single 
scheme of misconduct constituting one crime 
involving moral turpitude committed outside 
his first five years in the United States, 
whereas the cross-referenced § 
1227(a)(2) establishes removability, as 
relevant here,only for (i) a single crime 
involving moral turpitude committed within 
five years of an alien's admission or (ii) 
multiple crimes involving moral turpitude not 
arising out of a single scheme. The 
government didn't press—and has since 
abandoned—the argument that Barton's 1996 
crimes rendered him "removable" for stop-
time purposes. Instead, it insisted that 
Barton's 1996 offenses—even if considered 
as a single crime involving moral turpitude 
occurring outside the five-year timeframe—
rendered Barton "inadmissible" under § 
1182(a)(2), which unlike removability 
under § 1227(a)(2) isn't limited by a single-
scheme requirement. Barton replied—thus 
teeing up the issue before us—that as an 
already-admitted lawful permanent resident 
not seeking admission (or readmission) to the 
United States, he could not as a matter of law 
be "render[ed] ... inadmissible" within the 
meaning of § 1229b(d). 
The immigration judge ruled in the 
government's favor, concluding that Barton's 
1996 offenses "render[ed]" him 
"inadmissible" under § 1182(a)(2), thereby 
triggering § 1229b(d)(1)'s stop-time rule, 
thereby prematurely ending his period of 
continuous residence in the United States, 




Barton sought review of the IJ's order in the 
Board of Immigration Appeals, reiterating 
his argument that a lawful-permanent-
resident alien not seeking admission to the 
United States can't be "render[ed] 
inadmissible" under § 1182(a)(2) for stop-
time purposes. In a non-precedential single-
member decision, the Board agreed with the 
IJ, concluding that Barton's 1996 offenses 
triggered the stop-time rule and thus 
forestalled his accrual of the requisite seven 
years of continuous residence. Citing its 
earlier decision in Matter of Jurado-
Delgado, the Board (per the lone member) 
held that Barton's convictions barred him 
from seeking cancellation of removal 
because—so far as we can tell from a very 
summary order—the phrase "renders the 
alien inadmissible" in § 1229b(d)(1)'s stop-
time rule requires only that the applicant be 
"potentially" inadmissible, not that he be 
actively seeking admission. 
Barton now petitions for review of the 
Board's decision. He asserts, as he has all 
along, that as a lawful permanent resident he 
"plainly cannot be inadmissible as a result of 
any offense, as he is not seeking admission to 
the United States."  
II 
Under the principle announced in Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, "[a]s a general rule, an 
agency's interpretation of a statute which it 
administers is entitled to deference if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous and the 
interpretation is based on a reasonable 
construction of the statute.” And to be clear, 
the Supreme Court has held 
that Chevron deference applies with full 
force when the Board of Immigration 
Appeals interprets ambiguous statutory terms 
in the course of ordinary case-by-case 
adjudication. But so do Chevron's 
limitations. Accordingly, here as elsewhere, 
if we determine—employing "traditional 
tools of statutory construction"—that 
"Congress has spoken clearly, we do not 
defer to [the] agency's interpretation of the 
statute," because "we must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress."  
The threshold question before us, therefore—
at Chevron step one, so to speak—is whether 
the usual rules of statutory interpretation 
provide a clear answer to the following 
question: Can a lawful-permanent-resident 
alien who is not presently seeking admission 
to the United States nonetheless be 
"render[ed] ... inadmissible" within the 
meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)? 
Although it is undoubtedly true that "the 
concept of inadmissibility is generally 
married to situations in which an alien is 
actually seeking admission to the United 
States," for the reasons that follow, we hold 
that an already-admitted lawful permanent 
resident—who doesn't need and isn't seeking 
admission—can be "render[ed] ... 
inadmissible" for stop-time purposes. 
A 
Any application of the "traditional tools of 
statutory construction," of course, must begin 
"with the statutory text, and proceed from the 
understanding that unless otherwise defined, 
statutory terms are generally interpreted in 
accordance with their ordinary meaning.” At 
issue here (again) is the stop-time rule, which 
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(again) terminates the seven years of 
continuous residence that a lawful permanent 
resident must accrue in order to qualify for 
cancellation of removal. In relevant part, the 
stop-time rule provides as follows: 
[A]ny period of continuous residence 
... in the United States shall be 
deemed to end ... when the alien has 
committed an offense referred to 
in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that 
renders the alien inadmissible to the 
United States under section 
1182(a)(2) of this title or removable 
from the United States under section 
1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title, 
whichever is earliest. 
Because the parties here agree that Barton is 
not ineligible for cancellation of removal on 
account of having committed an offense that 
rendered him "removable" under § 
1227(a)(2) or § 1227(a)(4), the sole question 
before us is whether his 1996 convictions 
rendered him "inadmissible" under § 
1182(a)(2). Barton's position is simply stated: 
He says that he "plainly cannot 
be inadmissible as a result of any offense, as 
he is not seeking admission to the United 
States." Although Barton's argument has a 
certain intuitive appeal, we conclude that § 
1229b(d)(1)'s plain language forecloses it. 
We begin our textual analysis where Barton 
does—with the word "inadmissible." 
Standard English-language dictionaries all 
seem to define "inadmissible" in pretty much 
the same way: "Not admissible; not proper to 
be allowed or received." So, in short, an alien 
like Barton is "inadmissible" if he isn't 
"proper[ly]"—or doesn't "hav[e] the right to 
be"—present in the United States. 
On, then, to the word "renders," which 
precedes "inadmissible." Barton asserts that 
Congress's use of that term—such that the 
alien must commit an offense that "renders" 
him "inadmissible"—"requires certain 
factual circumstances to be in existence to be 
operative," and thus that it "makes most sense 
for Congress to have used 'renders' 
inadmissible to apply to those seeking 
admission ...." We disagree that the term 
"renders" necessitates (or even properly 
suggests) so narrow a reading. Turning again 
to the dictionaries, we find that they almost 
uniformly define "render" to mean "to cause 
to be or to become." Some, interestingly—
and we think tellingly—go on to explain that 
the word "render" can indicate the conferral 
of a particular condition, or "state."  
A "state"-based understanding makes 
particularly good sense here, where the word 
that follows "renders" is "inadmissible." By 
their very nature, "able" and "ible" 
words connote a person's or thing's character, 
quality, or status—which, importantly for 
present purposes, exists independent of any 
particular facts on the ground, so to speak. 
Consider, for instance, the following 
example, taken from one dictionary's 
definition of the word "render": "Sewage 
effluent leaked into a well, grossly 
contaminating the water and rendering 
it undrinkable for 24 hours." The described 
water isn't properly drunk for a full day—
whether or not anyone is actually trying to 
drink it. It is, by its very nature, not drinkable. 
Here's another, again from a dictionary 
definition of "render": "[T]he rains rendered 
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his escape impossible."  Because of the rains, 
the unidentified captive's escape couldn't be 
made—whether or not he was actually trying 
to make it. Similar illustrations abound: A 
terminal illness renders its 
victim untreatable regardless of whether she 
is actively seeking treatment; rot renders a 
piece of fish inedible regardless of whether 
someone is trying to eat it; sheer weight 
renders a car immovable regardless of 
whether someone is trying to move it. You 
get the point. So too here—an alien can be 
rendered inadmissible regardless of whether 
he is actually seeking admission. 
We simply cannot discern in § 1229b(d)(1)'s 
text any indication that in order to be 
"render[ed] ... inadmissible" within the 
meaning of the stop-time rule, an alien must 
presently be seeking admission. Rather, an 
alien is "render[ed] ... inadmissible" when he 
is "cause[d] to be or to become" not 
"proper[ly]" or "right[ly]" admitted. In other 
words, "inadmissib[ility]" is a status that an 
alien assumes by virtue of his having been 
convicted of a qualifying offense under § 
1182(a)(2). True, for an alien like Barton, 
who has already been admitted—and isn't 
currently seeking admission—that status 
might not immediately produce real-world 
admission-related consequences. But it isn't 
categorically irrelevant to admission either; 
rather, it may just be that the otherwise-latent 
status manifests somewhere down the road. 
Barton is of course correct that, as a general 
rule, an already-admitted lawful permanent 
resident needn't seek readmission to the 
United States. There are exceptions, 
however. For instance, a once-admitted alien 
may need readmission if he "has abandoned 
or relinquished [lawful-permanent-resident] 
status," "has been absent from the United 
States for a continuous period in excess of 
180 days," or "has engaged in illegal activity 
after having departed the United States."   
So as a matter of both linguistics and logic, at 
least for stop-time purposes, a lawful 
permanent resident can—contrary to Barton's 
contention—be "render[ed] ... inadmissible" 
even if he isn't currently seeking (and for that 
matter may never again seek) admission to 
the United States. 
B 
In resisting this plain-language interpretation, 
Barton relies principally on the rule against 
surplusage—which cautions against 
needlessly reading a statute in a way that 
renders (pun fully intended) certain language 
superfluous. In particular, Barton asserts— 
If an offense referred to in 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2), to wit, a [crime involving 
moral turpitude], categorically 
render[s] an alien inadmissible and 
trigger[s] the stop-time rule, without 
respect to whether that individual is 
actually seeking admission, then there 
would be no need to consider 
whether, in the alternative, the 
offense render[s] the alien removable 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) or (a)(4). 
Although we find Barton's surplusage-based 
argument a little hard to follow, he seems to 
be saying something like the following. At 
the outset, he correctly recognizes that in 
order to trigger § 1229b(d)(1)'s stop-time 
rule, two conditions must be met: first, the 
alien must have "committed an offense 
referred to in section 1182(a)(2)"; second, 
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and separately, that offense must "render[] 
the alien" either "inadmissible ... 
under section 1182(a)(2)" or "removable ... 
under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) ...." 
From that starting point, and presumably 
fastening on the fact that both § 1229b(d)(1)'s 
prefatory "referred to" clause and the 
"inadmissible" prong of the statute's 
operative clause cross-reference § 
1182(a)(2), Barton appears to contend that an 
alien's commission of any § 1182(a)(2)-
based crime that meets the threshold 
"referred to" condition will 
also ipso facto "render[] the alien 
inadmissible under section 1182(a)(2)." 
Thus, he says, there will never be a need to 
proceed to determine whether a crime 
qualifies under the operative clause's 
separate § 1227(a)-based "removable" 
prong—hence, the argument goes, the 
surplusage. Barton's solution: Courts should 
read the stop-time rule "so that the 
inadmissibility part applies to permanent 
residents seeking admission, and the 
[removability] part applies to those 
permanent residents in the United States 
already, not seeking admission ...." 
We reject Barton's argument for two reasons. 
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly explained that the usual 
"preference" for "avoiding surplusage 
constructions is not absolute" and that 
"applying the rule against surplusage is, 
absent other indications, inappropriate" when 
it would make an otherwise unambiguous 
statute ambiguous. Rather, faced with a 
choice between a plain-text reading that 
renders a word or clause superfluous and an 
interpretation that gives every word 
independent meaning but, in the doing, 
muddies up the statute—courts "should 
prefer the plain meaning since that approach 
respects the words of Congress." Because, as 
we have explained, the statutory language 
here is clear, it is unnecessary—and in the 
Supreme Court's words, would be 
"inappropriate"—to apply the anti-
surplusage canon here. 
Moreover, and in any event, Barton's 
surplusage-based argument misunderstands 
the stop-time rule's operation. Contrary to 
Barton's assumption, answering "yes" to the 
first question—whether the alien has 
"committed an offense referred to in section 
1182(a)(2)"—does not necessarily require a 
"yes" to the second question—whether that 
offense "renders the alien inadmissible ... 
under section 1182(a)(2)." The reason is that 
while the mere "commi[ssion]" of a 
qualifying offense satisfies the prefatory 
clause, actually "render[ing] the alien 
inadmissible" demands more. Under § 
1182(a)(2), an alien "is inadmissible"—here, 
as a result of a "crime involving moral 
turpitude"—only if he is "convicted of, or ... 
admits having committed, or ... admits 
committing acts which constitute the 
essential elements of" the listed offense. In 
short, while only commission is required at 
step one, conviction (or admission) is 
required at step two.   
So contrary to Barton's contention, there is no 
surplusage. The statutory language that he 
assails as superfluous is in fact the second of 
two independent requirements, both of which 
are necessary to trigger the stop-time rule.  
III 
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For the foregoing reasons, we hold, per the 
stop-time provision's plain language, that a 
lawful-permanent-resident alien need not be 
seeking admission to the United States 
in order to be "render[ed] ... inadmissible." 
Accordingly, the Board correctly concluded 
that Barton is ineligible for cancellation of 
removal because the stop-time rule—
triggered when he committed a crime 
involving moral turpitude in January 1996—
ended his continuous residence a few months 













































Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson 
 
April 22, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court could make it easier 
for lawful permanent residents to remain in 
the country after committing a crime.  
The justices agreed today to review an 
Eleventh Circuit ruling regarding when 
lawful permanent residents can obtain 
discretionary “cancellation of removal.”  
At issue is the “stop-time rule,” which pauses 
the accumulation of the seven-year residency 
requirement necessary to obtain cancellation.  
The rule is triggered, among other times, 
whenever such non-citizens commit an 
offense that renders them “inadmissible.”  
The Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have all said the rule is kicks in 
regardless of whether an admitted immigrant 
is seeking admission to the U.S.  
The Ninth Circuit is the only one to hold that 
immigrants can’t be “inadmissible” unless 
they are actually seeking admission.  
Andre Martello Barton, a Jamaican citizen 
and a lawful permanent U.S. resident, asked 
the Supreme Court to resolve the dispute after 
the Eleventh Circuit found that he was a few 
months shy of qualifying for cancellation of 
removal.  
The court agreed to take the case but likely 
won’t hear it until next term, which begins in 
October.  
There were an estimated 13.2 million lawful 
permanent residents in the United States as of 
January 2014, according to the Department of 
Homeland Security.  
The case is Barton v. Barr, U.S., No. 18-725, 














“Court Finds Green Card Holder in the United States ‘Inadmissible’ for Decades-
Old Crime”  
 
 
Ramineni Shepard Legal Blog  
 
Dayna Lally  
 
September 25, 2018 
 
On September 25, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit 
found that a U.S. permanent resident (“green 
card holder”) who has already been admitted 
to the United States- and who isn’t currently 
seeking admission or readmission- can, for 
stop-time purposes, be rendered 
“inadmissible” by virtue of a qualifying 
criminal conviction. 
Andre Martello Barton, a native and citizen 
of Jamaica, was initially admitted to the 
United States on May 27, 1989 as a B-2 
visitor. Approximately three (3) years later, 
Barton adjusted his status to that of a  lawful 
permanent resident, On January 23, 1996, 
Barton was arrested and charged with 
aggravated assault, first-degree criminal 
damage to property, and possession of a 
firearm during the commission of a felony. 
He was convicted for all of the offenses in 
July 1996. 
The Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) subsequently served Barton with a 
notice to appear; charging him, among other 
things, under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), 
for his conviction of two (2) crimes involving 
moral turpitude not arising out of a single 
scheme. Barton filed an application for 
cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(a). 
The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations at § 
1229b(a) gives the Attorney General the 
discretion to cancel the removal of a lawful 
permanent resident who (among other 
conditions) “has resided in the United States 
continuously for 7 years after having been 
admitted in any status.” The continuous-
residence requirement is, however, subject to 
the so-called “stop-time rule.” 
The “stop-time rule”, embodied at § 
1182(d)(1) of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, provides that any period of 
continuous residence in the United States is 
deemed to end when the alien commits, or 
has been convicted of, a crime involving 
moral turpitude. 
Barton argued to the Eleventh Circuit that the 
language of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act differentiates between those seeking 
“admission” to the United States and those 
already in the United States, and therefore, 
that the inadmissibility part of the statute 
should apply to permanent residents seeking 
admission, and the removability part should 
apply to those permanent residents in the 
United States already, not seeking admission. 
The Eleventh Circuit panel unanimously 
rejected Barton’s interpretation of the statute. 
In its opinion, it performed a “state”-based 
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textual analysis of the statute and found the 
term “render” to mean “to cause to be or to 
become.” The Eleventh Circuit used obscene 
examples of the dictionary definition of 
“render” to support its opinion that an alien 
can be rendered inadmissible regardless of 
whether he is actually seeking admission: 
“… rot renders a piece of fish inedible 
regardless of whether someone is trying to eat 
it… 
As of Tuesday, the Second, Third, Fifth, and 
now Eleventh Circuit courts are of the 
opinion that a lawful permanent resident need 
not be seeking admission to the United States 
in order to be “render[ed] … inadmissible.” 
Barton’s attorney is considering petitioning 
the U.S. Supreme Court to hear this case. 
Ramineni Law Associates, LLC is closely 
monitoring the proceedings and will provide 










































June 27, 2019 
 
U.S. permanent residents can’t be “rendered 
inadmissible” unless they are seeking 
admission into the U.S., a Jamaican citizen 
fighting his deportation told the U.S., a 
Jamaican citizen fighting his deportation told 
the U.S. Supreme Court on Wednesday, 
pushing an interpretation of the immigration 
statute that has split the federal circuit courts.  
 
Andre Martello Barton, a Jamaican citizen 
with a U.S. green card, argued in his opening 
brief at the high court that he was not 
“rendered inadmissible” more than two 
decades ago by a firearms offense he 
committed in 1996 when he was 18, as the 
government has argued, because Barton had 
already been legally admitted into the U.S. at 
that time.  
 
The immigration courts’ finding that he was 
in fact “rendered inadmissible,” which was 
ultimately upheld by the Eleventh Circuit last 
year, left Barton – now a father of four 
American Children – unable to stop his 
deportation years later under the so-called 
stop-time rule, which stops the clock on the 
number of years an immigrant accrues in the 
U.S.  
 
The panel’s interpretation has been rejected 
by the Ninth Circuit but adopted by three 
other circuit courts.  
Permanent residents are eligible for a form of 
deportation relief called a cancellation of 
removal if they have lived in the U.S. 
continuously for at least seven years. But the 
immigration judge found that Barton had 
been “rendered inadmissible” by that 1996 
crime just shy of reaching that seven-year 
mark, even though he has lived in the U.S. for 
nearly two decades by the time of the judge’s 
decision.  
 
The idea that Barton was rendered 
inadmissible because “hypothetically” in a 
“counterfactual world” he would have been 
inadmissible if he had needed to be 
readmitted into the U.S. in “implausible,” 
Barton told the justice.  
 
“The government’s interpretation would 
improperly rewrite the phrase ‘renders the 
alien inadmissible’ as ‘could render a 
hypothetical alien inadmissible,” Barton 
argued.  
 
As an already admitted permanent resident, 
Barton could only be rendered deportable, 
not inadmissible, the brief says. And whether 
an immigrant is “rendered” inadmissible or 
deportable should refer to a decision that an 
immigrant has just made, not to one that 
hypothetically could have been made.  
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The government’s interpretation of the law 
would require immigration judges to decide 
two removal hearings – the one at issue and 
the hypothetical one – which would be 
“irrational and inefficient,” the brief says. 
 
“It is improbable that, buried in a provision 
for computing the time period for continuous 
residency, Congress inserted a requirement 
for immigration judges to effectively restart 
removal proceedings from scratch,” the brief 
says.  
 
The high court previously examined the stop-
time rule in the 2018 case Pereira v. Sessions. 
In that case, the justices ruled that the 
government’s notices to appear in 
immigration court served to immigrants must 
include a hearing’s time and place 
information to be valid under the stop-time 
rule.  
 
According to court filings, Barton entered the 
U.S. on a visitor visa in 1989 as a child and 
became a legal permanent resident three 
years later. In January 1996, he was arrested 
and charged with aggravated assault, 
property damage and possession of a firearm. 
He was convicted of those three offenses later 
that year.  
 
He was later charged and convicted of drug 
offenses under the Georgia Controlled 
Substances Act in 2007 and 2008, prompting 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to 
initiate deportation proceedings against him 
for being convicted of crimes “involving 
more turpitude,” as defined by the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.  
 
Barton then filed an application for a 
cancellation of removal as a permanent 
resident who has resided in the U.S. since 
1989. An immigration judge ruled that 
Barton was not eligible for that relief because 
his continuous residency ended in 1996, 
when he was convicted of crimes that 
rendered him inadmissible and triggered the 
top-time rule. 
 
Barton appealed, but both the appellate board 
and Eleventh Circuit sided with the 
immigration judge’s interpretation of the law.  
 
Conducting a word-by-word analysis, the 
Eleventh Circuit panel applied what is called 
a “’state’-based understanding” of the 
language, noting that words that end in “-
able” and “-ible” indicated an individual’s 
character or status.  
 
Under that interpretation, the panel said in its 
September opinion, essentially, a person does 
not need to act on his or her status in order to 
be rendered that status.  
 
“A terminal illness renders its victim 
untreatable regardless of whether she is 
actively seeking treatment; not renders a 
piece of fish inedible regardless of whether 
someone is trying to eat it; sheer weight 
renders a car immovable regardless of 
whether someone is trying to move it. You 
get the point. So too here – an alien can be 
rendered inadmissible regardless of whether 
he is actually seeking admission,” the opinion 
said.  
 
Represented by attorneys with Jenner & 
Block LLP, Barton then petitioned the 
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Supreme Court in December to weigh in and 
resolve the split, arguing that the Eleventh 
Circuit panel got it wrong, The justices 
agreed to take up the case in April.  
 
Counsel for Barton declined to comment, and 
a Department of Justice spokesperson did not 
return a request for comment Thursday. 
 
Barton is represented by Adam G. 
Unikowsky and Lauren J. Hartz of Jenner & 
Block LLP and H. Glenn Fogle Jr. of The 
Fogle Law LLC.  
 
The government is represented by Solicitor 
General Noel J. Francisco and Joseph H. 
Hunt, Donald E. Keener, John W. Blakeley 
and Timothy G. Hayes of the DOJ.  
 
The case is Andre Martello Barton v. William 









































Nicole Narea  
 
April 22, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed 
to take up a case to determine whether a U.S. 
permanent resident can be “rendered 
inadmissible” under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act even if the individual is not 
seeking admission into the country.  
 
The Eleventh Circuit had found in September 
2018 that Andre Martello Barton, a Jamaican 
citizen could not dodge a deportation order 
through a cancellation of removal — a form 
of relief available to permanent residents who 
have lived continuously in the U.S. for at 
least seven years — because he was rendered 
inadmissible before reaching that seven-year 
mark. Barton had petitioned the high court to 
review the decision in December 2018. 
 
Under the appeals court’s interpretation of 
the INA’s language, which has been rejected 
by the Ninth Circuit but adopted by three 
other circuit courts, Barton — who entered 
the U.S. in May 1989 — became 
inadmissible in January 1996 when he was 
convicted of a crime, cutting off his required 
continuous residence under the so-called 
stop-time rule. 
 
The high court previously examined the stop-
time rule in the 2018 case Pereira v. Sessions. 
In that case, the justices ruled that the 
government’s notices to appear in 
immigration court served to immigrants must 
include a hearing’s time and place 
information to be valid under the stop-time 
rule.  
 
Barton had argued in his petition for a writ of 
certiorari that the case wan an ideal vehicle to 
resolve the circuit split because the lower 
court rulings had “turned entirely on [their] 
interpretation of the stop-time rule.”  
 
Barton also asserted that, under the stop-time 
rule, a noncitizen who has already been 
admitted to the U.S. cannot be later found to 
be inadmissible – only deportable. He 
acknowledged that certain circumstanced 
would require that authorities reevaluate a 
noncitizen’s admission, such as when they 
relinquish their green card, but said that he 
had done no such thing. 
 
“[Barton] was not ‘rendered inadmissible’ by 
his 1996 offense,” his petition for a writ of 
certiorari states. “He had already been 
admitted to the United States and did not need 
to be readmitted … [O]nce the alien has been 
“lawfully admitted,’ he cannot be “rendered 
inadmissible.” 
 
Barton had additionally claimed that the 
appeals court’s interpretation of the stop-time 
rule is “inconsistent with the structure of 
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federal immigration law.” He noted that the 
INA does not discuss the idea of being 
“inadmissible” in contexts outside 
noncitizens seeking admission to the country, 
as the appeals court has done.  
 
According to court filings, Barton entered the 
U.S. on a visitor visa in 1989 as a child and 
because a legal permanent resident three 
years later. In January 1996, he was arrested 
and charged with aggravated assault, 
property damage and possession of a firearm. 
He was convicted of those three offenses later 
that year.  
 
He was later charged and convicted of drug 
offenses under the Georgia Controlled 
Substances Act in 2007 and 2008, prompting 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to 
initiate deportation proceedings against him 
for being convicted of crimes “involving 
moral turpitude,” as defined by the INA. 
 
Barton then filed an application for a 
cancellation of removal as a permanent 
resident who has resided in the U.S. since 
1989. An immigration judge ruled that 
Barton was not eligible for the relief because 
his continuous residency ended in 1996, 
when he was convicted of crimes that 
rendered him inadmissible and triggered the 
stop-time rule.  
 
The BIA rejected his appeal, as did the 
Eleventh Circuit.  
 
Counsel for Barton and a representative for 
the DOJ did not immediately respond to 
requests for comment on Monday.  
 
Barton is represented by H. Glenn Fogle Jr. 
of the Fogle Law Firm LLC and Adam 
Unikowsky and Jonathan Langlinais of 
Jenner & Block LLC.  
 
The government is represented by Solicitor 
General Noel Francisco of the U.S. 
Department of Justice. 
 
The case is Barton v. Barr, case number 18-
725 in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
